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Abstract 
The world faces a plethora of serious challenges. The current SARS-CoV-2 Pandemic, Australian 
bushfires of 2019−2020 and rapid decline in global fish stocks are just a few of numerous recent events 
which highlight the necessity and urgency of a reconceptualization of the relationship between 
economic systems, society and the natural world – and the norms that underpin these relationships. 
While supranational frameworks such as the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals offer a 
viable ‘to do list’ in the direction of this reconceptualization, the willingness of various actors to work 
towards this end is mixed. Central to motivating diverse actors with oft-conflicting interests towards 
a future which is realistic about the carrying capacity of the planet seems to be understanding the role 
of business and markets as both the cause of − but also solution to − many of these interconnected 
wicked problems. Pivotal to this is understanding is gaining clearer insights into how and why 
organizations change their behaviour. This study considers one such mechanism: challenges to 
legitimacy.  
 
The aim of this study was to describe how organizational legitimacy is contested. This was done by 
exploring actor relations in the Swedish shrimp industry and analysing how debates around 
sustainability manifested through to one actor contesting the legitimacy of another. Thirty-five hours 
of interviews were conducted with senior managers from key actors in the Swedish shrimp and 
broader seafood industry between 2016 and 2019, including retailers, fishing companies, eco-label 
and certification schemes, environmental NGOs and seafood consumers.  
 
This study found that contests to legitimacy happen when actors (in this instance, NGOs) adopt the 
role of norm entrepreneur and use a strategy (in this case, shame-based campaigns) to uproot old 
norms and stabilize new ones by contesting the social license to operate (SLO) of corporations, and 
re-establish new ideas of what should constitute legitimacy. This study makes four specific 
contributions to existing literature and practice surrounding sustainability, legitimacy and SLO. 
Firstly, it presents a well-documented case of NGOs launching a successful legitimacy challenge and 
achieving new operating norms within corporations, a specific industry and the broader society of a 
country; norms which have remained in place for almost a decade. This is a rather rare and infrequent 
occurrence in a literature full of examples of NGOs lobbying corporations but often with very limited 
and slowly-progressing success, or success which is short-lived. Secondly, it considers the capture, 
exploration and extrapolation of the ramifications of the unusual and relatively under-documented 
phenomenon of a peculiar response to a legitimacy challenge: corporations ‘hedging’ their own 
internal strategy decisions on the artefacts produced by secondary actors – or in some cases 
outsourcing the strategy decision completely. The third contribution of this study is in showing that 
impacts of shaming against corporations exist on two distinct levels: the immediate impacts, and the 
long-term impacts. This is explored through a detailed and longitudinal example of a shame-based 
campaign in practice – one that was able to, in an efficient and effective manner, uproot an existing 
social norm and replace it with a new one, and translate this through to permanent changes to the 
SLO required for corporations to be considered legitimate. Finally, this study contributes by showing 
the important and presently under-appreciated role played by artefacts such as lists, guides and 
rankings in the establishment of legitimacy and subsequent contests to this legitimacy. 
   
Keywords: legitimacy, contest, actor, social license, seafood, shrimp, sustainability. 
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Prelude 
We’re not a political organization, but we’re using political methods and we try 
to influence politics, but we don’t have a party politics. We have a sort of, we try 
to take the voice of the one who is not at the table when decisions are made. So, 
who gets to decide [what is sustainable]? Well, we would like to get to decide, 
but usually, it’s always a compromise. We always want to get further and then 
have… what society ends up is a bit below what we aim for. We know also that 
10 years later, we usually get where we want. We’re trying to push society 
always to move in that direction, which isn’t the same thing as always being who 
decides.  
A respondent from an NGO (interview recording, 2019) 
 
 
They made a lot of noise in the media. They really, really - I mean more or less 
they just forced us to take away the shrimp. They have a lot of influence. And 
especially when they are doing a campaign. So that could be Greenpeace, 
Naturskyddsforeningen, and WWF. In Sweden now, with this consumer guide, 
they are having a big influence. Sometimes they think it's their role to be like that 
and that's why we definitely want to have their list automatically. Sometimes we 
actually disagree on what [is sustainable] when we have the exact same 
information. 
A respondent from a Swedish retailer (interview recording, 2017) 
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1. Introduction  
1.1 Overview 
Shrimp are an important part of Swedish culture, and one cannot go far in Sweden 
without finding a shrimp sandwich on a menu (räksmörgås), or seeing people partake 
in a shrimp binging session (räkfrossa) at a park or beach. So great is the love of 
shrimp1 in Sweden that each year hundreds of people partake in the annual shrimp 
peeling championship, held in the town of Strömstad. The current record stands at 
22 shrimp peeled in one minute and four seconds. In 2013, the welcome banner at the 
airport of Sweden’s second largest city – Gothenburg – famously proclaimed 
‘Welcome to the town of the shrimp!’ (Otero & Baumann, 2016, p. 3). 
 
Each year, the average Swede eats around of 4.5 kilograms of shrimp (UN FAO, 
2018), with Sweden and the other Scandinavian countries representing the second-
highest shrimp consumption figures in the world, surpassed only by North America. 
While shrimp are much loved in Sweden, they have been the source of much 
controversy due to the perceived and actual social and environmental harms arising 
from their capture and cultivation, and have come to be emblematic of the wider 
sustainability debate.  In the words of the chief executive officer (CEO) of a fishing 
company who was interviewed in this study, “The shrimp has been in Sweden some 
kind of symbol for bad cultivation.” (interview recording, 2017). This controversy 
centred around significant disagreement between actors in the industry in terms of 
what constitutes ‘sustainability’ – and in turn what actions and actors are legitimate 
or illegitimate.  
 
The context for this complexity is exacerbated by the acknowledged understanding 
from previous studies that, while there is indeed best-available science informing 
fishing and aquaculture, “Sustainability, in the context of seafood, is both complex 
and imperfectly measurable… and open to interpretation” (Roheim et al., 2018, p. 
392). This means that getting multiple actors with of-conflicting interests on the same 
page is difficult, because often actors will interpret sustainability in the manner that 
best suits their interests. There is indeed significant “complexity around 
 
1  Throughout this study, the word ‘shrimp’ is used to refer to any species of shrimp or prawn in the 
Dendrobranchiata and Pleocyemata sub-orders, which are commercially fished or farmed in saltwater or 
freshwater. The scope of this study does not consider lobster or larger crayfish in the Decapoda order, which are 
also popular seafood items in Sweden. 
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sustainability issues”, due in-large to the “tensions between different actors” 
(Baumann & Otero, 2016, p. 3). Moreover, sustainability has in some cases become 
synonymous with questions of social licence, legitimacy and even overall right to 
exist.  
  
So far has this controversy gone in Sweden that each year since 2011, a designated 
day (7 April) highlights the social and environmental harms of eating tropical 
shrimp. Known as ‘Anti-Scampi’ Day, this initiative was started by a Swedish non-
governmental organization (NGO) – The Swedish Society for Nature Conservation 
(SSNC), one of several such organizations which have played a prominent role in 
creating awareness of the sustainability issues pertaining to shrimp fishing and 
farming – and in doing so rising to a prominent (and in the opinions of some actors, 
controlling) position in determining the norms of the shrimp industry in Sweden.  
 
The shrimp debate comes at a time when more than a third of the world’s fish and 
shrimp stocks are fished beyond ecological capacity (UN FAO, 2018). Unsustainable 
fishing constitutes one of the 17 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (UN 
SDG): ‘Life Below Water’. A constant challenge in terms of sustainability2 in the 
fishing industry has been the truly global nature of the industry – that is, the fact that 
fishing and aquaculture take place in regions of the world which often have 
significant differences in terms of norms and practices, and legislation and 
enforcement (Gulbrandsen, 2010; Oosterveer & Spaargaren, 2011). Seafood 
production and the associated problems of unsustainable fishing and farming can be 
classified as meeting the criteria of a ‘wicked problem’ (Jentoft & Chuenpagdeeb, 
2009; Rittel & Webber, 1973). The extraction of natural resources at unsustainable 
levels is also a classic tale of self-interest, gradually (and often unintentionally) 
leading to the depletion of the very resource on which they rely: Wijen & Chiroleu-
Assouline (2019, p. 98) assert that “seafood catch and processing” suffers significantly 
from the “tragedy of the commons” problem (Hardin, 1968).  
 
At initial glance, the capture or importation, labelling and sale of shrimp in Sweden 
appears to be a relatively normal value chain, whereby consumer demand and 
 
2 No definition of ‘sustainability’, ‘sustainable’ or other terms of similar usage (such as ‘responsible’) is used in 
this study. This is done intentionally, as under legitimacy theory such terms do not have per se fixed meanings 
but rather alter in occurrence with changing societal norms. This choice is further informed by Roheim et al.’s 
(2018) argument that in the fishing and seafood industry in particular, the definition of ‘sustainability’ and its 
associated usage is often subject to significant differences in interpretation by different actors – despite the 
fact that there is generally agreed upon understanding of what constitutes the best-available science in terms 
of fishing and aquaculture. 
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available supply dictates what is sold. Look beneath the surface, however, and one 
will find that gaining access to the Swedish shrimp industry and maintaining this 
access across time requires making significant concessions and compromises in order 
to gain legitimacy in the eyes of to the dominant actors in the market. This legitimacy 
– or lack thereof – centres around fundamental questions as to what constitutes 
sustainability, what information should be used to make such decisions, and who 
should get to decide this. Despite having access to the same ‘best available science’ 
on shrimp fishing and farming (primarily the International Council for the 
Exploration of the Sea Stock Data Base, and UN FAO State of World Fisheries and 
Aquaculture Report and associated guidelines on best practices of shrimp 
aquaculture) and in general agreeing on the accuracy of this data, many of the actors 
in the Swedish shrimp sector have arrived at and continue to arrive at wildly different 
conclusions as to what is ‘sustainable’ and what is not. This has led to some actors 
(such as NGOs) launching contests to the social licence to operate (SLO) and in turn 
contesting the overall legitimacy of other actors (such as corporations).   
 
These disagreements consider questions such as: 
• What volume of shrimp can be taken from the ocean each year whilst not 
jeopardizing the future survival of a particular stock? 
• What species of shrimp should be consumed and what species should not be? 
• What methods of capture and farming are acceptable? 
• What level of social and environmental harm is tolerable in countries in the 
Global South partaking in shrimp farming?  
• What levels of bycatch are tolerable? 
• What role should guides, rankings and lists have in shaping decisions around 
what is sustainable/unsustainable, and what methodological approaches are 
acceptable and unacceptable in creating the data for these guides?   
• Which certification schemes constitute ‘sustainability’ and which do not? 
• Is there a place for philosophy, world view, opinion and emotion in the 
formulation of an organization’s interpretation of environmental 
sustainability, and if so, what weighting should this be given in comparison 
to the best available science? 
 
This thesis focused on the arrangement of ‘actors’ – defined in this study as a 
participant in an action or process – in the value chain of shrimp production in 
Sweden. Specific consideration was given to the relationship between primary 
producers and distributors and secondary and peripheral industry actors − primarily 
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non-governmental organizations (NGOs) − in the Swedish shrimp industry between 
2008 and 2018, and how information pertaining to shrimp was used by different 
actors in order to shape and support their interpretation of sustainability, and in turn 
contest the interpretations of other actors and challenge their legitimacy. The ecology, 
science and sustainability issues pertaining to the four most commonly available 
shrimp species in Sweden were examined extensively: the Northern Shrimp 
(Pandalus borealis) – a species native to the North Sea and caught in large quantities 
by Swedish fishing companies; the Spencer Gulf King Prawn (Melicertus latisulcatus) 
– a wild caught species from Australia which has become common in Sweden in 
recent years; and, two species of shrimp which are commonly farmed in Asia and 
South America and imported to Sweden for sale in supermarkets and use in 
restaurants – the Whiteleg Shrimp (Litopenaeus vannamei), and the Giant Tiger Shrimp 
(Penaeus monodon) (see Appendix for details of each shrimp).   
 
Analysis of the industry was carried out through an approach loosely inspired by 
‘controversy mapping’ (Otero & Baumann, 2016; Baumann & Otero, 2016; Venturini, 
2010), describing the dynamics between actors in the Swedish shrimp industry in the 
past 11 years, and centring on the key events, such NGOs publishing lists that deem 
certain species of shrimp and methods of capture to be unsustainable. These artefacts, 
including certification schemes, lists, and guides, are analysed in terms of how they 
affect and are affected by contestation as actors attempt to classify and sort things 
out. In turn they create implications for norms − standards or patterns of behaviour 
– within individual organizations, across hierarchal relations within the industry and 
across Swedish society more broadly.  
 
Thirty-five hours of semi-structured interviews were conducted with senior 
managers representing the key actors in the Swedish shrimp industry, including 
primary producers (Swedish fishing companies and seafood importers), distributors 
(retail outlets and restaurants), eco-label and certification schemes, environmental 
NGOs and seafood consumers. Interview transcripts were organized using thematic 
analysis. The interpretation of transcripts was aided by the use of secondary data 
including media content, and annual and sustainability reports of key actors. 
Empirical material was explained with the assistance of theoretical frameworks and 
concepts from a variety of different literatures, including legitimacy and social licence 
to operate (SLO), secondary actor/stakeholder influence on firms, and fisheries and 
seafood sustainability. Specifically, the main theoretical framework utilized in this 
study is legitimacy theory (Guthrie & Parker, 1989; Suchman, 1995; O’Donovan, 
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2002). In terms of the operationalization of a conceptual framework to assist in 
explaining the data, this is achieved by drawing inspiration from four smaller, 
specific conceptual frameworks which fall under the broad umbrella of legitimacy 
theory, in order to create a unique conceptual framework ideal to explore and analyse 
the data.  
 
At this point it is important to clarify the theoretical underpinnings of a number of 
the key terms used in this study. They are as follows: 
 
Legitimacy:   
The generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, 
proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions.  
(Suchman, 1995) 
Social licence to operate (SLO):  
Concerning corporate use of public natural resources, social licence to operate 
considers whether an organization has the on-going acceptance or approval from 
society to do something, or to even to exist.  
 (Adapted from Parsons, Lacey & Moffat, 2014 and Cullen-Knox et al., 2017) 
Contesting: 
The competitive interplay between actors with one another and social norms to achieve 
a desired goal, which may include using tactics such as questioning the legitimacy of 
another actor’s right to peruse a course of action or right to exist.  
(Author designed, inspiration drawn from Ayling, 2017; Black, 2008) 
Hierarchy:  
The order of two or more actors in relation to one another in terms of their status, 
authority or ability to achieve their desired interests ahead of the interests of other 
actor(s). 
(Author designed, inspiration drawn from Fine, 2019) 
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1.2 A brief background to the seafood and fishing industry 
It is becoming increasingly irrelevant to consider the issue of fisheries management 
and associated unsustainable seafood production and consumption on a country-to-
country level, due to the highly global and complex nature of many of these supply 
chains (Iiles 2007; Humphrey et al., 2013; Bailey et al., 2016). How well a country 
manages its own fishery resources can mean little if these countries consume large 
quantities of seafood sourced from other parts of the world (Bailey et al., 2016; 
Roheim et al., 2018). Many highly developed countries, such as Sweden, are net-
importers of seafood (perhaps surprisingly, Sweden imports around 80% of its 
seafood – much of which often comes from countries in the Global South). Thus, in 
recent years the direction of the fisheries management literature has shifted towards 
increasing emphasis on studying seafood within global supply chains. Existing 
literature has acknowledged that that the fragmented and complex nature of seafood 
supply chains creates major difficulties in terms of achieving salience of social and 
environmentally sustainable practices (Mol, 2013).  
Over the past 50 years, forces of globalization have created a situation where supply 
chains of goods typically span multiple countries, with resource extraction, 
production, distribution, sale and consumption often taking place in different 
geographical locations (Meixell & Gargeya, 2005; Baldwin, 2013). Like many food 
products, seafood has been a part of this trend, and there is increasing disconnect and 
complexity involved in getting a seafood product from point of capture/farming to 
the place of end consumption. Increasingly, consumers are becoming ‘detached’ from 
food value chains, and see only the end-result – which in the case of shrimp is a neat 
packet of peeled shrimp in the freezer aisle of the supermarket (Duffy, Fearne & 
Healing, 2005). Kumar and Deepthi (2006, p. 923) note that for anyone other than a 
seasoned fisher, seeing shrimp and other marine creatures flap around in the sorting 
tray gasping for air is a confronting and somewhat emotional experience.  
This disconnect has created a range of social, environmental and economic problems. 
What makes seafood of particular importance compared to other global supply chain 
contexts is twofold: the significance of the industry in terms of its economic 
importance and source of food, and the rapid rate at which fish stocks are in decline 
(Bailey et al., 2016). Daily, fish provides more than 3 billion people with their major 
source of protein. More than 65 million people are directly employed in the primary 
capture and farming of fish, and indirectly, in various capacities along the value 
chain, fisheries and aquaculture assure the livelihoods of an additional 760 million 
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(10–12% of the world’s population). Globally, 33% of wild-caught marine fish and 
invertebrate (including shrimp) stocks are being harvested at biologically 
unsustainable levels. Sixty percent are considered to be ‘fully exploited’, meaning 
that there is no room to increase catch-rates. Just 7% of fisheries are considered to be 
‘underexploited’ (United Nations FAO, 2018). The economic cost of mismanagement 
of global fisheries has been estimated to be in excess of USD $50 billion annually 
(Blomquist, Bartolino & Waldo, 2015; World Bank, 2009). Global per-capita 
consumption of seafood per annum has risen from an average of 9 kilograms in 1960 
to 21 kilograms in 2015. (United Nations FAO, 2018). In 2016, more than half of all 
seafood eaten globally was produced by farming (United Nations FAO, 2018).  While 
fish farming offers some benefits over wild caught fish in terms of sustainability, 
‘aquaculture’ as it is known is no silver bullet, and is fraught with its own unique set 
of social and environmental challenges (Broughton & Walker, 2010).  
A prominent trend in the fishing and seafood industry which started in the 1990s and 
has since become widespread (especially in Northern European markets) has been 
the phenomenon of primary producers adopting voluntary social and environmental 
standards in the form of certification schemes and third-party assurance systems, 
resulting in the generation of so called “eco-labels”. A particular species, location and 
fishing or farming method is assessed by a third-party (such as the Marine 
Stewardship Council), and ongoing compliance to a set of standards plus a financial 
payment to the third-party enables fishing companies to feature these labels on their 
products. Wijen and Chiroleu-Assouline (2019, p. 98) define these self-regulatory 
standards as existing to “certify that products in a variety of sectors… contribute to 
more environmentally “responsible” or “sustainable” business practices”, and note 
that the increasing prominence of these market-based tools has enabled many 
producers to charge a price premium for their product.  
Oosterveer (2010) notes that the development of eco-labels and certification schemes 
for seafood has come about largely due to forces of globalization, which has created 
large physical distances between the places where fish is caught and where it is 
consumed, resulting in the need for a degree of tractability and assurance. The first 
well-known label to appear was the ‘Dolphin Safe Tuna’ logo, which was introduced 
in 1990 to assure consumers that attempts were made to minimize dolphin bycatch 
during the capture of tuna (Oosterveer, 2010, p. 1). Whilst not a seafood eco-label per 
se, the Swedish scheme KRAV was founded in 1985, and features seafood products 
heavily. The Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), now the largest certification 
scheme for wild caught seafood, was launched in 1997. The Aquaculture Stewardship 
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Council (ASC), now the largest scheme for farmed seafood, came into existence in 
2010.  
As well as specific certification schemes, there exist a number of NGO-developed lists 
and guides which make suggestions to consumers as to which seafood should be 
eaten and which should be avoided. These lists assess the overall sustainability of a 
fish or shrimp species, including judgements on methods and locations of capture. 
They tend to constitute judgement of other certification schemes rather than 
providing one themselves. These lists often refer to certifications such as, 
Aquaculture Stewardship Council (ASC), Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) and 
KRAV. In Sweden, the three largest of such of these lists are the World Wide Fund 
for Nature (WWF) Sweden Consumer Fish Guide, and the Greenpeace Red List Fish. 
Another scheme of sorts, which falls between a list and a certification scheme, is the 
Swedish Society for Nature Conservation’s (SSNC’s) Bra Miljöval (Good 
Environmental Choice) label. (See Appendix for coverage of these certification 
schemes and lists, including the methodologies used.)  
It is important at this early stage to clarify that by the time relations between actors 
in an industry take place regarding the nuances of shrimp sustainability issues, much 
has already been pre-defined. It is not the focus nor intent of this study to offer 
coverage pertaining governance, legislative and regulatory aspects of fishing and 
seafood production. As a member of the European Union, Sweden is subject to the 
requirements of the Common Fisheries Policy and other frameworks and legislation. 
At a national level, Sweden also has various laws which govern the commercial and 
recreational capture of fish and shrimp in inland, coastal and deep-sea waters. This 
is managed through Swedish Government policy, which is transcended through to 
public agencies such as the Swedish Agency for Marine and Water Management, one 
of the actors interviewed in this study. This study looks at what is left after all of this 
has happened, and focuses on the territory which is still ’up for grabs’ after legislators 
in both Brussels and Stockholm have dictated their parameters. While it is indeed the 
case that in time social norms achieved through pressure on corporations may 
eventuate into changes in law, the formulation of legislation is beyond the scope of 
this study, which is interested in understanding how actors contest one another’s 
legitimacy on matters pertaining to sustainability. 
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1.3 A brief introduction to shrimp and Sweden 
Shrimp carry with them a significant set of sustainability issues which are prevalent 
in their capture and farming − issues which voices in the fisheries management 
literature have proposed are more severe than those associated with many other 
commonly consumed types of seafood (Boopendranath et al., 2008). Shrimp have 
been said to symbolize much of what is wrong with global fisheries management, 
and the broader relationship of humans with marine life (Folke et al., 1998). Trawling 
for wild shrimp typically involves an unusually high ratio of bycatch (Brewer et al., 
2006). What this means is that for every kilogram of shrimp caught, there will 
typically be between two to eight kilograms of bycatch (non-target species) – a ratio 
considerably higher than for most other species marine life commonly caught by 
humans. The primary species of shrimp caught in Swedish waters – Pandalus borealis 
– do not reach sexual maturity until after two or three years, meaning that 
populations are highly susceptible to overfishing if too many juveniles are caught 
before they have had a chance to reproduce (Wieland, 2004). The farming of shrimp 
around the world is associated with a range of environmental and social problems 
(Galappaththi & Berkes, 2015; Páez-Osuna, 2001), such as: clear cutting of ecologically 
important mangrove forests to make farming pens; instances of usage of banned 
chemicals such endosulfan, which are harmful to human health (Dorts et al., 2009; 
Farzanfar, 2006); contamination of nearby ecosystems from fertilizer runoff; and 
cases of child labour and below-living wages (Lebel et al., 2002). Greenpeace 
International claims that “In Bangladesh alone, there have been an estimated 150 
murders linked to aquaculture disputes (Greenpeace Seafood Red List, 2017, p. 1). 
There is general agreement as to what constitutes the best-available science in terms 
of shrimp capture and farming. Danish-headquartered International Council for the 
Exploration of the Sea (ICES) – the oldest intergovernmental scientific organization 
in the world – is considered to produce the highest quality and most accurate data 
on stock levels of wild caught shrimp. This is used by the European Commission to 
develop Total Allowable Catch figures, which enforce what Swedish fishing boats 
can and cannot do. In terms of the science for farmed shrimp, UN FAO guidelines on 
sustainable shrimp farming including the ‘International Principles for Responsible 
Shrimp Farming’, ‘Best Practices in Shrimp Aquaculture’ and related documents are, 
roughly speaking, held up as the best-available science. 
In Sweden, a highly-developed country of 10 million people with a 2018 GDP per 
capita of USD $54,500, widely varied export and import base, and high levels of 
consumer awareness around social and environmental issues, the past decade has 
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seen extensive change in the seafood industry – especially the sub-category of the 
shrimp sector. The industry was subject to similar trends in seafood ‘fashion’ as most 
other developed nations until 2010, when the Swedish-branch of environmental 
organization Greenpeace International ‘red listed’ all species of farmed tropical 
shrimp, including Litopenaeus vannamei and Penaeus monodon, which represented the 
second and third (respectively) most consumed shrimp globally, and amongst the 
most commonly purchased frozen shrimp in Swedish supermarkets (second only to 
the native Pandalus borealis). With pressure mounting on supermarkets to remove the 
products, the critical change in the sector came through the actions of the SSNC – the 
Naturskyddsforeningen in Swedish – in 2011. This year marked a pivotal year in terms 
of the shrimp debate in Sweden. The SSNC launched a massive campaign against 
farmed tropical shrimp, which had the effect of fundamentally and irreversibly 
changing the landscape of the sector and the hierarchical relationship between actors. 
Having previously been concerned primarily with farmed tropical shrimp, in 2013 
Swedish NGOs began asking questions around the sustainability of wild caught cold-
water shrimp, especially Pandalus borealis caught in the waters off Sweden (especially 
the waters off Gothenburg). In February 2014, the WWF gave Pandalus borealis a red-
light rating on its annual consumer fish guide, the WWF Sweden’s Consumer Fish 
Guide (Fiskguiden – WWF’s Konsumentguide för mer miljövänliga köp av fisk och skaldjur), 
which resulted in significant media coverage and intense debate. In November 2014, 
the IECS increased the Total Allowable Catch, nearly doubling it from 6,000 tonnes 
in 2014 to 10,900 tonnes for 2015 (ICES, 2017). This decision was seen as undermining 
the credibility of the WWFs red-lighting decision, and some actors associated with 
the Swedish shrimp industry began asking questions as to how the WWF and other 
NGOs used scientific data to inform their interpretation and practices of 
sustainability. The events between 2010 and 2013 resulted a situation where, as of 
2020, the prevailing interpretation of sustainability seafood industry in Sweden and 
the sub-sector of the shrimp industry is heavily (or in the opinion of some 
respondents, entirely) shaped by the guides, lists, and eco-labels produced by three 
NGOs: the SSNC, WWF Sweden, and Greenpeace Sweden.  Intertwined with these 
guides has been the rise to prominence of eco-labels and certification schemes such 
as the MSC, ASC and KRAV, which play a prominent role in the Swedish seafood 
industry. Increasingly in Sweden it is becoming rarer to find products which do not 
feature one or more of these labels – especially in the case of shrimp sold in 
supermarkets.  
Recent studies on shrimp in Sweden, such as Otero and Baumann’s (2016) 
‘controversy mapping’ of the ‘red listing’ of the Swedish West Coast Shrimp 
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(Pandalus borealis), suggested that “A large part of the disagreement centres on the 
question of legitimacy in terms of one actor’s call to stop consumption of shrimp from 
a particular stock.” (Otero and Baumann, 2016, p. 56). There are major 
methodological questions at play around the use of science in informing the 
definitions of what constitutes ‘sustainable’, which are operationalized through the 
influential consumer seafood guides and lists produced by environmental NGOs in 
Sweden. 
As well as different interpretations and enactments as to what constitutes 
sustainability in terms of shrimp, there also exist many paradoxes, controversies and 
tensions between actors in the Swedish seafood industry. For example, the case of 
one species of shrimp being ‘red listed’ by the WWF, while simultaneously being 
endorsed so long as it carries an eco-label. This situation created a “… paradoxical 
combination of ecolabel and red light” (Otero and Baumann, 2016, p. 56), which 
resulted in both confusion and strong opinions amongst many actors in the sector. 
Many of the respondents interviewed in this study – especially Swedish fishing 
companies and retail outlets − felt as though environmental NGOs had a 
disproportionally loud and influential voice in the debate, resulting in them needing 
to concede to all demands in order to sell shrimp. These voices also felt that NGOs 
had ignored the science, such as the WWF guide in 2014 deeming Pandalus borealis as 
red listed despite the European Commission increasing the Total Allowable Catch. 
On the other hand, spokespeople for the environmental NGOs, along with seafood 
consumers and several respondents from marine science research institutes felt that 
there was an urgent and pressing need to ensure the long-term survival of shrimp, 
and that this could only be achieved through major changes as to what sustainability 
means and the associated contests to what the social licence for operating in the 
industry should be. 
The shrimp sector in Sweden has undergone radical changes in the past decade – 
changes which have seen the operating parameters of the sector determined 
primarily by the wishes of NGOs. This phenomenon is interesting and worthwhile 
to study as it has implications which extend well beyond the shrimp industry and 
well beyond Sweden, and may serve as an important case study of how control over 
the prevailing interpretation of sustainability in the Swedish shrimp industry was 
essentially taken away from corporations by NGOs launching a sudden and effective 
contest to the social licence to operate, and subsequent legitimacy of the producers 
and sellers of seafood products. This matters because as arguably the dominant 
induction in society, business seems to be the cause of – but also solution to – many 
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of the complex social and environmental challenges facing the planet. As such, it is 
important to gauge a clear understanding of how and why they change behaviour. 
One angle of this which has received limited coverage in existing social science 
literature is understanding how contests to organizational legitimacy happen.  
1.4 Research question 
The aim of this study is to answer the question: How is legitimacy contested?   
This is done by exploring actor relations in the Swedish shrimp industry over an 11-
year period from 2008 to 2018, focusing on debates and controversies surrounding 
the sustainability of shrimp. While coverage is given to all actors in the value chain, 
the primary focus is on NGO-corporation relations.   
1.5 Overview of structure, and notes for reader 
This text is set out in a fairly standard manner. Chapter Two, Theory, starts with a 
summary of key literatures pertaining to the study, including both general literatures 
such as sustainability, as well as more detailed ones – such as NGO influence on 
firms. The second part of Chapter Two describes the theoretical framework and 
conceptual framework used in the study: three concepts based in legitimacy theory. 
Chapter Three outlines the Methodology which was undertaken in the collection and 
analysis of data. The organized empirical material is presented in Chapter Four, 
Results. Chapter Five, How legitimacy is contested, provides analysis and discussion 
of empirical material, with the assistance of the conceptual framework. Chapter Six, 
Conclusion and contributions, concludes the study and proposes some suggestions 
for future research. The Appendix follows, with the Reference list and Index at the 
end of the thesis.  
 
Notes: Should the reader require detailed knowledge on any aspect of specific 
scientific, technical and/or methodological information relating to fishing, seafood, 
or shrimp, their attention is directed to the Appendix of this text, which provides 
coverage of information, namely: the biology of the four species of shrimp, the details 
of the MSC, ASC and KRAV and the methodology underpinning each, and the details 
of each of the lists, guides and ranking schemes produced by the Swedish NGOs and 
the methodology underpinning each. It may be of some interest to the reader to spend 
10 minutes skimming over this information before commencing reading Chapter 4. 
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2. Theory 
2.1 Literature review 
How is organizational legitimacy contested? In order to answer this question, we 
must first acknowledge the voices in the social science literature which have 
previously grappled with aspects of this enquiry, and map out the territory covered 
(and not covered) by these authors. The natural starting place for such a review is the 
sustainability and corporate social responsibility literature, which is of central 
importance to this study for two key reasons: firstly, it is the contextual domain 
around which the shrimp case was focused (that is, debates around what constitutes 
sustainability). Secondly, there is a trend in the literature for increasing crossover, 
overlap and even interchangeability between phrases such as responsible, 
sustainable, legitimate and social licence (Gehman, Lefsrund & Fast, 2017; Deegan, 
2019). Once this is done we must then review the specific literature pertaining to the 
contributions which this study claims to make. 
2.1.1 Sustainability and corporate social responsibility 
The corporate social responsibility (CSR) and sustainability literature (and their 
closely related counterpart, stakeholder theory) have long struggled with ambiguity 
surrounding precise definitions of concepts (Dahlsrud, 2008; Frederick, 1994; Paul, 
2008). Pedersen (2006, p. 139) argues that there has never been and will most likely 
never be a clear definition of CSR or sustainability, and that they will “mean different 
things to different people at different times.” Banerjee (2010) argues that the 
formulation of what constitutes responsible behaviour by an organization is 
intrinsically inseparable from the need of the organization to “advance their 
agendas… and promote their interests” (Banerjee, 2010 in Gond et al., 2016, p. 4).  
 
Much of this definition debate has been conducted at a metaphysical level: that is, 
debating the moral question of what obligations (if any) does the firm owe to groups 
and individuals that affect and are affected by its decision-making processes, and 
who these stakeholders might be (Freeman, 1984; Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997; van 
Marrewijk, 2003).  
 
In terms of legitimacy, firms engage in CSR activities to “compensate for historic 
corporate social irresponsibility or to build goodwill to draw on in the event of 
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corporate negligence, or in other words provide a margin of protection from the 
threat of losing a SLO.” (Cullen-Knox et al., 2017, p. 70).  
 
Levy, Reinecke and Manning (2016) used the context of the global coffee industry to 
show how the “dynamics of moves and accommodations between challengers and 
corporate actors shape the practice and meaning of ‘sustainable’ coffee” (Levy, 
Reinecke & Manning, 2016, p. 364).  In the case of shrimp, there is broad consensus 
that International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) stock data for wild 
caught shrimp, and UN FAO guidelines on sustainable shrimp farming represent the 
‘best available science’ on shrimp fishing and farming, respectively. However, there 
are still considerable challenges in the seafood and fishing sector – including shrimp 
– in terms of sustainability being challenging to define and properly encapsulate – 
even with access to high quality data. Roheim et al., (2018) argue that this is especially 
significant in the case of seafood, noting how “sustainability criteria are imperfectly 
measured” and are “open to interpretation” (Roheim et al., 2018, p. 392). This creates 
challenges in terms of “the ability of NGOs to coordinate the evolution and future of 
the sustainable seafood market” (Roheim et al., 2018, p. 392). 
 
Haward, Jabour and McDonald (2013, p. 25) described the case of the Abel Tasman 
‘Super Trawler’ in Australia in 2012, where the best-available science on fish stocks 
showed that the proposed capture of fish by the vessel was perfectly sustainable in 
the sense that it would not deplete fish stocks below replacement levels, but emotive 
arguments fuelled by photos of dolphin bycatch ‘won’.  
 
Unequal levels of ability to influence between actors have been widely acknowledged 
in the organizational theory literature as being a key determinant of ‘who gets what’ 
in any sort of contestation, both in terms of individuals contesting for themselves, 
and on behalf of another actor (such as a manager contesting on behalf of an 
organization with a manager representing another organization) (Bacharach & 
Lawler, 1981; Kim, Pinkley & Fragale, 2005; Pfeffer, 2010). Baumann and Arvidsson 
(2020, p. 53) describe the "presence of multiple and sometimes conflicting interests 
across actors in a production and consumption system.” 
Kim et al., (2005, p. 799) note that “the greater one’s” own power or influence relative 
to another, the more “resources one should be able to claim.” The significance of 
sustainability and CSR in the organizational theory literature in the past two decades 
has been increasing emphasis placed on how such concepts are defined and the 
underlying processes which determine what exactly is deemed to be ‘sustainable’ or 
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‘responsible’ behaviour (Banerjee, 2010). In order to achieve the level of social and 
environmental responsibility that is required to ensure the longevity and prosperity 
of the seafood industry and global fish stocks, there must be a degree of commonality 
and “consistency of action” between actors in interpreting and practicing 
substantiality (Alvarez, Young & Woolley, 2018, p. 4).  
Another distinct sub-theme of the sustainability and CSR literature – one which 
crosses over into the supply chain management space – is that of sustainable supply 
chain management and associated pressure for firm transparency, and eco-labels, 
certification, tractability and assurance schemes. This literature has become 
especially prominent in the context of an increasingly interconnected and globalized 
world, where the resource extraction manufacturing, sale, and end-consumer use of 
products and services often take place in separate geographical regions − regions 
with often significantly differing levels of economic and social development (Meixell 
& Gargeya, 2005; Baldwin, 2013).  Zyglidopoulos and Fleming (2011) propose that so 
complex and removed have many of these global supply chains become, that it has 
allowed for a situation where the “consequences of MNC actions” (multinational 
corporation) are “not to be traceable back to their original causes” (Zyglidopoulos & 
Fleming, 2011, p. 695, in Egels-Zandén & Hansson, 2016). 
 
Alongside the broader trend of increasing societal pressure on firms leading to higher 
levels of social and environmental responsibility has been the expectation for firms 
to know the finer details of the people and places involved in their supply chains and 
to disclose this information to secondary stakeholders (Doorey, 2011), partake in 
voluntary environmental standards (Vogel, 2008) and to act decisively in cases where 
there are breeches of legal and ethical boundaries (Mol, 2013, p. 154). Mol notes that: 
 
Throughout the years, transparency has matured from a marginal phenomenon, into 
the heart of modern society… the rise of transparency on the public and political 
agendas is not an accident or fad…transparency will remain a key topic in global value 
chains and will further develop as it piggy-backs on wider social developments.  
 
The availability of supply chain information has in part enabled a reduction of the 
gap in information asymmetry between stakeholders and the firm (Martinez and 
Crowther, 2008). The interplay between the benefits of transparency in supply chain 
for both the consumer and the firm was considered in Egels-Zanden and Hansson 
(2016, p. 377), who found “that consumers do not leverage transparency but that 
transparency improves consumer willingness to buy.” Egels-Zanden, Hulthén and 
 
 
16 
Wulff (2015) described how management faces a number of distinct trade-offs when 
trying to create a transparent supply chain, and has to choose between two distinct 
approaches: compliance – where the firm uses the threat of cutting off a supplier from 
their supply chain as a way of making them improve conditions and “treat 
transparency as end in itself” (Egels-Zanden, Hulthén & Wulff, 2015, p. 103), or 
cooperation – where the firm  seeks to “understand the network context of their 
suppliers and to involve suppliers” in creating greater transparency and improving 
social and environmental outcomes (Egels-Zanden, Hulthén & Wulff, 2015, p. 103). 
The highly complex nature of the fishing and seafood industry – especially in terms 
of the gap between sourcing and end-consumption − has created unique challenges 
for the achievement of supply chain transparency within the sector (Bailey, Bush, 
Miller & Kochen, 2016; Denham, Howiesona, Solah & Biswas, 2015).   
 
The rise to prominence of expectations on firms to know where their goods and 
services come from, how the people producing them were treated and paid and the 
environmental impacts of the creation of the product has led to the development of 
numerous eco-labels, certification, tractability and assurance schemes. Olson, Clay 
and da Silva (2015) described how this has especially been the case for food, with 
“consumer movements directed toward food systems” – especially seafood – 
becoming “increasingly prevalent” (Olson, Clay & da Silva, 2015, p. 476).  
 
A trend in managing sustainability in supply chains which started in the 1990s and 
has since become prominent has been the phenomenon of firms adopting voluntary 
social and environmental standards, achieved through the use of certification 
schemes and third-party assurance systems resulting in the generation of so called 
“eco-labels”. Wijen and Chiroleu-Assouline (2019, p. 98) define these self-regulatory 
standards as existing to “certify that products in a variety of sectors, ranging from 
coffee growing to garment manufacturing, contribute to more environmentally 
‘responsible’ or ‘sustainable’ business practices”. The process of certification itself can 
be defined in numerous ways, but a definition in the literature which is emblematic 
of many others is of certification as being “the “(voluntary) assessment and approval 
by an (accredited) party on an (accredited) standard” (Meuwissen et al., 2003, p. 172, 
in Gawron & Theuvsen, 2009). 
 
In the seafood industry, early schemes such as ‘Dolphin Safe Tuna’ – introduced in 
1990 − offered (sometimes dubious) assurance to consumers that dolphin bycatch 
was minimized in the capture of tuna brands featuring that label. Teisl, Roe and Hicks 
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(2001) conducted a case study of Dolphin Safe and “showed how market-based 
evidence that consumers can respond to eco-labels.” (Teisl, Roe & Hicks, 2001, p. 355). 
Such ‘market-based’ approaches, according to Roheim et al., (2018, p. 392) “largely 
resulted from non-governmental organizations’ (NGO) frustration with the 
perceived inability of fisheries regulators globally to mitigate overfishing.” The 
Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) – now the largest certification scheme for wild 
caught seafood – was launched in 1997. The Aquaculture Stewardship Council (ASC) 
– now the largest scheme for farmed seafood – came into existence in 2010 in a 
partnership between the WWF and the Dutch Sustainable Trade Initiative. Extensive 
coverage of the ASC, MSC and other seafood eco-labels and schemes is covered 
throughout this thesis, but briefly here from a literature review perspective it is 
important to touch on the latest trends in the literature regarding these eco-labels.  
 
Recent studies such as Roheim et al., (2018) suggest that “many of the concerns that 
led to the seafood movement remain unresolved, especially in developing countries, 
and are now exacerbated by new climate-related threats to the world’s ocean 
resources.” This paper (and several others like it) suggest that market-based systems 
such as eco-labels in their current form may not be strong enough to bring about the 
necessary level of change needed to ensure the long-term survival of the world’s 
marine and freshwater ecosystems, and that further strengthening of legislation – 
amongst other measures – may be needed to aid market-based solutions such as eco-
labels. Roheim et al., (2018, p. 395) point to a “shift in the roles that extra transactional 
actors, including both NGOs and governments, play in markets demanding credence 
attributes”. However, despite all this, there still is a gap in the literature in terms of 
clear descriptions of the process by which sustainability is debated by actors in an 
industry, and how this process interplays with broader notions of societal norms and 
the granting of legitimacy to the actions of a firm. This is one of several such areas of 
literature which this study builds on and extends.  
 
Fishing and seafood governance and regulation is a complex beast, and as earlier 
mentioned falls outside of the scope of this study. Nonetheless, it is important to 
briefly acknowledge voices such as Kalfagianni and Pattberg (2013), which 
acknowledge the complexity of the undertaking of managing fisheries resources, 
given the cross-border aspects of oceans and competing interests of different actors 
Studies such as Jokikokko and Jutila (2005) suggest that, if implemented correctly and 
appropriately enforced, fishing regulation can have significantly positive impacts on 
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the long-term survival of particular species and particular waterways. This appears 
to be especially the case for regulation targeted at spawning and breeding metrics. 
 
Now that we have given coverage to the broader aspects of the sustainability and 
CSR literature (as well as touching on some aspects of the seafood and fisheries 
literature), we must now consider what has been said already about how contests to 
organizational legitimacy occur.  
 
2.1.2 NGO pressure on corporations  
Within the broader sustainability, CSR and stakeholder literature exists a niche 
category, focusing on secondary stakeholder and actor influence on corporations.  
 
This literature considers four key questions. The first of these, roughly speaking, is: 
What strategies and tactics do NGOs and other secondary stakeholders use to influence 
corporations? van Huijstee and Glasbergen (2010, p. 591) considered how different 
NGO strategies “simultaneously target the same corporation on the same issue” (of 
social/environmental sustainability/responsibility). Their study provided detailed 
descriptions of three previously under-studied dimensions of this question, being 
“the different types of influence of contrasting strategies; the interplay between 
contrasting strategies; and the dynamic relation between firm–stakeholder resource 
dependence relationship and NGO influence strategy.” (Huijstee & Glasbergen, 2010, 
p. 591). Den Hond and De Bakker’s (2007) Institutionalization, Deinstitutionalization 
and Legitimacy, and Typology of Tactics model considered how social and 
environmental activism-oriented NGOs seek to challenge and influence firms, 
finding that “ideological differences among activist groups motivate them to choose 
different influence tactics to motivate their claims”. On the related-yet-broader 
question of stakeholder influence tactics on firms (which includes NGOs but also 
other secondary stakeholders), Frooman (1999) described how stakeholder tactics 
will vary depending on their relationship with the firm in terms of varying levels of 
dependence/interdependence. Following on this was Frooman and Murrell’s (2005) 
study which found that “Both structural and demographic variables can act as 
determinist of strategy choice.” (Frooman & Murrell, 2005, p. 3).  
 
In the context of the fishing and seafood industry, secondary actor pressure typically 
takes the form of environmentally-oriented NGOs achieving to influence the actions 
of primary producers (businesses involved in the capture or farming of fish and 
shrimp) and distributors (usually grocery stores and restaurants), with campaigns 
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being one of the main tactics used (Deighan & Jenkins, 2015). NGOs have been 
especially important in contexts where “management by the state and by the industry 
itself has not been sufficient” (Deighan & Jenkins, 2015, p. 476). NGO-developed lists, 
guides, codes of conduct, rankings, and sustainable fishing-oriented campaigns have 
in the past three decades become a prominent part of the seafood industry globally 
(Roheim, 2009). The earliest NGO-led guide described in the literature is the 
Monterey Bay Aquarium (MBA) Seafood Watch wallet card, and was documented as 
one of the first prominent instances of NGOs creating a sustainability ranking as a 
means of indirectly influencing firm behaviour by attempting to change consumer 
purchasing habits (Roheim et al., 2018). 
  
At a halfway point between the question of strategies and tactics and the broader 
notion of what do firm and NGO relationships look like, papers such as Zietsma and 
Winn (2008) describe the orientation of these relationships in the case of scandals and 
conflicts. Zietsma and Winn (2008, p. 68) found that four approaches were used by 
secondary stakeholders – namely, “issue raising, issue suppressing, positioning, and 
solution seeking.” 
 
The second question of this literature is around the theme of what do NGO and 
corporation relationships look like? It was Vogel (1978) who first formally documented 
in the management and organization literature the influence of NGOs on firms. Since 
then, the literature has grown large, and branched off to focus on specific and 
nuanced details pertaining to the corporation–NGO relationship.  
 
On the question of corporation−NGO relations in terms of CSR and sustainability, 
Kourula and Hamle (2008) suggest that these relations vary considerably in terms of 
their strength and status, ranging from less involved models such as sponsorship 
through to active working partnerships. Holmes and Moir’s (2007) study on the 
possible positive correlation between NGO-firm closeness and firm innovation found 
that this link had perhaps been overstated. Ählström (2010) found that civil society 
organizations (including NGOs) present to the firm a “challenging discourse” around 
particular social and environmental issues, a discourse which ultimately seeks to 
“change the dominant corporate discourse” (Ählström, 2010, p. 70).  
 
Eesley and Lenox (2006) draw on Mitchell, Agle and Wood’s (1997) work on 
stakeholder salience in order to consider firm responses to secondary stakeholder 
actions, concluding that there are inseparable ties in power, legitimacy and urgency 
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between secondary stakeholders and the firm itself and as such these phenomena 
cannot be viewed in isolation and must always be considered in terms of 
relationships. 
  
Recent studies on this question of secondary stakeholder and firm relations, such as 
Sulkowski, Edwards and Freeman (2018), argue that cooperation between secondary 
stakeholders and firms do not have to be zero sum games but can be ‘win-win’ 
scenarios where cooperation can create shared, sustainable value that benefits both 
parties.  Sulkowski, Edwards and Freeman (2018, p. 31) described how a recent trend 
involved firms being proactive and actively seeking out and initiating relations with 
secondary stakeholders, “possibly even starting, propagating, or leveraging 
movements – to affect positive change” leading to “sustainable value.” The notion of 
dialogue and conversation is explored by Burchell and Cook (2013, p. 505), who 
describe how “experiences of dialogue are strategically transforming interactions 
between businesses and NGOs.” Inauen and Schoeneborn (2014) describe how social 
media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook have allowed the firm-NGO 
relationship to take on a new dimension – especially in terms of the speed and 
frequency at which dialogue and debate can occur.   
 
The third major question in the corporation-NGO literature has been around the 
relationship and interplay between social norms, NGOs and firms. Den Hond and 
De Bakker (2007) published one of the early papers which identified that the social 
movement literature and management and organization literature had been quite 
separate in their exploration of similar questions. Overlap and crossovers of these 
two areas was explored in their paper, and King (2008) then offered a social-
movement theory-based model to analyse the interplay between the firm and its 
secondary stakeholders – including the broader public and society. King (2008, p. 23) 
frames social movement theory (SMT) around “the conditions under which collective 
action by outsiders to dominant societal institutions emerge and facilitate access to 
those institutions, allowing outsiders to potentially affect social and political 
change”, and proposes that SMT is necessary in “understanding stakeholder 
collection action and influence”. Brown (2014) considered the NGO/SMT link with 
an exploration of the North Indian state of Punjab – finding that “identity and 
structure are negotiated and constructed” at a midpoint between the wishes of the 
broader public and the NGOs conducting activism on behalf of a specific cause 
(Brown, 2014, p. 66).  
 
 
 
21 
While in the 1970s and 1980s social movement activism was primarily targeted at 
firms and governments on national issues, Finger and Princen (2013) describe how 
the forces of globalization – as well as prominent scandals of the 1990s such as sweat 
shop labour – has led to a situation where NGOs now often peruse larger goals on an 
international level. According to Finger and Princen (2013, p. 62) “This change in 
focus, along with the institutionalization of the green movement, reflects the 
emergence of international environmental NGOs”, who often mobilize public 
support in order to start and progress social movements. Recently, the 
NGO/corporation relations sub-literature has considered the role of social media – 
especially Facebook and Twitter – as important contextual mediums in terms of 
applying pressure to firms to bring about social and environmental changes 
demanded by society and NGOs. Gomez-Carrasco and Michelon (2017, p. 855) 
attempted to quantify this impact in terms of influence on firm stock price, finding 
that “Twitter activism of key stakeholders has a significant impact on investors’ 
decisions”. More broadly, the concept of ‘hashtag activism’ is explored in the context 
of the recent #Metoo movement to show how social media can facilitate large-scale 
and sudden social movements and amplify the voice of the public in order to 
indirectly apply pressure on firms (Xiong, Cho & Boatwright, 2019). The significance 
of the ‘incremental outcomes’ of social movements were described in Gupta (2009), 
who found that small victories or losses by NGOs in a broader social movement – 
while seemingly insignificant – had more significant consequences in terms of 
reshuffling the arrangement of dynamics between actors.   
The fourth and final question − which is worthy of its own section given its centrality 
to this study – is consideration of how NGO activism manifests as a contest to 
legitimacy, and how successful this is at changing behaviours and norms. 
 
The success of NGO contests to corporation legitimacy 
A contest to legitimacy happens when an actor (an individual or organization, either 
internal or external, but usually the latter of each) uses publicly oriented tactics to call 
into question the specific actions of an organization or industry and/or raise questions 
about its right to exist (Waldron, Navis & Fisher, 2013). Contests to legitimacy, 
according to Ayling (2017, p. 351), centre primarily on matters of “perception and 
social constructions”. They usually, according to Waldron, Navis and Fisher (2013, p. 
397), manifest against larger companies, usually seeing NGOs “contesting the 
practices of the more prominent firms in focal industries.” There has been an 
increasing emphasis in the past two decades on understanding how legitimacy is 
both established and contested, given the increasing prominence that private (as 
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opposed to governmental) actors such as NGOs and corporations play in both 
creating, and solving, the various social and environmental challenges facing the 
planet (Bernstein & Cashore, 2007; Cashore, 2002). Recent contributors have noted 
that “There are surprisingly few scholarly accounts that treat the interactions 
between corporations and NGOS as contests over legitimacy” (Ayling, 2017, p. 349), 
suggesting a need to provide compelling empirical material framing NGO pressure 
as contesting of legitimacy. Voices such as Lenox & Eesley (2009) consider how NGOs 
select corporations to target and how these corporations responded.  Their study 
found that the success of NGO campaigns, and in turn their contestation of overall 
firm legitimacy, was varied, and depended on a range of variables around the 
configuration of the size, resources and threat of punishment of both the firm and the 
NGO(s) involved: 
We propose that the more polluting a firm, the greater the operational loss to the firm 
from complying with activist demands, and thus the lower the likelihood the firm 
complies to the activist demand. We propose that the greater a targeted firm’s reserves of 
capital, the greater the ability of the firm to fight activist actions, thus raising the marginal 
cost of the activist of delivering harm, decreasing the likelihood the firm will be targeted, 
and decreasing the harm threatened by the activist. 
Lenox & Eesley (2009, pp. 69-70) 
The majority of the literature covering NGO-corporation interactions seems to show 
“mixed or partial success” in NGOs achieving their goals (Sasser, Prakash, Cashore, 
& Auld, 2006, p. 28), or “incremental outcomes” (Gupta, 2009, p. 417). Some studies, 
such as  Spar & La Mure (2003, p.94 ) have found that while the momentum is perhaps 
shifting, there is still great variation across different domains: 
NGOs are increasingly focussing their powers of persuasion on firms and that firms, in 
turn, have become increasingly responsive. This responsiveness, however, is not 
consistent across either industries or individual firms. 
Ingram, Yue, & Rao (2010) found that activist success against large corporations (in 
their study, stopping Wal-Mart from launching in new cities in the U.S) was 
becoming somewhat more successful in the first decade of the 21st century compared 
to the last of the 20th - especially in cases when large public support was rallied to get 
behind a cause. This finding of the combination of public support with NGO 
campaign efforts was echoed in Tracey et al., (2013). Their study of the ‘Super 
Trawler’ fishing vessel in Australia found that NGOs rallying public sentiment (and 
turning this into potential political harm to the government in office) was the defining 
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factor which lead to the large fishing corporation being denied the social and then 
legal licence to operate in Australia. 
The other angle of approaching this question of ‘how successful are NGO challenges 
against corporations’ is considering the customer-end. Contributions such as Baron 
(2011) find that a corporation is more likely to concede to NGO pressure if it feels that 
consumers may value the credence attributes to which it is making a compromise. 
For example, questions around the social, environmental and ethical matters within 
the supply chain of a product. In the domain of seafood and fishing, Blomquist, 
Bartolino, & Waldo (2015) present evidence that consumers in Sweden are willing to 
pay a price-premium for a product certified with a scheme such as MSC. NGOs in 
the seafood space often spend a considerable portion of their time on pressuring 
corporations to adopt certain certification schemes, or abide by particular lists 
(Roheim et al., 2018), and as such this seems to be an (albeit indirect) way that NGOs 
contest corporation behaviour.  
Other studies, such as Waldron, Navis and Fisher (2013), found that while there are 
indeed examples where NGOs have achieved modest to moderate levels of success 
in their attempts to alter corporation behaviour, there exist great differences between 
how effective campaigning is between corporations, industries and countries. Often, 
lasting and permanent change is rare. Things seems to return to status quo or base 
line levels once the legitimacy challenge has passed or died down (Waldron, Navis 
and Fisher, 2013).  
Black 2008 (p. 144) notes that “Sociological debates on legitimacy ask an empirical 
question: when is an actor regarded as legitimate, and why?”, and as such 
‘answering’ such a question should be done using empirical evidence.  This matters 
because, as arguably the dominant institution in society, business plays an important 
role in both a cause of – and solution to – many of the most serious social and 
environmental challenges facing our planet. Therefore, it is important that we have 
empirical material highlighting cases where organizational behaviour has been 
changed, not just in the immediate term but in the longer term also. There are few 
prominent examples in the literature of instances where pressure has been applied to 
corporations in an industry and has achieved a substantial and lasting change in 
behaviour. This lack of prominent examples is alluded to in studies including Spar & 
La Mure (2003), Sasser et al. (2006), and Lenox & Eesley (2009).  
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Shame-based campaigning 
A specific method of contesting legitimacy is the use of shame-based campaigning, 
which draws on “shared social meaning and on norms about permissible and 
impermissible behavior” (Skeel, 2001, p. 1811), in an attempt to alter the behaviour of 
an organization, or in some cases to push for it to cease to exist.  At the onset, it  is 
important to state that some of what has been written on the topic of shaming in the 
management and organization literature does not use the specific language of 
shaming or shame-based campaigning, but instead implies that shaming was a central 
part of the campaign efforts due to the instigation that the target of the campaign was 
reputation. Waldron, Navis and Fisher (2013, p. 397), for example, describe how most 
research on external actor pressure on firms has focused on the phenomena of how 
these actors “target firms by using publicity oriented tactics to erode those firms' 
reputations, consequently damaging key stakeholder relationships and fiscal 
performance”.  
The concept of ‘politics beyond state’ – that is, looking at political economy 
interactions at a firm rather than state-centric level of analysis (Wapner, 1996) co-
evolved alongside the sustainability and CSR literature, and paved the way for the 
growing popularly of shame as an activism tactic.  
Early studies in the management and organizational literature focusing on shame 
(such as Sasser et al., 2006, and Schurman, 2004) considered the way in which activist 
groups such as NGOs use shame-based tactics against large corporations by targeting 
reputation towards the end of having them change to a more sustainable or 
responsible supplier. While the language of shaming is used in these early papers, 
the emphasis seems to be more on the reputational side, rather than looking directly 
at how and why shaming manifests. Studies looking at shaming specifically seems to 
have come into the corporation-external actor/stakeholder vernacular more recently, 
perhaps alongside the rise to prominence in social media, which has allowed 
shaming to take place at previously unseen speeds and scales (Fine, 2019). Haufler 
(2015, p. 199) found that shaming can indeed lead to change in organizational 
behaviours, but cautioned that “The degree to which shame functions to change 
behavior varies widely across firms and sectors.” The use of ‘name and shame’ tactics 
by secondary stakeholders – especially NGOs − to pressure firms into improving the 
social and environmental aspects of their supply chain is considered in studies such 
as Bartley (2007). Bloomfield (2014, p. 263) considered how market based shaming 
against corporations can be a powerful mechanism in the pursuit of social and 
environmental goals; especially in terms of the role they play in “terms of challenging 
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unwanted industry activities by circumventing the state institutions that facilitate 
their imposition”. 
Taebi and Safari’s (2017) study on the effectiveness and legitimacy of shaming as 
strategy against anthropogenic-induced climate change found that shaming can be 
effective (especially when the corporation operates in a business-to-consumer rather 
than business-to-business or state-to-state domain), but that shaming carries with it 
several “ethical pitfalls”, which have the possibility of existing at the end of both the 
shamer and the shamee (Taebi & Safari, p. 2017). In congruency with the SOL 
literature, the authors propose that shaming often exists in contextual domains 
related to matters pertaining to the natural environment, due to the fact that “most 
people acknowledge that corporations have special obligations when it comes to 
protecting the environment.” (Taebi & Safari, p. 1299, 2017). 
Moreover, the authors claim that there are “prominent examples in the literature, in 
which shaming has influenced corporation’s behavior, in issues associated with CSR 
and environmental management” (Taebi & Safari, 2017, p. 1303) and that the success 
of these examples is driven largely by the involvement (either direct or indirect 
involvement) of the consumer. None of these examples are cited in the paper, and 
while a search of the literature does indeed highlight some anecdotal cases, there 
appear to be no outstanding documented examples in the literature. And of the ones 
that do exist, shaming is merely analysed in terms of its immediate, short-term 
impacts. There appears to be a notably less coverage regarding the longer-term 
impacts of shaming on corporations. Nor does existing shaming literature offer much 
in the way of how shaming shapes the broader arrangement of relations between 
actors in a value chain. This is acknowledged by voices in the literature, with 
statements such as “Future empirical research needs to explore the effectiveness of 
shaming strategies in different business relationships.” (Taebi & Safari, 2017, p. 1303).  
In regards to specific literature on contests to legitimacy which consider shaming, 
there have been several which infer shaming, but no not refer to it explicitly. Black 
(2008) considered the interplay between legitimacy and accountability in polycentric 
regulatory environments. A key finding was the way in which the “institutional 
embeddedness” (Black, 2008, p. 157) within regulatory environments could serve as 
either shield to legitimacy contest or an effective avenue to launch a contest.  Ayling 
(2017) considered legitimacy contests in the energy industry (specifically, fossil fuels) 
and described the complexity of such challenges due to the audiences involved and 
the to and fro between the contester and contested. It is now necessary for us to 
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consider what has been said already about how corporations respond to legitimacy 
contests.  
How do corporations respond to legitimacy contests?  
The effects of such a contest to legitimacy can range on a spectrum, extending from 
being a minor inconvenience which is ignored through to a full-blown crisis which 
threatens the entire existence of a corporation or industry (Black, 2008; Waldron, 
Navis & Fisher, 2013). Corporations respond in a range of ways when contests to 
legitimacy are launched, depending on the configuration of a number of variables 
(Spar & La Mure 2003). These variables include: who is launching the contest and the 
threat level in which the corporation views that actor; transaction costs; the nature of 
the subject matter relating to the legitimacy contest; the size, industry and operating 
environment of the corporation itself; relevant laws and regulation; potential for 
punishment or reward; and, the interests and opinions of the company’s managers 
and owners (Spar & La Mure, 2003; Lenox & Eesley, 2009; Waldron, Navis & Fisher, 
2013). Spar and La Mure (2003) pondered on the question of what accounts for the 
variation in how firms respond to activist pressure?, finding that ‘when the costs of 
compliance are low or the benefits high, firms are more likely to concede [to the 
wishes of NGOs] (Spar & La Mure, 2003, p.95).  
According to Black (2008), the response of the corporation to the contest will depend 
on the nature of the legitimacy challenge in terms of its pragmatic, moral or cognitive 
implications. What is meant by this is how organizations respond to legitimacy 
contests will depend on the nature of who is bringing the challenge, the nature of the 
topic of the debate and how the organization perceives itself. Spar and La Mure (2003, 
p.94) describe the variations in responses in the following terms: 
Some firms respond more vigorously to activist attacks than others; some work with the 
activists, others against them. Part of this variation may be explained by a slight twist on 
standard models of profit maximization: when the costs of compliance are low or the 
benefits high, firms are more likely to concede. 
Under Suchman (1995), the managing of organizational legitimacy roughly speaking 
involves building it, maintaining it and repairing it in the event that it is lost or 
challenged. When a contest to legitimacy does occur, there are three main responses 
according to Black (2008, p. 146), who builds on Suchman’s initial idea: 
… attempting to conform to legitimacy claims that are made on them; they can seek to 
manipulate them; or they can selectively conform to claims from among their 
environments. 
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Lenox & Eesley (2009) framed the particular topic of grievance and its relevance to 
the corporation’s main business activity being an especially important factor in 
determining corporation response to NGO pressure. The closer that the NGO contest 
to a field which may undermine the overall operating viability of the corporation, the 
more strongly it would fight back and the less likely it would be to concede ground 
to NGO pressure (Lenox & Eesley, 2009). This argument has been empirically shown 
in several cases in Australia, such as the mining tax (Bell & Hindmore, 2014) and the 
foreign-owned fishing ‘Super Trawler’ (Tracey et al.,2013).  
Ingram, Yue, & Rao (2010) found that what was of more concern to corporations than 
solely NGO pressure was pressure which tapped into public sentiment and actively 
involved members of the public in campaign efforts. 
Size and visibility also play an important role in determining how a corporation will 
respond to NGO pressure which manifest as a contest to legitimacy (King & Soule  
2007; Lenox & Eesley, 2009; Ingram, Yue, & Rao, 2010). Large, visible targets were 
easier for NGOs and activist groups to identity and target, but harder to influence due 
to the fact that corporations could respond more effectively. Bell & Hindmore (2014) 
considered the response of large corporations in the Australian mining sector to a 
proposed super-profits resource rent tax. They found that the huge size of 
corporations meant that they could respond with massive campaigns against NGOs 
(and even against the Australian Government), and ultimately were successful in 
maintaining the status quo of no tax. Lenox & Eesley’s (2009, p.70) findings are salient 
with the aforementioned points on size: 
Finally, we propose the larger, more visible, and more polluting a firm, the greater the 
incremental utility to the activist of gaining compliance, and thus the greater the 
likelihood the firm will be targeted and the greater the harm threatened by the activist. 
Directly interrelated to the consideration of how a corporation responds to a 
legitimacy challenge is the concept of social license to operate (SLO). Gehman, 
Lefsrund and Fast (2017) propose that the terms ‘legitimacy’ and ’SLO’  have become 
increasingly similar, to the point of interchangeability. For this study, the terms will 
be used closely but also distinctly (see Chapter 1, Introduction for definitions of key 
terms, including SLO). Given the focus of this study on the natural resources sector 
(for example, shrimp), it is assumed that all actors operating in the industry must be 
in possession of an SLO (Cullen-Knox et al., 2017; Kelly, Pecl & Fleming, 2017). 
Therefore, any contest to legitimacy that centres on any social and/or environmental 
aspects of shrimp farming and capture by definition simultaneously calls into 
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question both SLO and legitimacy. To be more precise however, we will work on the 
theoretical assumption in this study that SLO is necessary for legitimacy to exist, and 
if it is revoked then legitimacy is also revoked, which may create an existential crisis 
in terms of the future viability of an organization.  
When legitimacy is contested, corporations in some industries may unite together 
against a perceived common enemy (such as an NGO running a campaign) and 
decide on a collective course of action which responds to the activists claims 
sufficiently to maintain SLO but does not go far enough as to concede to all of their 
wishes.  Sasser et al. (2006) describe an interesting case, where corporations in the 
forestry sector in the United States perceived that the contest by various actors could 
have implications for their standing in the eyes of the broader public (that is, SLO) so 
decided to create their own industry-based standard, rather than adopt the 
certification scheme the activists had been striving for: 
Advocacy has  limited  success  in  modifying  the  behaviour  of  targeted  actors: in  
the  U.S.,  forestry  firms  have  resisted  joining  the  NGO-sponsored   Forest   
Stewardship   Council   (FSC),   preferring   instead   an   industry-sponsored  private  
authority  regime,  the  Sustainable  Forestry  Initiative  (SFI).   
(Sasser et al., 2006, p. 2) 
Such a ‘half-way’ type response seems to be emblematic of how many corporations 
and industries respond to NGO legitimacy and SLO contests: by making a few 
concessions, but ultimately standing their ground.  
In summary, we know that corporations respond to legitimacy contests in a number 
of different ways, based on multiple different variables. What we know less about 
are the specifics and nuances of how and why these responses happen. One  such 
area is consideration as to the role of  artefacts.  
The role of artefacts in legitimacy  
The question of how individuals and organizations alike attempt to classify, 
categorize and ‘sort things out’ is a prominent topic throughout various streams of 
the social science literature. Papers from the legitimacy theory space such as Suchman 
(2003) frame the contract as a social artefact, and touch upon its role in establishing 
legitimacy. Ahmad and Sulaiman (2004) frame environmental disclosures as 
sometimes manifesting as artefacts, especially when the report follows a pre-defined 
format or incorporates an external framework or initiative. More recent contributions 
(such as Niu et al., 2019, and Mendoza & Clemen, 2013) describe the notion of 
 
 
29 
corporations being aware of external actors creating lists and guides which categorize 
them, but fail to consider the implications of this occurrence. There seems to be a need 
to extend the understanding of the role that artefacts play in both establishing and 
contesting organizational legitimacy – especially lists and guides produced by 
external actors. And also the role of ranking systems which use consumer-friendly 
modes of communication such as traffic light colours. 
 
This gap is identified in Bartlett, Pallas and Frostenson’s (2013) appropriately titled 
book chapter ‘Reputation and Legitimacy: Accreditation and Rankings to Assess 
Organizations’. The authors make the case that accreditation and ranking systems 
play an important and presently-under-appreciated role in the establishment of 
legitimacy, given the manner through which they “provide the mechanism for 
comparing organizations and assessing their relative value” (Bartlett, Pallas and 
Frostenson, 2013, p. 530). The authors conclude the chapter by pointing to the need 
for further research in this space, suggesting potential for “interesting and important 
future studies” pertaining to the role that artefacts play in shaping legitimacy “across 
multiple levels of analysis”, stressing that: 
 
Given the emphasis in industry on the importance of reputation, and the claims by the 
public relations industry in particular in regard to reputation management, there are 
significant opportunities for the academic research to further inform this area of 
organizational life. 
(Bartlett, Pallas and Frostenson, 2013, p. 530) 
 
A considerable amount of what has been written about the relationship between 
organizational legitimacy and the use of artefacts comes from the institutional theory 
literature. According to Bartlett et al., this is inevitable given the crossovers and 
closeness between the two approaches. Sauder and Espeland (2009, p. 63) frame the 
use of artefacts as a means of establishing legitimacy as follows: 
 
To secure legitimacy and conform to general expectations, organizations may develop 
symbolic responses to environmental pressures without disrupting core technical 
activities. 
 
One of these “symbolic responses” is the use of artefacts such as lists, guides and 
rankings as a means of signalling reputation, compliance to environmental pressures 
and incorporation of norms in organizational identity and behaviour.  
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What seems to be far less clear in the literature is the role that artefacts play in contests 
to legitimacy, and also what role they might have in affecting the longevity of the 
impacts of a contest.   
The seafood and fishing literature has itself briefly considered the role of artefacts 
affect and are affected by actor interactions within a specific industry – especially the 
recent phenomena of certification schemes which can allow for the charging price 
premium. Sutton (1997, in Roheim et al., 2018, p. 392) frames the overall strategy of 
the so-called global sustainable seafood movement (GSSM) as being based on a 
“theory of change”, which “proposed a demand-driven approach to biological and 
ecological improvements in seafood production systems.” Roheim and Sutinen 
(2006) describes the main approaches of the GSSM as being oriented around creating 
demand for sustainable seafood through the use of certification schemes and seafood 
guides, lists and rankings.  
To conclude, there seems to be a need to better account for the role of artefacts in both 
establishing and contesting organizational legitimacy.  
Now that we have reviewed existing literature surrounding contests to legitimacy, it 
is necessary to outline the conceptual framework that will be most useful for 
analysing the collected empirical material.  
 
 
2.2 Theoretical framework 
This study uses the context of shrimp sustainability in Sweden between 2008 and 
2018 in order to answer the question how is legitimacy contested? The selection of the 
theoretical framework was made on the basis of choosing a coherent and organized 
body of work that would best assist in analysing the collected empirical data in 
relation to this question, and from this seeking to make a theoretical contribution.  
 
The primary theoretical framework used in this study is therefore legitimacy theory 
(Guthrie & Parker, 1989; Suchman, 1995; O’Donovan, 2002). It is used to assist in the 
explanation of the data by both acting as an explanatory force itself, as well as serving 
as a theoretical anchor for the three specific operationalizable concepts which form 
the theoretical framework. Three specific concepts directly associated with and 
congruent to the central foundations of legitimacy theory form the conceptual 
framework of this study: social license, norm entrepreneurs, and shaming. Each has 
been chosen based both on their congruency to the theoretical assumptions of 
legitimacy theory, and usefulness in their ability to explain empirical material (both 
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individually, but also when packaged together). Social license has long been 
established as an operable concept of legitimacy theory (Boutiler & Thomson, 2011), 
one that offers a practical and working framework through which to consider 
whether the actions of an organization fall within the bounds of societal norms. So 
embedded is social license within the literature that recent contributions such as 
Gehman, Lefsrund and Fast (2017) have even suggested that the terms ‘legitimate’ 
and ‘social license’ have now become somewhat synonymous with one another.  
While the idea of a norm entrepreneur has its origins from within the sociology of 
law literature (Sunstein, 1996), applications and offshoots have stemmed to multiple 
disciplines, including management and organization. Within this literature, norm 
entrepreneurship is increasingly being applied to questions around the interplay 
between firm legitimacy, social values and corporate social responsibility – especially 
in terms of how the actions of individuals and organizations can progress and solidify 
a new norm to which firms must conform if they wish to retain their legitimacy 
(Sendlhofer, 2019; Flohr, Rieth & Schwindenhammer, 2010; Sjöström, 2010). The 
literature around shaming has its own unique place. Shame itself stems back to an 
ancient evolutionary biologic mechanism designed to punish oneself or another, and 
was first clearly described (at least in terms of its possible evolutionary role) by 
biologist Charles Darwin (1872). Increasingly, shame has been studied in terms of its 
role as mechanism through which to ask questions around the legitimacy of the 
actions taken or stance conveyed by an organization or individual(s) within the 
organization, and in some cases use shaming tactics as a driver of change (Friman, 
2015). This has become especially prevalent in the period of 2005 – 2020, where rapid 
advancements in technology have meant that shaming of firm practices can take 
place through social media in a highly coordinated, timely manner (Fine, 2019). 
 
Each of these three concepts offers a unique yet coherent lens through which to 
analyse empirical material and draw out novel insights which may enable a new 
theoretical contribution to progress our understanding of legitimacy.  Packaged 
together as a practical, working framework from within legitimacy theory, the 
concepts seem to meet Boxenbaum and Rouleau’s (2011, p. 274) criteria of being wide 
enough to “capture a broad range of empirical situations” but also “precise enough… 
to test propositions and hypothesis”. It is not the aim of this conceptual framework 
(nor any such framework in the management and organization literature) to provide 
a “final and truthful mapping of underlying practices” (Styhre, 2013, p. 40); rather, it 
instead serves to act as a “heuristic for navigating territories” (Styhre, 2013, p. 40). In 
general terms, the framework of this study fits Eisenhart’s (1991, p. 205) 
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interpretation of a theoretical framework as “a structure that guides research by 
relying on a formal theory … constructed by using an established, coherent 
explanation of certain phenomena and relationships”, as well as Grant and Osanloo 
(2014, p. 16) need for a conceptual framework to offer  a “logical structure of 
connected concepts that help provide a picture or visual display of how ideas in a 
study relate to one another within the theoretical framework.” 
 
Legitimacy theory 
Legitimacy theory (Guthrie and Parker, 1989; Suchman, 1995; O’Donovan, 2002) is a 
framework that considers how the behaviours of an organization are judged by 
society, and whether these behaviors are deemed to fall into the realm of what society 
considers acceptable. It works on the basis that an organization must maintain a 
certain level of acceptability in order to maintain relevance and existence, and this 
requires it to be seen to be perceived in the eyes of external actors as “operating in 
conformance with community expectations (Deegan, 2019, p. 2315). Legitimacy is a 
“resource… on which the organization is dependent for survival and is conferred on 
the organization by society” (Deegan, 2019, p. 2315).  
 
Considered by sections of the academy to be an independent theory in its own right 
and by other parts to constitute a part of other theories (such as institutional theory) 
(Parsons, Lacey & Moffat, 2014), legitimacy theory is “based on the idea that in order 
to continue operating successfully, corporations must act within the bounds of what 
society seems as socially acceptable behavior” (O’Donovan, 2002, p. 344). Legitimacy 
theory has distinct connections and crossovers with the CSR and sustainability 
literature, something which recent voices such as Deegan (2019) argue will help 
achieve greater disclosure of social and environmental information.  
 
Parsons, Lacey and Moffat, (2014, p. 84) suggest that at the heart of what constitutes 
legitimacy is the idea: “… that corporations need a license not only from regulators, 
but also from society.” In an instrumental sense the theory considers how legitimacy 
is “… gained, maintained, or lost” (O’Donovan, 2002, p. 344) and strategies that 
management can use to manage this. Suchman (1995, p. 575) notes that “Legitimacy 
[is] an operational resource... that organizations extract – often competitively − from 
their cultural environments and that they employ in pursuit of their goals”. Acting 
in a socially and environmentally responsible manner can “… endow the 
organization with a perceived legitimacy among external observers who may 
otherwise constrain or frustrate organizational activities” (Parsons, Lacey & Moffat, 
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2014, p. 84). In a normative sense, legitimacy theory deals with many of the same 
philosophical questions of the sustainability and CSR literature, such as to whom 
does the corporation owe obligations, and what are those obligations. Amongst the 
most commonly cited interpretations of legitimacy is Suchman’s (1995, p. 574) 
definition: 
 
 a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, 
proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions. 
 
Suchman (1995) describes three main forms of legitimacy. Moral legitimacy, as the 
name suggests, is generated when organizational goals are “seen as morally 
appropriate” (Black, 2008, in Ayling, 2017, p. 352). Pragmatic legitimacy deals with 
questions around the “instrumental value” of the organization to stakeholders 
(Ayling, 2017, p. 352). Cognitive legitimacy is about situations where there is a 
“taken-for-grantedness” or degree of inevitability about the existence of an 
organization due to it engaging in an activity which is socially useful (Suchman, 1995, 
p. 575).   
 
Legitimacy theory has its roots in the idea of organizational legitimacy (Maurer, 1971; 
Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Weber, 1978). Dowling and Pfeffer (1975, p. 122) proposed 
that organizations will seek to “… establish congruence” between their activities and 
those of “… the larger social system of which they are a part”. According to Dowling 
and Pfeffer (1975, p. 122) “… an organization’s legitimacy is threatened when there 
exists between the entity and its social system “a disparity, actual or potential.” 
Dowling and Pfeffer (1975, p. 125) argue that “Since organizational survival is 
enhanced by legitimacy, legitimacy can be viewed as a resource which a given focal 
organization attempts to obtain and which, occasionally, competing organizations 
may attempt to deny.” Closely connected to legitimacy theory is the concept of 
resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Resource dependence theory 
considers how “organizations are controlled by an external source to the extent they 
depend on that source for a large proportion of input or output” (Pfeffer & Salanick, 
1978, p. 271). While not directly utilized in this in this study, resource dependence 
theory is a framework which is used indirectly to inform the overall framing of 
legitimacy theory as it is used in this study. 
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Both Gray (2002) and O’Donovan (2002) suggest that legitimacy theory is similar to 
and has significant overlaps with both stakeholder theory and accountability theory, 
as all three pose similar questions around the corporation, the groups and individuals 
who it affects and is affected by, and the notion of a social contract between the two, 
as well as what information should be reported (O’Donovan, 2002, p. 345). 
Beddewela and Fairbrass (2016) argue that the increasing trend for organizations to 
report CSR-related metrics has come about in response to changing societal norms to 
which organizations must conform in order to appear legitimate in the eyes of its 
stakeholders (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; O’Donovan, 2002). In terms of CSR, recent 
applications of legitimacy theory have been in terms of seeking to understand how 
“the power attached to CSR activities is derived from the political legitimacy 
granted” to organizations within specific institutional contexts (Moon et al., 2010 in 
Gond & Nyberg, 2017, p. 1132). Recent contributions, such as Ayling’s (2017) study 
of the divestment movement against the fossil fuel industry in Australia, frame 
legitimacy as being ‘contestable’.  
 
As a process, legitimation of an organization overall or of its specific behaviour in a 
particular instance occurs when an organization “justifies to a peer or subordinate 
system its right to exist.” (Maurer, 1971, p. 361 in Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975, p. 123). In 
terms of assessing whether an organization has legitimacy, the simplest of ways is to 
see the willingness of people to engage with that company. This may be an employee 
working for an organization, an investor buying shares, a company buying a product 
or an NGO forming a partnership. An organization can be said to have a high degree 
of legitimacy when it possesses “largely unquestioned freedom to peruse its 
activities.” An organization can be said to have a low level of legitimacy when it its 
activities face a high degree of scrutiny from its stakeholders and society-at-large. 
The legitimacy theory literature has come to fruition over a 40-year period which has, 
amongst other things, been characterized by a massive increase in the role of NGOs 
in holding companies to account, a phenomenon first recognized by Vogel (1978). 
Despite this, there have been “surprisingly few scholarly accounts” in the literature 
dealing with firm-NGO interactions in terms of being framed around legitimacy. 
  
The legitimacy (or lack thereof) of an organization cannot be seen in isolation; rather, 
it can only be examined within the context of a particular set of societal norms and 
values (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975, p. 124). Since legitimacy is an intangible, fluid 
social contract as opposed to a somewhat static regulatory framework, organizations 
must learn how to effectively manage perceptions of their legitimacy so as to stay 
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relevant to the societal norms in which they operate. It is about a fit between an 
organization’s own values, and the values of the society in which it operates. 
 
 
Norm entrepreneurs 
‘Norm entrepreneur’ was first coined by Sunstein (1996, p. 909), who defined the 
concept as being about “people being interested in changing social norms”. 
Sunstein’s concept is built on the assumption that “existing social conditions are often 
more fragile than might be supposed”, and describes how the actions of norm 
entrepreneurs (who can either be individuals or groups of individuals – that is, 
organizations) can lead to three outcomes. The first outcome is that an attempt to 
change the norm can fail and the remaining norms will stay in place. The second 
outcome is what Sunstein calls ‘norm bandwagons’, where efforts by one or more 
actors lead to initially small shifts, which grow increasingly larger as more people 
pile on the bandwagon. This may eventually lead to a ‘norm cascade’, which is 
characterized by “rapid shifts in norms” (Sunstein, 1996, p. 909). Once a new norm is 
in place, it is possible that legal frameworks and regulation will be altered 
accordingly. As applied to debates around the legitimacy, sustainability and/or social 
responsibility of the actions of organizations, recent contributions such as Sendlhofer 
(2019, p. 1), and Sjöström (2010, p. 177) have framed the term as being about actors 
seeking to shape new norms and standards of “appropriateness”, while 
simultaneously “persuading” others to join the movement. Becker’s (1963) notion of 
the ‘moral entrepreneur’ has many distinct crossovers to norm entrepreneur, and the 
terms are often used interchangeably. For example, Felner’s (2012) study of human 
rights NGOs uses the term ‘moral’ instead of ‘norm’, yet still follows the basic 
principles of Sunstein’s framework. Fine (1996, p. 1159) describes the term 
‘reputational entrepreneurship’, a related yet different concept which considers 
actors who “attempt to control the memory of historical figures through motivation, 
narrative facility and institutional placement.” This concept could indeed be useful 
in explaining empirical material relating to how external actors could attempt to alter 
reputational perceptions of a firm in order to bring about their desired change, but 
perhaps deviates too far into the ‘history wars’ debate to be relevant for this 
component of the conceptual framework.  
 
Norm entrepreneurs has been chosen as a conceptual tool to form part of the 
theoretical framework due to its usefulness in explaining how and why social norms 
come to be and change and dissolve over time – especially in terms of the interplay 
between firms, consumers, and civil society organizations. This is congruent with 
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recent studies which have applied the norm entrepreneur concept to matters of 
corporate social responsibility and framed the term as being about any actor who 
seeks to “influence corporate behaviour” (Sjöström, 2010, p. 170). 
The assumption made in Sunstein (1996) about the fragility of social norms is a central 
tenant of legitimacy theory: that what constitutes legitimate behaviour by a firm can 
change dramatically across the space-time continuum and is not in any way shape or 
form fixed, and as such organizations are subject to situations where the legitimacy 
of one of their actions may be contested, or in some cases their entire existence may 
be contested. This is becoming especially true in the context of rapid technological 
change, which is allowing public debates around social and environmental issues to 
take place through social media at speeds with which many organizations are unable 
to keep up. In Sweden, for example, many smaller fishing and seafood firms which 
not only closely abide by all relevant national and supra-national laws (as well as 
enact voluntary standards) have had their legitimacy to operate contested by NGOs, 
who have played the role of norm entrepreneurs by shifting the norms of what 
constitutes ‘sustainable’ shrimp.  
 
As such, this concept will prove useful for explaining empirical material where 
respondents from NGOs openly question the legitimacy of seafood producers and 
retailers (and vice versa). It is a particularly good fit for a study based in Sweden, due 
to previous literature such as Ingebritsen (2002), which have classified the 
Scandinavian countries themselves as being norm entrepreneurs. The usefulness of 
the concept will be further enhanced by its synergistic relationship with social license. 
Early literature in social license, such as O’Donovan (2002), seeks to ask questions 
around the congruence between corporate activities and society’s expectations of said 
activities. The proactive identification by firms of either actual or striving-to-be norm 
entrepreneurs can add to the social license model by allowing for a degree of 
strategizing so as to map out what the norm shifts might be and plan a response.    
 
Moreover, the concept of the norm entrepreneur applied to empirical material which 
features one of the very early (and effective) large scale social media campaigns (that 
is, the 2011 Anti-Scampi campaign) may allow for the formulation of a greater 
understanding regarding the contesting of legitimacy through virtual mediums.  
 
Shaming 
The concept of shame (and associated usages such as shaming) has been considered 
notoriously difficult to define precisely due to the large number of contextual 
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domains in which it is used (Friman, 2015; Peters et al., 2014). The American 
Psychological Association defines shame as “a highly unpleasant self-conscious 
emotion arising from the sense of there being something dishonourable, immodest, 
or indecorous in one’s own conduct or circumstances.” (APA, 2019). In the 
management and organization literature, shame has typically been studied in terms 
of its role a tactic through which one actor tries to influence the behaviour of another 
by tarnishing their reputation in order to progress towards a strategic goal (Friman, 
2015). When used against an organization, shame can be employed to target 
individual people or groups of people associated with the organization (such as a 
specific manager, owners/shareholders, board directors and so forth), or in many 
cases the shaming can be less-specific and target the entire organization itself, or even 
an entire industry or sector (Skeel, 2001).  Shaming of organizations typically features 
several key characteristics: “elicit moral disapproval… drawing on shared social 
meaning and on norms about permissible and impermissible behavior” (Skeel 2001, 
p. 1811); “change industry practices by targeting the reputational value of individual 
firms (Bloomfield, 2014, p. 263); “draws on soft law… aims to institutionalize a social 
norm without exerting legally-binding force” (Taebi & Safari, 2017, p. 1296). Fine 
(2019) notes that the literature on shame blurs with and is to a degree inseparable 
with that on scandals, reputation, status, moral hazards, callout-culture, lobbyism, 
and moral panic.  
 
Shaming can be done by anyone, against anyone, and through a variety of different 
mediums, but typically has a degree of coordination to it. While there is no ‘typical’ 
shaming situation, one of the most commonly documented cases seems to be an NGO 
with social or environmental goals employing shame against a large for-profit 
business (Kaprus, 2018). The shaming can be in regards to a specific decision taken 
by an organization, or in some cases the shaming can be used to question the very 
legitimacy of the organization’s right to exist (Friman, 2015). The overall effectiveness 
of shaming as a tactic is unclear, with many examples of success as well as many 
cases of failure. Haufler (2015, p. 199) notes that “The degree to which shame 
functions to change behaviour varies widely across firms and sectors.” Shaming has 
been argued to have a very low cost to the party instigating the shame (Skeel, 2001), 
thus improving its attractiveness as a tool for bringing about change. 
 
The period of 2005 to 2020 saw shaming tactics, which were traditionally done using 
television, radio and print media, employed via a new medium: social media. 
Technologies such as Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, Instagram, and YouTube allow 
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for shaming to take place at unprecedented speeds, with national boarders posing no 
barriers (Kaprus, 2018). Hashtag activism, clicktivism and similar terms describe a 
phenomenon where armchair critics can join a campaign simply by pressing the 
‘Like’ button. According to Kaprus (2018, p. 125), social media technologies can be 
“powerful in the hands of environmental organizations that know how to utilize 
them properly”. While a structured and coordinated shaming-based campaign 
against a company is often started by an NGO, it usually achieves its intended 
purpose due to large numbers of individuals (many of whom may have had no 
previous involvement with the NGO) joining the movement. This is often necessary 
due to the fact that there often exists a “discrepancy between the resources available 
to environmental activists and the scope of their ambitions” (Bloomfield, 2014, p.  
263). 
 
The first way that shaming is used in this study is in terms of assisting in the 
explanation of empirical material relating to the use of tactics by NGOs on 
consumers, producers and retailers.  Viewing data through the concept of shaming 
allows for the identification of shaming practice, and subsequent analysis of the 
potential role that shame plays as a medium for contesting legitimacy. Specifically, 
shaming will be used to view the contesting of legitimacy between actors in the 
Swedish shrimp industry at pivotal moments of controversy where the legitimacy of 
several actors and actions are called into question. Focus will be on understanding 
the possible role of shame in destabilizing and/or revoking the legitimacy of an actor, 
as well as consideration of what role shame plays in solidifying new norms and 
shaping the arrangement of actor dynamics post-controversy.  
 
The second use of the concept of shaming in this study is pertaining to empirical 
material which refers to artefacts and objects – primarily lists, guides and certification 
schemes, and ask questions around who has the legitimacy to decide such lists and 
to use shaming to enforce them. The significant interplay between artefacts and 
shame is brought about due to the extent to which lists and guides project reputation. 
Reputation, proposes Fine (2019, p. 248), often takes the “form of a ranking, list, or 
hierarchy that permits the human desire for evaluative comparisons.”  Suchman, 
whose 1995 definition of legitimacy theory is usually cited as being the ‘first’, 
described in his 2003 paper how social artefacts such as contracts are vital aspects of 
achieving and maintaining legitimacy. In the seafood industry, it is becoming 
increasingly common for all producers and retailers to pass through several opinion 
corridors, or bottlenecks, in the form of artefacts. In the case of Sweden, this usually 
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takes the form of seafood producers firstly being socially (but not legally) obligated 
to go through a third-party certification assessment to have their seafood legitimized 
(MSC, ASC and KRAV are the main such schemes in Sweden). Following this, a 
second obligatory passage point must be passed through: meeting the acceptance of 
the NGO-produced guides and lists. These artefacts have considerable power over 
both producers and sellers of seafood. They have been deemed obligatory because in 
most cases in Sweden, having anything less than a ‘Green’ rating means not only a 
loss of access to sell ones product in a retail store, but shaming through orange and 
red ratings. Louche, Gond and Ventresca (2005, p. 148) note that “Little is known 
about the processes through which they (CSOs/NGOs) have acquired their 
legitimacy, that is, their ‘right-to-rate’ corporations.” Thus, it seems a worthwhile 
pursuit to use the concept of shaming to assist in explaining empirical material 
related to artefacts, and in doing so possibly seek new and novel insights into the 
relationship between third-party shaming and firm legitimacy. 
 
Social license to operate 
Perhaps the most prominent and operationalizable conceptual framework to emerge 
from the realm of legitimacy theory is that of social license, or social license to operate 
(SLO) (Boutiler & Thomson, 2011; Joyce & Thomson, 2000; Parker et al., 2008;) as it is 
sometimes referred to. ‘Social license’ essentially refers to whether an organization 
has “… on-going acceptance or approval” (Parsons, Lacey & Moffat, 2014, p. 84) from 
society to do something, or even to exist. It is the idea that corporations need a license 
not only from regulators, but also from “… society and local communities, and this 
‘license’ can be gained by “fitting in and adapting to the prevailing social norms” 
(Parsons, Lacey and Moffat, 2014, p. 84).  What makes social licence unique is that it 
is “usually concerning corporate use of public natural resources” (Cullen-Knox et al., 
2017, p. 70). O’Donovan (2002, p. 347) describes how there must be “congruence 
between corporate activity and society expectations of the corporation … based on 
social values and norms” for social license to be present. For management, “the 
significance of a social license may derive from the capacity of stakeholders to impose 
costs on companies.” (Parsons, Lacey & Moffat, 2014, p. 84). The legitimacy of an 
organization and its possession or non-possession of a social license can often come 
to a head and manifest quite suddenly around a particular issue or situation. 
 
An actor having SLO is based not on them fulfilling legal requirements (this is 
assumed in most cases). Rather, it is based upon the degree to which an organization 
and its activities meet the expectations of local communities and society at large. The 
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SLO literature proposes that it is “generally understood that to gain a SLO a 
corporation engages in voluntary activities beyond what is legally required”. 
(Cullen-Knox et al., 2017, p. 70). While an organization may commence an activity 
that is perfectly legal in a regulatory sense, the activity may fail as it is unable to 
gather the necessary support from its stakeholders, such as funding from banks, or 
sales from customers. Or it may face such a high level of opposition from the public 
or NGOs that proceeding with the activity would be extremely detrimental to its 
reputation, or the company’s very existence would be unprofitable and 
reputationally harmful to those who worked in it. These stakeholders can be said to 
have imposed a cost on the company for failing to have the necessary social license. 
Parsons, Lacey and Moffat (2014, p. 84) note that the concept of social license “… 
encapsulates notions such as demands and expectations, legitimacy, credibility… 
and informed consent. Perhaps most fundamentally… it suggests that stakeholders 
many threaten a company’s legitimacy to operate through boycotts, picketing, or 
legal challenges” The social license differs from its counterpart in laws and 
regulations. The social license is “… intangible and unwritten, and cannot be granted 
by any formal civil, political or legal authorities.” Much like the very idea of power, 
a social license (or lack thereof) can be hard to define, but easy to see. 
 
Haward, Jabour and McDonald (2013) carried out the first major study to apply the 
conceptual framework of social license specifically to actor-relations within the 
fishing industry. Their study explored the case of a foreign-owned fishing company 
which sought permission to conduct fishing operations in Australian waters. The 
Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA), an independent Federal body 
which assesses the sustainability of fish stocks and methods, initially granted 
permission for the vessel to trawl for small pelagic fish. However, a number of 
environmental NGOs, including Greenpeace and the WWF, deemed that the ‘factory 
trawler’ vessel would be catching fish at unsustainable levels, as well as with 
unacceptably high levels of dolphin bycatch. A large ‘Stop the Supertrawler’ 
campaign was run by the NGOs, which quickly gained massive public support. The 
government, soon facing an election, realized that the issue was going to be politically 
costly, so intervened and passed legislation to overturn the decision made by AFMA. 
The company was banned from fishing in Australian waters. Haward, Jabour and 
McDonald (2013) illustrated that while Able Tasman had legal backing to conduct its 
operations, it did not have the necessary legitimacy in the eyes of the environmental 
NGOs and the public, meaning that it lacked a ‘social license’. 
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Recent studies of social license applied to the fishing and seafood industry have 
considered questions such as the role of environmental NGOs using SOL as a 
mechanism through which to achieve “governance via persuasion” (Murphy-
Gregory, 2018); social license as applied to marine ecosystem management (Kelly, 
Pecl & Fleming, 2017); and the role of social license in achieving marine governance 
(Cullen-Knox et al., 2017).  
 
Using social license carries with it several implications. Firstly, it goes somewhat 
against the grain of the fisheries management literature, which has traditionally 
argued that regulation and legal frameworks are the key to achieving sustainable 
levels and methods of fishing and associated seafood consumption. Although this 
has changed in recent years, driven mainly by the success of market-based solutions 
such as labelling schemes, the literature is still of the perspective that the 
development and enforcement of legislation is the primary solution to effective 
fisheries management. Social license as a concept claims that a social license may in 
fact be a “… prerequisite for a legal license” (Parsons, Lacey and Moffat, 2014, p. 84). 
Secondly, social license works on the tacit assumption that organizations partaking 
in sustainability and CSR activities are driven by self-interest and the need to survive, 
rather than some sort of higher altruism. The final major theoretical implication of 
using the concept of social license is that the corporation no longer has the same 
degree of dominance as it once did, and is arguably at the mercy of external 
stakeholders more so than any point in history. Parsons, Lacey and Moffat (2014, p. 
8) suggest that the concept of social license, along with associated concepts such as 
CSR and sustainability have in the past 30 years “shifted the balance of decision-
making power from corporations to stakeholders”. Haward, Jabour and McDonald 
(2013, p. 25) note that this is particularly prominent for the case of fisheries 
management, as illustrated in the case of the 2012 super trawler dilemma in Australia: 
 
The Abel Tasman controversy highlighted the emerging role of social license in decision 
making: the political storm that engulfed the fishers, scientists, decision makers and 
their management… may well foreshadow increased public scrutiny of Australian 
fisheries. 
 
After understanding the theoretical implications of using social license in this study, 
it is necessary to consider how the concept will be operationalized – that is, how it 
will actually be used to help answer the central research question of the thesis. Firstly, 
social license will be drawn upon in order to derive what are some of the social values 
within Swedish society to which an organization must conform in order to gain 
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legitimacy. Since the possession of a social license depends on “… alignment between 
an organization’s values... and wider social-cultural values” (Parsons, Lacey & 
Moffat, 2014, p. 85), determining whether an organization possesses a social license 
requires analysis of what are the deeper, tacit espoused values within Swedish 
society, both in a broad sense but also in a narrow sense in relation to the natural 
environment, fishing, and seafood. It will allow the ascertaining of what are the 
societal norms and values in Sweden in relation to fishing and seafood that a player 
in the industry must conform to in order to gain a social license, how these have 
changed over time, and how recent pivotal events driven by NGOs such as the Anti-
Scampi campaign might have shifted these values. 
  
Secondly, social license will be used to attempt to understand relations between 
actors in the Swedish shrimp industry, both in a general sense but also in the context 
of two specific events which called into question the social license of actors in the 
industry. Parsons, Lacey and Moffat (2014, p. 83) argue that the new-found 
requirement for an organization to hold a social license “… represents a shift in 
power relations”. In a similar way to Haward, Jabour and McDonald’s (2013) study 
of actors negotiating in the Australian fishing industry, social license will be used in 
this study in order to attempt to make sense of how controversies around shrimp 
sustainability lead to major changes in the legitimacy hierarchy of the seafood 
industry. Finally, SLO can be used to analyse another critical part of the research 
question: how actors arrive at their interpretation as to what constitutes 
‘sustainability’ in terms of shrimp capture and farming, and translate that through to 
a judgement of the overall legitimacy of another actor. SLO will be used to consider 
the way that actors use information and translate this through to decisions about 
sustainability, and the idea that while a decision may be environmentally sustainable 
from a scientific sense, it can still be banned because of social license issues. This is a 
critical element of the study, as actors in the industry work off essentially the same 
information, yet many have arrived at widely different conclusions as to what is 
sustainable and what is not. SLO can be used to explain why it is that some industries 
have a much greater need for a social license compared to others (such as the case of 
mining which is pointed to in Parsons, Lacey and Moffat, 2014). Upon analysis of 
results, we could use social license to hypothesize claims such as that the more 
‘emotive’ the industry, the greater the need for a social license, as emotion and 
politics can overpower logic and science. This also has distinct crossovers to the 
concept of shame. Signs of this have already been seen in studies such as Haward, 
Jabour and McDonald (2013, p. 25), where the science showed that the capture of fish 
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was perfectly sustainable in the sense that it would not deplete fish stocks below 
replacement levels, but emotive arguments fuelled by photos of dolphin bycatch 
‘won’: 
 
In addition to foreshadowing a broadening base of stakeholder interests in Australian 
fisheries, the debate over the Abel Tasman challenged the current science-based input 
into decision making. While the Australian partnership model of management is well 
regarded internationally, the controversy over the SPF revealed limitations in this 
approach. On the one hand the sequence of events could be seen as a classic science-
policy gap, with science being found wanting in an environment conducive to political 
pressure. Alternatively, it could be argued as a classic case of democracy at work: the 
power of the public voice to articulate concern over the direction of public policy, albeit 
within a particular political climate and with political actors receptive to such concerns. 
 
To summarize, three specific concepts directly associated with and congruent to the 
central foundations of legitimacy theory form the conceptual framework of this 
study: social license, norm entrepreneurs, and shaming. Each has been chosen based 
both on their congruency to the theoretical assumptions of legitimacy theory, 
usefulness in their ability to explain empirical material (both individually, but also 
when packaged together). They have also been chosen on their assistance in 
addressing gaps in previous literature around how contests to organizational 
legitimacy happen, how organizations respond to these contests, and the role of 
artefacts. 
Now that the literature has been reviewed and chosen conceptual framework 
explained, we must outline the methodological steps involved in conducting the 
study. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1 Overview 
An inductive qualitative approach utilizing semi-structured interviews with key 
personnel from major actors in the Swedish seafood industry and associated shrimp 
sector was the major source of data collection in this study. Interview transcripts, 
along with secondary data including media content, annual and sustainability 
reports of key actors and shrimp product information were coded, organized and 
thematised under an inductive thematic analysis approach, loosely following the six 
steps of thematic analysis described in Braun and Clarke (2006). Key themes and sub-
themes were extracted from the empirical data and explored drawing on five 
theoretical concepts under the broader umbrella of legitimacy theory in order to 
attempt to ‘answer’ the focal research question of the study. Analysis of the Swedish 
seafood industry and shrimp sector was carried out through a hybrid approach 
combining a case study approach with ‘controversy mapping’ (Otero & Baumann, 
2016; Venturini, 2010) in order to describe the dynamics and hierarchical 
arrangement between actors in the Swedish shrimp industry in the past 11 years – 
centring on the key events, such NGOs publishing lists that deem certain species of 
shrimp and methods of capture to be unsustainable.  
 
The methodological approach of this study was oriented around the need to find the 
most effective way of studying the process of how ‘what constitutes sustainability’ is 
determined between actors in an industry and what information is used to inform 
this interpretation (and why this information is used), and then how these 
interpretations subsequently lead through to contests to social licence and legitimacy. 
An inductive approach, which allowed for the study’s design to be driven and 
changed by the ongoing findings of the data – where minimal preconceived notions 
or categories are used, best took the form of semi-structured interviews coupled 
together with thematic analysis. A key focus was on how actors in a particular 
domain make use of scientific information (secondary material such as scientific 
reports), in terms of translating information into a broad interpretation and then into 
practical decisions, and the extent to which conformity to the wishes of prominent 
actors in the industry shaped these decisions. The ecology, science and sustainability 
issues pertaining to the four most commonly available shrimp species in Sweden 
were extensively examined from multiple perspectives – including tracing the 
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journey of the shrimp from farm/boat to the end-consumer, and mapping out the 
actors implicated in this journey and seeking to describe how their interpretation of 
sustainability affected and was affected by the shrimp. This included methodological 
approaches such as observing consumers in the freezer aisle of supermarkets and 
speaking with them, studying shrimp product availability across Sweden and the 
aspects of each product in terms of packaging, price and labels, and seeking to 
identify the gaps between stated positions during interviews by representatives of 
actors versus the actual actions of the actor in reality. Silverman (2016, p. 5) suggests 
that if we want to understand behaviour and interaction, it is not enough to “ask 
questions. We must also observe the routines and practices of actors”. 
Sweden was chosen as the principal focus of this study for the primary reason that it 
exemplifies the stereotypical profile of a highly developed country which manages 
its own fishery resources well (UN FAO, 2018), but is a net-importer of seafood from 
complex global supply chains which are fraught with social and environmental 
challenges. With 80% of its seafood originating from aboard, in 2016 Sweden was the 
world’s ninth largest receiver of foreign seafood products (UN FAO, 2016). Sweden 
is noted as a market with significant awareness of and demand for certified seafood 
products, with consumers perceiving personal health benefits as well as a broader 
altruistic desire to act in an environmentally responsible manner (Blomquist, 
Bartolino & Waldo, 2015). And perhaps above all else, Sweden is a country with a 
long history of progressive environmental movements (McCormick, 1991; Mol, 2000). 
For these reasons, it is a suitable domain in which to attempt to understand how 
power dynamics between actors shape interpretations as to what constitutes 
sustainability.  
Before commencing data collection, a number of initial steps were taken. Firstly, 
extensive analysis was conducted in order to ascertain key trends and patterns in 
seafood production and consumption, within both Sweden and on a global level. 
From this analysis, a specific seafood type (shrimp) was selected, due to the fact that 
shrimp exemplified the social and environmental challenges associated with complex 
global supply chains. 
Secondly, key actors involved in the supply chains of each species were identified. A 
‘snowball’ style of identifying actors was used, which drew on conducting several 
pilot interviews with easily identifiable actors in order to find actors which were less 
obvious during content analysis. Once a profile of key actors was formed, interviews 
were conducted with key personnel from each actor/organization involved in the 
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industry. Semi structure interviews were used, focusing primarily on attempting to 
understand how the organization interpreted the notion of sustainability in relation 
to shrimp, why they interpreted it in this way, and the degree to which other actors 
in the industry shaped this interpretation. As of September 2019, more than 30 hours 
of recorded interview data had been collected from interviews with a range of actors 
directly implicated within the Swedish shrimp industry, as well as an additional 
peripheral organizations.  
The societal setting of this study was one of rapidly declining global fish stocks, 
increasing disconnect between where seafood is caught and where it is sold and 
mounting pressure on both business and end consumers to engage with fisheries 
resources in a more environmentally sustainable manner. The study is of interest to 
a wide range of stakeholders associated with fisheries management and the seafood 
industry, including policy makers, seafood retailers, governmental agencies, 
commercial fishing companies and seafood consumers. The findings of this study 
have direct relevance for many other countries that have similar economic and 
consumer market conditions to Sweden, such as Denmark, Norway, Germany and 
The Netherlands. 
3.1.1 Initial analysis 
Firstly, extensive analysis of industry reports, academic publications and certification 
schemes pertaining to fishing and seafood was conducted in order to ascertain key 
trends and patterns in seafood production and consumption, both within Sweden 
and at a global level. The approach taken was based around idea of “controversy 
mapping” – seeking to pinpoint the location of the greatest tensions within the 
seafood industry (Otero and Baumann, 2016). This analysis highlighted shrimp as the 
seafood that exemplifies the social and environmental challenges associated with 
complex global supply chains, making it the chosen candidate for this study.  
3.1.2 Identifying key actors 
The analysis outlined above was used to begin the process of identifying the key 
actors associated with the value chains of each of the four shrimp species under 
investigation. A ‘snowball’ style of identifying actors was used, which drew on 
conducting several pilot interviews with easily identifiable actors in order to find 
other actors who were less obvious during content analysis. Noy (2008) suggests that 
the flexibility, spontaneity and adaptability of such an approach is well suited to a 
study which has somewhat broad research questions which may be subject to change 
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as the study progresses − that is, that the study has freedom to change and evolve as 
it progresses. Heckathorn (1997) notes that the malleability offered under a snowball 
approach allows for the on-going inclusion of different actors which may have not 
initially been identified in the early stages of the study. The basis of this snowballing 
approach was to map out the “entangled actors and relationships” (Gond & Nyberg, 
2017, p. 1137) that existed within the Swedish shrimp industry, so as to determine 
which actors would be included in the study and which would not.  
Following this process, key actors were identified. Four distributors of shrimp 
products – food retailers – were selected to focus on: ICA (ICA Gruppen AB), Coop 
(Coop Sverige AB), Hemköp (Axfood AB) and Willys (Axfood AB). Together these 
supermarkets accounted for 79% of all grocery sales in Sweden as of 2018. Four 
primary producers of shrimp products were chosen to focus on (names withheld due 
to privacy issues associated with the smaller size of two of these organizations): a 
Gothenburg-based seafood importer, an Australian commercial shrimp trawler 
whose product became in demand in Sweden following pressure on retailers to take 
away tropical shrimp; a Danish-owned commercial fishing company selling shrimp 
in Sweden, and a Vietnam-based shrimp operation exporting products to Sweden. 
The certification schemes of the Aquaculture Stewardship Council, Marine 
Stewardship Council, and Swedish-based KRAV were chosen, while the three most 
prominent environmental NGOs in Sweden of Greenpeace, SSNC and the WWF were 
selected. Swedish seafood consumers were also naturally identified as a key actor, 
and interviewed in this study.  
3.2 Data collection 
There were three main components to the main data collections in this study:  
1. Semi-structured interviews with senior management from each actor 
2. Review and analysis of the shrimp products available in Sweden, including 
both physically acquiring products, observing products in store, and 
researching information pertaining to the ‘journey’ of each product from the 
boat/farm to the point of sale 
3. Review and analysis of information relating specifically to each actor 
interviewed − such as annual reports, sustainability reports and traceability 
information of products 
4. Media analysis, focusing on how the shrimp debate in Sweden played out over 
both traditional and social media.  
These are described in turn below in sections 3.2.1 to 3.2.4. 
 
 
49 
 
3.2.1 Semi-structured interviews with senior management each actor 
Semi-structured interviews with senior management from each major actor in the 
Swedish shrimp industry formed the main source of data collection. Once a profile 
of key actors was formed, interviews were conducted with key personnel from each 
actor/organization involved in the capture/farming, processing, distribution, 
labelling, distribution, sale and consumption of shrimp. Michalak et al. (2006, p. 26) 
note how thematic analysis is well suited to semi-structured interviews, which 
“began and finished according to a standard script, but were otherwise left 
unstructured”.  
Interviews 
The choice of semi-structured interviews was considered appropriate given the need 
for a degree of flexibility when seeking information from a stakeholder interview 
(Yin, 2003) – especially as the topic of fishing and seafood is somewhat ‘controversial’ 
and emotionally loaded. Sticking to specific questions was not likely to produce 
answers that addressed the key issues. A semi-structured interview allowed for 
periods of free-flowing conversation and this generally resulted in good quality and 
more rigid data. It also allowed the freedom to change questions (and questioning 
style) in light of new information and answers given by previous interviewees. 
Interviews lasted for on average 48 minutes. Privacy of the respondents – who kindly 
partook in interviews often out of their own personal time − has been given 
paramount importance, due to the commercial and sensitive nature of the topic. As 
such, in the results section only a vague description of the respondent is given (for 
example, respondent from an NGO), and only the year (rather than the month and 
day) of the interview is provided.   
Interview questions 
Three possible ‘starting-point’ interview questions were used in phase one 
interviews, which were held between May 2016 and September 2017. These questions 
were intentionally written in a simple and straightforward manner, so as to avoid 
unnecessary academic language which might confuse or even potentially be seen as 
disrespectful to the interviewees (Kvale, 2006): 
1. What types of things does your organization do to be sustainable or responsible? 
2. What are some of reasons why your organization does these things? 
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3. How does your organization relate to other organizations in the seafood 
industry? What kind of interactions do you have? What things do you disagree 
on? 
Phase two interviews, which were held between September 2018 and September 
2019, asked more complex and specific questions of actors. An example of such 
questions included the following: 
Another criticism that your organization [international aquaculture certification 
scheme] has received from some of the NGOs I've spoken to here is the feed standard 
that they've said that your organization has been too slow to get up to speed with the 
feed standards. So, what would you say to that? 
If you get an email from an NGO saying, "Hey, why isn't this being done? Why is the 
feed standard taking so long?" How do you communicate over the phone or an email 
what you just said to me then about the pace, that it takes a long time to do things 
properly? How do you get across to a group like an NGO that may not fully understand 
how long it takes to do these sorts of things? 
How does your organization use information (such as scientific data) in helping you 
make decisions around sustainability? What kind of information do you use, and why? 
Furthermore, all 37  interviews concluded with a question to each respondent, asking 
them to reflect on their personal level of optimism about the long-term sustainability 
and overall viability of the planet’s oceans and waterways. This question was asked 
to them as individuals rather than them speaking on behalf of the organizations that 
they represented. 
3.2.2 Review of the physical shrimp products available in Sweden, and information 
pertaining to the ‘journey’ of each product from the boat/farm to the point of sale 
The physical shrimp products available in Sweden formed a part of data collection. 
These products were purchased, and analysis was conducted of what labels and 
certification schemes each had, what species were used in the product, and any 
information given regarding method and location of capture and or farming. Figure 
1 shows a selection of the products which are the focal point of this study. These 
products were acquired primarily so as to get product label information which could 
facilitate a study of the ‘journey’ of the shrimp, and having leads (such as species 
names, labels and packaging locations) which could be used in order to research and 
document the steps that were involved in the shrimp. In the early stages of the study 
(especially 2015), this was going to form a prominent part of data collection. By 2019 
 
 
51 
it had taken on a less important role, and while the ‘journey’ of each species of shrimp 
was indeed documented (and is available in Chapter 4, Results), this information was 
not as comprehensively as first planned – due to interviews becoming a more critical 
aspect of the study, as well as coming up against ‘road blocks’ in terms of actors 
refusing to share traceability information. Furthermore, this point was reinforced in 
a follow-up email exchange with a seafood manager for a major Swedish retailer. 
During the interview it was repeatedly claimed that the organization strives for 
openness and traceability of all products. In an email several days after interview, 
information relating to a shrimp product produced by the company was requested. 
The response to the email was: 
I am sorry to inform you that this information is nothing I can share with anybody 
outside my company. 
 (Seafood manager for a major Swedish retailer, email, 2017) 
Figure 1: A selection of shrimp products sold in Sweden featured in this study  
 
Source: L. Wainwright, copyright holder of photo. 
 
3.2.3 Review and analysis of information relating to each actor 
The third component of data collection was analysis of information and documents 
(such as annual reports, sustainability reports and traceability information of 
products) pertaining specifically to each actor and the four shrimp species. This step 
differed from the more general review of the fisheries and seafood literature that was 
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conducted in the pilot phase the study in the sense that it was far more specific. 
Extensive analysis of secondary data relating to the four shrimp species was 
conducted, with the ultimate goal being to map out each product and tell its ‘story’. 
This followed the principles of ‘archival research’ outlined in Ventresca & Mohr  
(2002), Buchanan and Bryman (2009) and Patton (2005). Archival research can be 
defined as "any qualitative data reduction and sense-making effort that takes a 
volume of qualitative material and attempts to identify core consistencies and 
meanings” (Patton, 2005 p. 453). This involved using product information available 
from fishing companies, eco-labels and supermarket chains, in conjunction with a 
wide range of governmental and agency publications (especially The United Nations 
State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture reports), conventional media, social media, 
annual reports, and existing academic literature. Focus was on the simple question 
of “What is going on here?” (Paull. et al. 2013), and trying to decipher who are the 
actors associated with each of the shrimp, and how they interpret the notion of 
sustainability and the extent to which this interpretation has been influenced by other 
actors in the industry. At one point this information was included in the results 
chapter, but was then moved to the Appendix, and eventually removed from the 
thesis entirely as it was just too long.  
3.2.4 Media analysis 
Data from both social media and traditional media were drawn upon in this study. 
In the later stages of the study extensive focus was placed on understanding how the 
shrimp controversy was covered across both social and traditional media between 
2008 and 2018 – especially in terms of seeking to understand the manner through 
which NGOs used media during 2011 to 2015, when the shrimp debate was at its 
peak. This section of data collection helped considerably in the eventual generation 
of several of the sub-themes which are covered in Chapter  4, Results – especially 
those relating to how NGO influence was achieved, and how sustainability was 
operationalized.  
Analysis of social media was carried out in a haphazard, unstructured manner, and 
consisted primarily of searching on Facebook and Twitter for pages and hashtags 
associated with shrimp in Sweden – especially in terms of the SSNC’s prominent 
Anti-Scampi campaign.  
Traditional media coverage of the shrimp debate was undertaken in a more 
structured manner. An analysis was conducted through the University of 
Gothenburg Library’s Newspaper, Audio and Video Database, which searches 
 
 
53 
through a massive catalogue of the most common news television programs, 
newspaper articles and radio broadcasts. Search terms used were various 
combinations of shrimp, prawn, räka, räkor, scampi, Anti-Scampi, hållbarhet , hållbar 
utveckling, Pandalus borealis, Litopenaeus vannamei, Melicertus latisulcatus, and Penaeus 
monodon. Results suggested that these terms featured around 1,840 times in major 
newspaper, radio and television stories between 2011 and 2015. 
3.3 Summary of completed data collection 
3.3.1 Long interviews which were recorded 
Thirty-seven formal recorded interviews with key actors in the Swedish shrimp 
industry took place between May 2016 and September 2019. There were two distinct 
phases of interviewing. Phase 1 took place primarily in the first half of 2017, 
concentrated on ascertaining the lay of the land. Phase 2, which took place primarily 
in mid-2019, focused on asking specific, detailed questions of key actors regarding 
how they relate to one another, what sustainability means to their organization and 
why and under what circumstances and how they might they manifest disagreement 
with another actor.  
Each of these interviews was audio recorded and transcribed. The total duration of 
recorded voice interviews was 30 hours and 3 minutes. The mean interview duration 
was 48 minutes and 44 seconds. Of the 37 interviews, 14 took place face-to-face (6 in 
Stockholm, 5 in Gothenburg, 2 in Uppsala and one in San Francisco. The remaining 
23 were conducted over phone or video call (12 and 11, respectively). Only relevant 
content (that is, actual discussion pertaining to this research project) was calculated 
as recorded time (polite idle chit chat and introductions, which typically made up 10 
minutes of each interview, were excluded from the total duration of each interview, 
reducing the total time from around 34 hours down to 30 hours). Face-to-face 
interviews often involved further activities before and/or after the interview, such as 
meeting other staff in the office, consuming refreshments, and being given materials 
such as documents.  
Three interviews of 42 minutes, 56 minutes and 31 minutes in duration were initially 
recorded but ultimately were removed from this study, due to privacy issues.  
Except for a few leads in 2016 which were provided by the author’s supervisor, the 
majority of these respondent s were ‘cold called’ or emailed. Between May 2016 and 
May 2019, more than 400 emails were sent to personnel connected to the Swedish 
seafood industry, and shrimp sub-industry. The average reply rate was around 10%, 
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and of those 10%, around half would be willing to partake in audio recorded 
interviews. The author’s weak Swedish language skills and subsequent use of 
English in most of the ‘cold’ emails may have played a part in the arguably-low reply 
rate. Table 1 documents the key information pertaining to the 37 voice-recorded 
interviews:  
Table 1: Summary of key information about voice-recorded formal interviews 
Date Location Duration Organization General non-
specific 
description of 
job/position 
2016-05-10 Uppsala, 
Sweden (Head 
office of 
organization) 
53 minutes Swedish incorporated 
association with 
environmental focus 
Account manager 
2016-10-24 Phone call 
(respondent  in 
Sweden) 
33 minutes Major Swedish food 
retailer 
Sustainability 
coordinator 
2016-11-11 Video call 
(respondent  in 
Australia) 
21 minutes Australian shrimp 
cooperative 
C-suite executive 
2016-12-12 Stockholm, 
Sweden 
(regional head 
office of 
organization) 
1 hour 5 
minutes 
International wild-
caught seafood 
certification scheme 
Program director 
2016-12-20 Phone call 
(respondent  in 
Sweden) 
31 minutes Swedish incorporated 
association with 
environmental focus 
Account manager 
2017-02-09 Video call 
(respondent  in 
Netherlands) 
45 minutes International 
aquaculture 
certification scheme 
Communications 
director 
2017-02-10 Stockholm, 
Sweden 
(regional head 
office of 
organization) 
1 hour 7 
minutes 
International wild-
caught seafood 
certification scheme 
Stakeholder 
manager 
2017-02-10 Stockholm, 
Sweden 
(regional head 
office of 
organization) 
34 minutes International wild-
caught seafood 
certification scheme 
Commercial 
officer 
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Date Location Duration Organization General non-
specific 
description of 
job/position 
2017-02-22 Phone call 
(respondent  in 
Sweden) 
43 minutes International wild-
caught seafood 
certification scheme 
Program director 
2017-03-18 Phone call 
(respondent  in 
Sweden) 
51 minutes International 
assurance, inspection 
and certification 
provider  
Auditor   
2017-03-18 Video call 
(respondent  in 
Vietnam) 
32 minutes Vietnamese shrimp 
farming business 
Export director 
2017-03-21 Gothenburg, 
Sweden (café)  
34 minutes Major Swedish food 
retailer 
Seafood manager 
2017-04-11 Gothenburg, 
Sweden 
(research lab 
where 
respondent  
works) 
57 minutes Gothenburg-based 
university; Swedish 
incorporated 
association with 
environmental focus 
Marine scientist 
and board 
member 
2017-05-04 Stockholm, 
Sweden (Head 
office of 
organization) 
1 hour 17 
minutes 
Major Swedish food 
retailer 
Sourcing manager 
2017-05-05 Phone call 
(respondent  in 
Sweden) 
50 minutes Swedish seafood 
wholesaler/importer 
C-suite executive 
and owner 
2017-05-09 Phone call 
(respondent in 
Greenland) 
21 minutes Greenlandic seafood 
company 
Sustainability 
manager 
2017-05-11 Gothenburg, 
Sweden 
(interviewers 
office) 
54 minutes Swedish research 
institute; Swedish 
incorporated 
association with 
environmental focus 
Marine scientist 
and board chair 
2017-05-12 Phone 
(respondent in 
Stockholm, 
Sweden) 
30 minutes Major Swedish food 
retailer 
Sustainability 
coordinator  
2017-05-17 Gothenburg, 
Sweden 
59 minutes Swedish research 
institute 
Marine scientist 
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Date Location Duration Organization General non-
specific 
description of 
job/position 
(interviewers 
office) 
2017-05-22 Phone call 
(respondent in 
Stockholm, 
Sweden) 
41 minutes Swedish 
environmental NGO 
Policy officer 
2017-05-22 Uppsala, 
Sweden (head 
office of 
organization) 
44 minutes Swedish Government 
agency 
Manager and 
Nutritionist 
2017-06-15 Video call 
(respondent in 
United 
Kingdom) 
50 minutes International wild-
caught seafood 
certification scheme 
Supply chain 
manager  
2017-07-19 Video call 
(respondent in 
United 
Kingdom) 
49 minutes International wild-
caught seafood 
certification scheme 
C-suite executive 
2017-09-12 Phone call 
(respondent in 
Sweden) 
36 minutes Swedish seafood 
wholesaler/importer 
C-suite executive 
and owner 
2019-04-09 San Francisco, 
USA (café)  
44 minutes Swedish 
environmental NGO 
Former employee 
2019-05-23 Gothenburg, 
Sweden 
(regional office 
of 
organization) 
25 minutes Swedish 
environmental NGO 
Director of 
certification 
schemes 
2019-05-28 Video call 
(respondent in 
Sweden) 
41 minutes International 
environmental NGO 
Program director  
2019-06-10 Stockholm, 
Sweden (café)  
2 hours 12 
minutes 
Swedish 
environmental NGO 
Strategic director 
2019-06-10 Stockholm, 
Sweden 
(regional head 
office of 
organization) 
1 hour 5 
minutes  
International wild-
caught seafood 
certification scheme 
Senior manager 
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Date Location Duration Organization General non-
specific 
description of 
job/position 
2019-06-12 Video call 
(respondent in 
Sweden) 
54 minutes International 
environmental NGO 
Global project lead 
2019-06-18 Video call 
(respondent in 
Sweden) 
52 minutes International 
environmental NGO 
Fisheries expert 
2019-08-18 Phone call 
(respondent in 
Sweden) 
1 hour  Swedish 
environmental NGO 
Strategic director 
2019-08-19 Video call 
(respondent in 
Australia) 
51 minutes Australian shrimp 
cooperative 
C-suite executive 
2019-08-21 Video call 
(respondent in 
France) 
54 minutes International 
aquaculture 
certification scheme 
Communications 
director  
2019-08-21 Phone call 
(respondent in 
Sweden) 
1 hour 6 
minutes 
Swedish Government 
agency 
Senior analyst in 
fisheries 
department 
 
2019-08-22 Phone call 
(respondent in 
Sweden) 
50 minutes Swedish seafood 
wholesaler/importer
  
C-suite executive 
and owner 
2019-09-24 Video call 
(respondent in 
Australia) 
30 minutes Australian shrimp 
cooperative 
Export director 
 
3.3.2 Follow up 
There was further follow up in 17 of the 37 recorded interviews. Typically, this took 
the form of one or more short phone conversations or email correspondences several 
weeks after the initial interviews, in order to clarify specific points. Several cases also 
involved the respondent sending documents or other information which provided 
further information on a question that may have been incompletely answered during 
the interview.   
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3.3.3 Non-recorded formal interviews 
Eight unrecorded interviews totalling 6 hours 17 minutes were held between 2016 
and 2019 with key personnel from various organizations relating to the Swedish 
shrimp industry (two of which also were related to shrimp trawling in Australia). 
Three of these interviews were held face-to-face, and the rest over video call and 
telephone. The interviews were not recorded for various reasons, but typically due 
to privacy issues.  
3.3.4 Customer interviews and observations 
Interviews were conducted with grocery store customers in the process of selecting 
seafood products. These interviews were held in the seafood freezer aisles of the ICA 
Rosenlund store in Gothenburg, Sweden. An individual was only approached if they 
were actually in the process of physically touching a seafood product. and took place 
on 2017-05-26 and 2017-06-20. Of around 50 people approached, a total of 24 
interviews, each of approximately five minutes, were held. These interviews were 
based around three questions pertaining to their understanding and knowledge of 
different eco-labels, and the extent to which such labels and consideration of 
sustainability motivated their purchasing – including paying a price premium.  
3.3.5 Viewing and purchasing of shrimp products 
Between 2016 and 2019, informal, non-systematic observations were conducted of the 
shrimp species available at the four largest food retail outlets in Sweden. 
Furthermore, in mid-2017, every variety of shrimp product available in the four 
largest Swedish retailers in Gothenburg was purchased.  Product information on each 
packet assisted in the ‘following the journey’ dimension of the study. The shrimp 
were eventually consumed by the author of the study. Visits to seafood sections of 
Whole Foods and Trader Joes supermarket outlets in California, USA in 2018, and 
analysis and photograph of shrimp products was also conducted, with the same 
occurring in New South Wales, Australia, in June and September of 2017. This helped 
to gauge how shrimp product availability in other countries compared to Sweden.   
3.3.6 Tours 
Several interviews involved extensive tours of facilities and presentation of key 
organizational information beyond the scope of the seafood industry, such as 
occurred at the head office of a large food retailer in Stockholm during an interview 
in May 2017. Other interviews involved the meeting of other key staff in the office 
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(which sometimes led to them being interviewed), partaking in lunches and coffee 
breaks, as well as being given pamphlets and booklets. A tour of university research 
facilities, including fish and shrimp breeding laboratories, took place following an 
interview with a marine scientist in April 2017. 
 
3.3.7 Other 
Informal discussions were held with seafood and shrimp experts during breaks and 
lunches of academic conferences and events between 2016 and 2019, such as at 
several University of California Berkeley events in March and April 2019, as well as 
at a seminar on shrimp at the University of Gothenburg which was held in September 
2019. Such discussions did not constitute a formal part of data collection but rather 
served as a way of increasing understanding of the sector.  
3.3.8 Job titles and roles 
The personnel interviewed had a variety of different job titles and roles. The majority 
were at a mid to senior level of management within their respective organizations, 
with some being at an executive or board level. Nine of the people interviewed held 
PhDs in fields such as fisheries management and marine biology, with the majority 
of the others holding Master’s degrees. Specific job titles are not used in this study, 
for privacy reasons.  
3.4 Data analysis 
3.4.1 Thematic analysis 
The interview and observation data were analysed using inductive thematic analysis 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006), in order to ascertain key themes so as to describe the 
relationship between actors in the Swedish shrimp industry regarding debates 
around sustainability and subsequent contests to the legitimacy of one another.  
The ‘six steps’ of initial familiarization, coding and first-order categorization, 
generating initial themes, reviewing themes, naming themes and writing up as 
described by Braun and Clarke (2006) were followed. Drawing on Michalak et al. 
(2006, p. 27), “emergent themes were selected on the basis of how many participants 
mentioned them, and how frequently they were mentioned. Thematic analysis was 
used in “systematically identifying, organizing, and offering insight into patterns of 
meaning (themes) across a data set”. This allowed to “see and make sense of 
collective or shared meanings and experiences” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 57).  
 
 
60 
Following transcription, recorded interviews were formatted and printed off – along 
with key secondary information (mainly the annual and sustainability reports of each 
actor). The first step involved in thematic analysis was getting to know the empirical 
material. This meant reading over all of it several times, until a point was reached 
whereby familiarity was achieved. Next, coding was undertaken. Deriving codes 
consisted of using different colour pens to highlight each distinct code on the printed 
material.  Following this, first-order themes were developed from the various codes. 
There was some to-ing and fro-ing in this process, but after some time the main first-
order themes became fairly clear and distinct. The focus here was on ascertaining the 
prevalence and frequency of mention or inference of a particular idea in the empirics 
(Michalak et al., 2006).  
Initially, just three first-order themes were identified: the significant influence of 
NGOs, contextual uniqueness of Sweden and of the seafood industry, and differences 
in interpretation and practice of sustainability. The main to-ing and fro-ing took place 
around whether the ‘interpretation and practice of sustainability’ theme was in fact 
two distinct themes. The pivotal moment in this decision was identification of several 
interviews where respondents clearly spoke of the division between the two. It 
therefore became necessary to divide this theme into two. 
Next, smaller sub-themes were identified under the banner of each broader theme. 
At this point it became possible to start giving rough working names to each major 
theme and sub-theme. As in Braun and Clarke (2006), this naming process was not 
straight-forward, and the names changed considerably over the course of the analysis 
process. It also become necessary to merge together several second-order categories, 
which upon first inspection were distinct but after sometime working with the 
empirical material it became clear that they belonged together. One particular sub-
theme which jumped between various broader themes was that of shrimp as a central 
actor and key stakeholder. Initially this sub-theme seemed to be a part of the first 
order theme of the uniqueness of seafood. Eventually however, more nuanced and 
careful reading of the interviews mentioning and inferring this idea led to it being 
repositioned under the theme of differing interpretations of sustainability.  
The subsequent step was to type up a table capturing the four main categories and 
smaller sub-categories. Following this, it was necessary to select quotes from the 
empirical material which would best illustrate each theme. This process took 
considerable time (due to the sheer volume of empirical material). As did trimming 
down and shortening quotes to exclude irrelevant material.  
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The end result of this process led to four main themes being derived from the 
empirical material. Firstly, that there existed significant disparities between actors in 
their ability to dictate the operating rules of the shrimp industry, including 
interpretation of sustainability and challenging the legitimacy of other actors. 
Secondly, the contextual uniqueness of both Sweden, and of the seafood and fishing 
sector. Thirdly, that there were major differences in interpretations of sustainability 
between actors, and these differences were brought about through selective use (or 
disregard) of both science and ideology. Fourthly, descriptions of how sustainability 
was operationalized in practice by actors. Each of these themes also featured several 
smaller, more nuanced and specific yet significant sub-themes (totalling seventeen).  
This material is presented in the following section: Chapter 4, Results.   
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4. Results 
The terms of reference of the results chapter was to present the collected empirical 
material pertaining to the central research question of the study: ‘How is legitimacy 
contested?’ The contextual domain for exploring this question was through analysis 
of the relations of actors within the Swedish shrimp industry between 2008 and 2018, 
centring on those groups and individuals implicated within the consumption, sale, 
production, certification, or advocacy and protection of the four most commonly 
available species of shrimp.  
 
The empirical material showed that the contesting of legitimacy in the Swedish 
shrimp industry took place primarily through disagreements around the term 
‘sustainability’. The data showed that some actors – mainly Swedish and 
international environmental NGOs – had a disproportionally high level of influence 
within the shrimp industry. This influence was used by NGOs in order to contest the 
actions of other actors in the industry by calling into question their involvement with 
sustainability issues pertaining to shrimp.  
 
Sustainability was frequently stated in terms of being synonymous to legitimacy, and 
compliance with the new norms demanded by the NGOs became a requisite to 
achieve social acceptability.  Conforming to these interpretations of sustainability 
was found to be essential in order to negotiate access to the market and maintain this 
access across time – and in turn, to achieve social acceptability and legitimacy. It was 
found that many actors were aware that determining what exactly is sustainability 
was anything but a straightforward process, and in practice often represented a 
midpoint between scientific information, and political necessity. Because of this, 
many actors would aim to get an interpretation beyond their goal, on the basis that 
what they ended up with would be watered down. However, it seems that for 
primary producers and distributors, these two occurrences did not happen in the 
shrimp debate, and instead they were overwhelmingly beaten in the debate by the 
NGOs.  
  
It was found that significant differences existed between actors in terms of how they 
interpreted shrimp sustainability pertaining to questions around shrimp stock levels, 
methods of farming and capture and what certification schemes constituted 
sustainability, and that both science and ideology were used (or disregarded) in order 
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to push for one interpretation over another. Reasons for these differences sometimes 
pointed to actors being motivated primarily by interests such as survival and 
maintaining relevance, minimizing reputational harm and improving financial 
prospects, and the notion of being willing to endure short-term pain if it meant 
progressing towards a broader strategic goal. Data suggested that NGOs were able 
to achieve a significant and unparalleled level of influence by creating and leveraging 
societal momentum, which was amplified through both traditional and social media.  
 
Running effective campaigns – campaigns amplified by NGO member base through 
both traditional and social media – were used as the primary initial strategy to push 
other industry actors into conformity, and the future threat of this occurring again 
seemed to have acted as a strong enough deterrent for most primary producers and 
distributors (for the foreseeable future at least) to go along with the NGOs’ 
interpretation of sustainability. It was found that the primary way through which 
actors operationalized their interpretation of sustainability was through the use of 
guides, lists, rankings and certification schemes. Some actors, mainly NGOs, created 
these artefacts. Other actors, mainly fishing companies and retailers, drew on these 
artefacts heavily or entirely to inform their seafood sustainability strategy either 
partially or fully on these artefacts, and in doing so partially or fully ‘outsource’ the 
determination of their sustainability interpretation to a third party. Finally, both 
Sweden and the seafood and fishing sector were found to be unique and unusual, for 
a variety of reasons, factors which could be said to have exacerbated the ferocity of 
the shrimp debate. The reader is once again reminded that, should they find that 
during the reading of this results chapter they encounter technical, scientific and 
methodological details pertaining to fishing and seafood for which they require 
further information, to consider glancing over the Appendix. Table 2 on the following 
page presents a summary of the themes covered in this results chapter.  
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Table 2: Summary of the themes and sub-themes from the empirical material 
 
 
Themes 
1. Disparities 
between actors in 
ability to influence 
See Section 4.1 
2. The contextual 
idiosyncratic nature of 
Sweden, and the 
seafood and fishing 
industry 
See Section 4.2 
3. Different 
interpretations of 
sustainability and 
use (or disregard) of 
information and 
ideology 
See Section 4.3 
4. The 
operationalization of 
sustainability in 
practice 
See Section 4.4 
Sub-themes 
The prominent and 
unrivalled impact of 
NGOs 
See Section 4.1.1 
The uniqueness of Sweden 
See Section 4.2.1 
How actors 
differentiated in their 
interpretation of 
sustainability 
See Section 4.3.1 
The creation and use of 
artefacts and outsourcing 
of sustainability 
See Section 4.4.1 
Conformity needed to 
negotiate market access 
and maintain access over 
time 
See Section 4.1.2 
The uniqueness of the 
fishing and seafood 
industry 
See Section 4.2.2 
Scientific data and 
their ideological 
interpretation: how 
and why actors 
operationalized (or 
disregarded) 
information and/or 
emotion to rally for 
their interpretation of 
sustainability 
See Section 4.3.2 
Dialogue, roundtables 
and day-to-day actor 
engagement 
See Section 4.4.2 
How NGO influence 
was gained and 
maintained 
See Section 4.1.3 
Personal connection to the 
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4.1 Disparities between actors in ability to influence norms 
Empirical data pointed to clear and significant disparities between actors in their 
ability to influence the prevailing norms regarding sustainability (and in many cases 
in turn what constituted social acceptability and therefore legitimacy) as well as to 
dictate the overall operating norms of the shrimp industry. These differentials in 
ability to influence between actors was found to have a substantial role in shaping 
what can be constituted as ‘sustainability’ in regards to shrimp stock levels, and 
methods of farming and capture, amongst other variables. The implications of these 
differences in ability to influence were and continue to be significant, and gaining 
access to the market or maintaining legitimacy seems to be heavily dependent on 
conforming to the wishes of what dominant actors (primarily NGOs) declare to be 
sustainable. Non-conformity to the guides and lists produced by environmental 
NGOs could result in exodus from the market. These lists, covered in significant 
detail in Theme four (‘the operationalization of sustainability in practice’), proved 
influential in shaping the overall seafood strategies adopted by both fishing 
companies and supermarket chains, and in some cases influenced the strategic 
direction of the organization in regards to sustainability. 
 
Analysis of data collected in this study – especially interviews with senior 
management from organizations implicated in the shrimp industry – suggested that 
disparities in levels of influence actors played a significant role in determining what 
constitutes ‘sustainability’. This applied to a range of questions regarding which 
species of shrimp are sustainable and which are not, stock levels and how many 
shrimp can be caught, methods of capture or farming, acceptable levels of bycatch, 
and a range of other variables associated with the production of shrimp. Despite 
having access to and utilizing essentially the same data points and the best available 
science (namely, ICES and UN FAO data which is considered to represent the peak 
of knowledge in regards to shrimp), actors in the industry concluded widely different 
interpretations of what constituted sustainability. It became apparent that the shrimp 
industry represented a domain of multiple and conflicting actor interests. 
Participating in the shrimp industry was not straightforward or stable process. 
Rather, it was (and still is) a complex process where the needs of multiple actors had 
to be met, concessions made, and the ability in place to respond to sudden and 
unexpected events which could question the legitimacy of a product, corporation or 
perhaps even the entire industry. The most notable influence inequality which 
shaped the sustainability debate and associated challenges to social acceptability and 
legitimacy was that of the dominance of the environmental NGOs - especially the 
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WWF, Greenpeace and SSNC over other actors. These organizations were perceived 
as being (and shown, in actuality) to be able to effectively utilize media in order gain 
the support of the seafood buying public, and as a result achieve levels of influence 
far beyond what their size or membership base would typically be able to. Actors in 
the industry, especially fishing companies and retailers, felt that they were at the 
mercy of whatever the NGOs decided constituted sustainability, and had to comply 
with these demands by stopping the production or sale of certain shrimp species. The 
following quote taken from an interview with a sustainability manager for a large 
Swedish retailer summarizes this theme:  
They made a lot of noise in the media. They really, really – I mean more or less they 
just forced us to take away the shrimp. They have a lot of influence. And especially 
when they are doing a campaign. So that could be Greenpeace, Naturskyddsforeningen, 
and WWF. In Sweden now, with this consumer guide, they are having a big influence. 
Sometimes they think it's their role to be like that and that's why we definitely want to 
have their list automatically. Sometimes we actually disagree on what [is sustainable] 
when we have the exact same information.  
(interview recording, 2017) 
From this broad theme of disparities between actors in their ability to influence the 
prevailing interpretation of sustainability and overall operating norms of the 
industry, five sub-themes arose from the data. Firstly, the prominent and unrivalled 
impact of NGOs: the perception by primary producers and distributors of NGOs 
having a disproportionally large influence in shaping all aspects of the Swedish 
shrimp industry. Secondly, evidence of how significant conformity and concessions 
were needed in order to negotiate initial market access and maintain this access over 
time. Thirdly, descriptions of how NGO influence was achieve and maintained. 
Fourthly, the role of conventional and social media in amplifying changes to social 
norms. Finally, how NGOs were perceived by other actors as often failing to 
understand the realities of business and placing idealistic rather than realistic 
demands on them.  
4.1.1 The prominent and unrivalled impact of NGOs 
A clear and consistent sub-theme to emerge from the empirical material was that of 
the perception by primary producers and distributors of NGOs having a 
disproportionally large influence in shaping all facets of the Swedish shrimp 
industry. The data revealed that NGOs such as Greenpeace Sweden, the WWF 
Sweden and the SSNC were able to achieve a commanding level of influence over 
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other actors. This level of influence meant that NGOs played a decisive role in 
determining and enforcing the levels of social and environmental performance that 
an actor needed in order to enter the market and maintain a presence over time, and 
in doing so indirectly dictated and controlled the overall operating terms of the 
industry.  
 
This perception was also matched by actuality – that the NGOs did have a significant 
level of influence over the shrimp industry. The mechanisms by which the NGOs 
exerted this influence were primarily through the publication of seafood rating 
guides and lists, as well as direct campaigning, such as through the Anti-Scampi 
campaign. NGOs did this by simultaneously targeting the reputation of fishing 
companies, the outlets that sold their products (primarily supermarkets), and the 
consumers which purchased them.  
 
A Seafood manager for a major Swedish food retailer spoke how the SSNC in 
particular had been able to gain a level of “enforcement” over the seafood 
sustainability decisions of the retailer, describing “The problem is today that 
Naturskyddsföreningen in Sweden, they have still very strong political, how should I 
say, enforcement on the supermarket chains”. (interview recording, 2017) 
 
Another respondent, working for a major seafood certification scheme, described 
how “a big issue” in their organization was the question of “How do we avoid getting 
into trouble with the NGOs?” (interview recording, 2017). This question permeated 
throughout the data gathered during interviews with retailers and seafood 
corporations. And even when it was not said as explicitly as here, it was still implied.  
 
Many actors felt that their strategic options had become severely limited because of 
the constraining effects of the demands placed on them by NGOs and the high 
standard of sustainability which was the norm. A C-suite executive and owner of a 
Swedish seafood wholesaler/importer reflected on “just how much power they [the 
environmental NGOs] have over us” (interview recording, 2019). 
 
A marine scientist who was interviewed reflected on the ‘Anti-Scampi’ campaign run 
by the NGOs, which resulted in major changes to the availability of and demand for 
shrimp which were deemed to be ‘unsustainable’, noting how it had made a big 
difference: 
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Yes. That [the Anti-Scampi campaign] made pretty a big difference, mostly at the big 
chains. They don't sell these scampis anymore and that happened in a fairly short time. 
(interview recording, 2017) 
 
Another respondent, from a commercial fishing company, echoed these sentiments, 
reflecting on how “[It’s] so strange that the small organization like 
Naturskyddsforeningen actually can have that kind of influence in this trade in Sweden. 
(interview recording, 2017) 
 
It was found that primary producers and distributors (that is, fishing and aquaculture 
businesses, and food retailers) were eager to partake in whatever demands were 
made of them by NGOs in order to ‘keep the peace’. A respondent from an 
international environmental NGO central to the shrimp debate in Sweden described 
an interaction with a Nordic retail chain: 
 
I remember some of that campaigning we did more of that at that time, targeting a 
supermarket… I had some very desperate supermarkets who called me and said, 
“We’ve now spent a year, we’ve done these massive assessments. We’ve sent out 
teams. We’ve paid consultants. We’ve found a producer we think that we can work 
with and we want to invest in their business and making sure that it’s sustainable. 
(interview recording, 2019) 
 
While the perception of the significant influence of NGOs was described on 
numerous occasions by other actors in the Swedish shrimp industry, it was also 
described by the NGOs themselves. One interview subject from a major international 
environmental NGO reflected as follows: 
 
We see that we’re having an influence and that consumers and different players are 
actually following our recommendations. And for some species the recommendations 
can shift from one year to another, and it can be rapid changes. And, of course, it’s 
complicated for companies to follow these… Well, these shifts in different lights.  But 
still that’s how nature works. So, some species, they will go up and they will go down. 
And I mean it’s… There’s not really anything we can do about it, that’s how nature 
works… I understand that it’s complicated but I also… I mean it’s up to the companies 
to find ways to… Well, to adapt to these changes, and be flexible. Because I mean some 
stocks you can have a cut in quota with 40% from one year to another. There’s nothing 
that we can… We’re just communicating that message. 
(interview recording, 2019) 
 
 
 
70 
In the words of a program director from another NGO operating in Sweden, “It was 
campaigning, which Anti-Scampi shows you” through which NGOs have been able 
to achieve their interpretation of sustainability as “the prevailing one” (interview 
recording, 2019). 
 
A spokesperson for one of the NGOs seemed surprised at the levels of influence that 
they were able to command in the Swedish retail food market. One respondent made 
a comparison between McDonalds, a large multinational organization which their 
NGO had been campaigning for years, and a Swedish supermarket chain, in order to 
illustrate how quickly change was achieved in Sweden: 
  
I think what’s always fascinated me with McDonald’s is this idea that when we 
challenged them on sustainability, we haven’t really got around to how we’re going to 
deal with the meat issue, but they work with suppliers for a long time, so they don’t 
just change. While some Swedish supermarkets just panic and just go, “Tell me what 
to do. Tell me who I should buy from.” That’s their first, and I’m like, “That’s not my 
role. My role is to provoke you or force you to think about what you’re doing and then 
you change. 
(interview recording, 2019) 
 
Accordingly, a level of conformity to the wishes of NGOs by primary producers and 
distributors was needed in order to negotiate initial market access and maintain this 
access over time.  
 
4.1.2 Conformity needed to negotiate market access and maintain access over time 
Negotiating access to the Swedish seafood market and maintaining this access over 
time required some actors – primarily producers and distributors – to make 
significant concessions and accommodations that conformed to the wishes of other 
actors. What constituted legitimate or illegitimate actions was largely determined by 
the NGOs, and conformity was essential in order to achieve societal acceptance. 
Empirical evidence suggested that this need for conformity led to the quite 
dramatically (and for the foreseeable future, permanently) raising of the 
requirements needed to participate in the Swedish shrimp industry. This seems to 
have also spilled over into the seafood industry more broadly, and in some cases even 
causing actors to significantly change their relationship with organizations that they 
deal with, well beyond the capacity of shrimp. 
    
 
 
71 
An export director from an Australian shrimp cooperative looking to export its 
product to Sweden quickly became aware of the minimum standard of entry into the 
Swedish market, which in the case of wild-caught shrimp took the form of MSC 
certification:  
 
One of the things that became evident early on was that Sweden in particular, if we 
wanted to get a foot in the door there we had to have an MSC product. It just so 
happened that that coincided with when the WWF approached Spencer Gulf 
Association and started working hand in hand to get the accreditation. And so, we 
obviously supported that. 
(interview recording, 2019) 
 
Sometimes this standard of entry was seen as being “unfair”, as an actor could have 
acted with good intentions to orient their sustainability approach towards the wishes 
of NGOs, but still be denied entry to the market. An analyst in the fisheries 
department of a Swedish Government agency reflected on this: 
 
But for the individual fisherman of course, it creates a problem in that well, “I’ve done 
everything, I’ve followed all the rules, but still I get a red light.” It definitely creates a 
sense of unfairness in some cases, I think. 
(interview recording, 2019) 
 
One respondent, the owner of a Swedish seafood company, expressed their 
frustrations in dealing with SSNC, and proposed that campaigns such as Anti-Scampi 
were not driven by a sense of service to the natural environment but instead used by 
NGOs as an instrument primarily to survive, maintain relevance and get new 
members to their organization: 
 
I have the impression that they have also for the last year, have used this question as 
one of the biggest tools to survive, by getting new young people to their organizations 
like, “Please don't eat the shrimps and then you will be a good person and everything 
else is fine." You can still go with your SUV to work but as long as you don't eat those 
big shrimp, it's good. 
 (interview recording, 2017) 
 
It became evident upon analysing data that pressure on the supermarket chains by 
NGOs, amplified by the media and support of the public, had broad implications on 
the overall dynamics, relationships and communication styles between actors in the 
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industry. The shrimp debate was seen to act as a gateway to other sustainability 
conversations and cooperation. A respondent working for one of the large Swedish 
retailers spoke of how an unprecedented level of cooperation between retailers 
became necessary, due to NGO pressure: 
 
At first with organizations like the WWF, MSC and Naturskyddsforeningen, it was more 
of a resistance from all the retailers, to discuss with them. But now it's completely 
different. It's more of a cooperation. Because what we have to admit actually, is that I 
don’t think that we today had been where we are without NGOs or the media actually. 
It’s definitely media and NGO which have a part, which have pushed all the retailer 
and the business into more or less, accepted to work with sustainability. 
(interview recording, 2017) 
 
Another respondent, an analyst from the fisheries department of a Swedish 
Government agency, spoke of how the “push” by NGOs on social and environmental 
matters was a necessary force which was desirable in order to eventually bring about 
high level changes in policy and legislation: 
 
And then you kind of have a parallel structure of NGOs that are somehow wanting to 
push it even more in more direction. It becomes… that’s of course really important to 
have that push one way otherwise the politics would never follow. 
(interview recording, 2019) 
  
NGOs themselves appeared aware of the level of influence that they held in terms of 
determining the operating terms of the market, as highlighted in a point raised by a 
program director of one of the large international environmental NGOs: 
 
And I think retailers and producers are very, very sensitive to what is going on, in 
terms of the market. I mean, if you feel real pressure or if you feel a trend, you can 
definitely see the changes that are happening in the companies. 
(interview recording, 2019) 
 
Furthermore, the data suggested that NGO-led campaigns could not only change the 
sustainability behaviour of primary producers and distributors in the immediate 
term, but could also act to keep them basing their sustainability interpretation on that 
deemed acceptable by the NGOs on a longer-term basis. The data indicated that the 
organizational memory of the impact of initial campaign was lasting, and created 
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ongoing ‘obedience.’ As of 2019, all of the major food retailers in Sweden either 
partially or fully base their sustainability strategy on a list produced by an NGO.  
 
4.1.3 How NGO influence was gained and maintained 
NGO influence and ability to mount social acceptability and legitimacy challenges 
was gained and maintained in a number of different ways. Data suggested that this 
included the use of campaigns, protests, lobbying, favourable media coverage, 
meetings with primary producers and distributors, and seeking to create a situation 
whereby the guides, lists and rating systems produced by NGOs would be perceived 
as being guiding documents through which all seafood sustainability decisions 
should be made. The primary mediums through which these activities were carried 
out were online (primarily through social media), over traditional media (television 
and radio), through in-store protests, and through these mediums rallying the 
Swedish public to support their cause. According to a respondent, a director of 
certification schemes at a Swedish NGO, this influence was achieved by NGOs using 
a “multitude of tools that have addressed the same issue.” (interview recording, 
2019). 
 
Other respondents during interviews were very open with the fact that their goal was 
to gain a commanding narrative of the sustainability definition in the seafood 
industry, such as a director at a Swedish NGO reflecting on changing social norms: 
 
We’re not a political organization, but we’re using political methods and we try to 
influence politics, but we don’t have a party politics. We have a sort of, we try to take 
the voice of the one who is not at the table when decisions are made. So, who gets to 
decide? Well, we would like to get to decide, but usually, it’s always a compromise. 
We always want to get further and then have… what society ends up is a bit below 
what we aim for. We know also that 10 years later, we usually get where we want. 
We’re trying to push society always to move in that direction, which isn’t the same 
thing as always being who decides. Others are perhaps seeing the same aspects 10 years 
later then, well. 
 (interview recording, 2019) 
 
It is interesting to note here the way in which it is described how “what society ends 
up is a bit below what we aim for” highlighting how actors may intentionally 
‘overshoot’ their wished interpretation of sustainability on the basis that what they 
will get will inevitably be a somewhat watered-down version. The Swedish shrimp 
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case however, was not really an example of this phenomena: rather, the NGOs got 
exactly what they sought (and in many cases, much more).  
 
A key way that NGOs were able to achieve such a level of influence and mount 
contests to social acceptability and legitimacy was through utilization of their 
membership base. Respondents working for the WWF, Greenpeace and the SSNC 
frequently described during interviews the extent to which having large membership 
bases enabled them to act quickly and decisively to start and spread campaigns. 
A policy officer working at one of the NGOs reflected on the importance of using 
their members during campaigns: 
 
We do have a group of people who are very engaged in this issue [of shrimp 
sustainability]….We launched reports, did campaigning via various social media all 
that. Our members went to different restaurants in Stockholm and the restaurants and 
stores had actually said, "Okay, whoa. We didn't realize you have the issue with this." 
And they decided to not send shrimps, then they got a diploma, they can put on the 
windows. Using your members, the active members and the members who are very 
much interested in a specific issue is a good way of going about this issue. When it 
comes to the other issues, we are working with the state fisheries. I also do a lot of direct 
lobbying towards politicians. 
(interview recording, 2017) 
 
The active involvement of members in campaigning efforts was one of several ways 
that NGOs increased their size and ability to influence other actors into changing 
their behaviour.  
A director of certification schemes at another Swedish environmental NGO described 
the same phenomena, i.e. how they could tap into the sentiment and feelings of both 
their membership base and also the broader Swedish public in order to gain a 
decisive say on a topic such as shrimp: 
 
What is our organization’s strength is that we have this outreach into the public 
because of all our members. When something is boiling, we sense that... If you look at 
the wave, it’s not us who starts the wave but when it comes, then we can enforce it. 
 (interview recording, 2019) 
 
A respondent from yet another NGO (an international one with a presence in 
Sweden) described how the large size of their organization enabled them to achieve 
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influence, primarily by seeking to use consumer pressure to change the actions of 
firms: 
 
[NGO name] is a huge organisation, we have a strong brand, and many people 
recognise it and believe in our messaging. And we’re also independent, which makes 
it easier for people to trust our work, and what we’re doing. Because we don’t have a 
specific interest – our interest is in nature and people. So, I mean I think it’s all about 
consumers and the general public believing in our brand and supporting us. And that’s 
also why the retailers and producers want to follow our messaging, because it’s 
consumer pressure that makes them move forward in their work.  
 (interview recording, 2019) 
 
Some respondents, such as a project lead at a major international NGO, perceived 
their role working for NGOs to be about disrupting the norm and creating a “crisis”, 
as it was the best way to bring about change: 
 
I think our job as [NGO name], it’s like my job is to make some sort of crisis that 
someone has to solve and it means that someone has to sit down and change and think. 
So, I think if I’m not able to kind of get that immediate… at least in my role, as an oceans 
campaigner, working globally, if I don’t get that sort of gut reaction, I think I’ve partly 
failed. 
 (interview recording, 2019) 
 
This seeking out of a reaction from companies could be interpreted as a challenge to 
the social acceptance of their behaviour. Other interview subjects noted how they 
targeted their campaigning simultaneously at companies and the end customer, such 
as the SSNC’s ‘one small thing’ video during Anti-Scampi. 
A fisheries expert at an international environmental NGO described how their role 
was not necessarily to ban a certain type of product entirely, but instead to make 
consumers aware that there are more sustainable alternatives available: 
 
I think it’s important to show that there are alternatives, and that’s also how we believe 
we can shift the market. Because people won’t stop eating shrimp, even though we’ve 
said like, “Avoid… You shouldn’t eat any giant shrimp at all, or tiger shrimp.” You 
will still see people who buy them. And then it’s better, and we think that it’s more 
efficient to show… I mean – here’s a green alternative. So, if you want to eat this 
product you should choose ASC. 
 (interview recording, NGO, 2019) 
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Sometimes, direct communication between NGOs and corporations was a means of 
interaction. One respondent, a director at a Swedish NGO, told of how emailing 
reports produced by their NGO to the head office of Swedish retail outlets was a 
strategy by which they attempted to achieve their goal of banning the sale of tropical 
shrimp: 
 
We sent it to them, [Swedish retailer name], our report on all of this. They wrote to us… 
they wrote to our head office, saying, “A reply to…” [report name], was what our 
organization had done. At that time the first thing I wrote was actually to ask them a 
set of questions, because they can’t answer.  
 
They say that for example the programme provides – they say ASC, provides a means 
to measurably improve the environmental and social performers of shrimp 
aquaculture. Then we say – please show us measured improvements… Of chemical 
use before and after ASC certification, from a specific farm; Please specify kind and 
amount of antibiotics used before and after. They can’t answer, because they have no 
idea. 
 (interview recording, 2019) 
 
Another way that NGOs sought to achieve influence was by seeking to shape the 
formulation of regional, national and supranational legislation governing matters 
pertaining to seafood. 
 
One respondent, a project lead at an international environmental NGO outlined how 
old legislation coming up for renewal presented a window of opportunity for 
shaping new standards and norms: 
 
Now we have the process…which is a very big priority for [NGO name]. There are new 
negotiations on an Oceans Treaty, because if we don’t get that right, then we’re going 
to be in really big shit. But we have an opportunity to kind of fix some of this, like 
broken patchwork of governing the high seas and governing the oceans. 
(interview recording, 2019) 
 
NGOs also often wrote reports about specific topics, and used these reports to 
generate awareness as well as to legitimatize their efforts. A respondent from an 
international NGO spoke of a forthcoming report on unsustainable fishing 
operations in the Global South: “We’re very soon going to release a report about the 
expansion of fishmeal and fish oil factories in West Africa. They’re like basically 
stealing food in West Africa.” (interview recording, 2019) 
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Between 2008 and 2018, the most significant and influential action taken by an NGO 
in Sweden was the launch of the ‘Anti-Scampi’ campaign against tropical shrimp, 
started by the SSNC. The campaign successfully utilized traditional and social media 
– especially YouTube, Twitter and Facebook – in order to change an existing norm 
about tropical shrimp which quickly escalated into something significant, and 
fundamentally reshaped the dynamics of the seafood sector and shrimp industry.  
 
Anti-Scampi 
In 2011, the SSNC launched a massive campaign against farmed tropical shrimp, 
especially Penaeus monodon, but also Litopenaeus vannamei. The SSNC utilised social 
media, traditional media and physical protests in order create awareness of the social 
and environmental harms which they perceived tropical shrimp farming as causing. 
The stated mission of the campaign was “Om du bara vill göra en enda pyttesak som är 
helt ovärderlig för miljön – då är det att avstå från jätteräkan!”, translating in English to 
“You only want to do one teeny tiny thing that will contribute to a better world, keep 
tiger prawns off your plate!” Since 2011, 7 April has been celebrated by 
Naturskyddsforeningen as ‘Anti-Scampi’ Day.  
 
The campaign centred around a short animated ‘ad’ shown on television and 
YouTube titled ‘one small thing’, as well as two mini documentaries showing the 
practice of farming of tropical shrimp in Bangladesh, and in Ecuador. The devastating 
truth behind shrimp farming has 114,000 views as of January 2019. During the video, 
the supermarkets ICA and Coop are singled out and directly asked to stop selling 
tropical shrimp. The documentary also claims that endosulfan, a broad-spectrum 
insecticide which is banned in most countries, is still used in prawn farming in 
Bangladesh.  Endosulfan is an xenoestrogen, which mimics the human hormone 
estrogen and can create serious endocrinological problems in human beings, as well 
as killing other species in areas surrounding prawn farms and accumulating up the 
food chain (Dorts et al., 2009). The making of the documentaries, which involved 
SSNC staff traveling to these countries, was partially funded by the Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), a Swedish Government 
agency. A disclaimer at the end of the documentaries states “Produced with 
economic support from SIDA. SIDA has not participated in the production of the 
publication and has not evaluated the facts or opinions that are expressed.” The 
Swedish version of the Anti-Scampi YouTube video was posted in November 2011. 
Comments from viewers range from people trolling with posts such as “Sucked in, I 
just put scampi on my pizza!” through to more thoughtful comments such as “I find 
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this informative but it only covers one point of view.” As of November 2017, the Anti-
Scampi Facebook page had 14,300 ‘likes’, and the hashtag #keepemoffyourplate 
featured prominently on Twitter in late 2011 and early 2012, based on searches 
conducted on Twitter.  
 
As well as an online campaign, the Anti-Scampi campaign also involved protests in 
the seafood aisles of supermarkets. The sustainability coordinator of one of the major 
Swedish food retailers interviewed in this study, who witnessed such a protest, noted 
that the store was overwhelmed by the consumer response to the campaign and were 
“basically forced” (interview recording, 2017) to remove all tropical shrimp. 
 
A director at an international seafood certification scheme shared their surprise at 
how quickly the campaign rose to prominence: 
 
I was so surprised [at Anti-Scampi]… I became aware of this huge issue that it's become 
with this shrimp and there was even on television, so I realise how high visibility it 
had. 
 (interview recording, 2019) 
 
The owner of a Swedish seafood company noted that during the Anti-Scampi 
campaign, there was absolutely “nothing” (interview recording, 2017) to 
counterbalance the claims made by some of the environmental NGOs. The whole 
affair, according to this respondent, presented a one-sided view and turned a 
complex issue into a black and white one, all the while not giving seafood companies 
a fair chance to respond and stand up for themselves. A respondent from an 
international NGO was also surprised at just how successful it was, and the fact that 
many firms felt upset by the campaign and other decisions around shrimp, such as 
suddenly ‘red lighting’ certain species: 
 
I mean the Anti-Scampi campaign – it went huge. I think it was significant, definitely. 
And I think we’ve seen that over the years in terms of other species as well. I mean we 
had a… The Pandalus borealis, here in Sweden, the shrimp fishermen – I think it was in 
2014 – we put them on our red light… And I mean it just went bananas, you know. We 
had so many different phone calls, and the fishermen were really upset and the retailers 
were upset. And everyone talked about how sustainable they were. And then I mean 
after the storm you sort of saw an impact in the industry. And it actually, our red-
listing, the effect that that had was that the shrimp fishermen went into certification. 
So, I think it was like one year later they were MSC certified. So that really shows that 
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what we’re saying is having an impact, and they are improving. So even though the 
instant reaction might be like, “No, you’re wrong.” After some time has gone, you sort 
of see an effect. 
 (interview recording, 2019) 
 
One of several ways that the SSNC sought to alter norms of what the norms of 
acceptability for operating in the shrimp industry were (beyond physically protesting 
in stores, which was done to great effect in 2011) was to make it a distinct condition 
of their Bra Miljöval label that the certified store sell no tropical shrimp at all, no 
matter what eco-labels they carried. If a store wanted overall Bra Miljöval certification 
(which many apparently did as they perceived it as a strategic advantage in 
environmentally conscious Sweden), then they had to get rid of all tropical shrimp. 
This was done, according to one respondent from an NGO, in order to “put pressure 
on them and their suppliers. All the three major retailing chains in Sweden, it’s an 
oligopoly, more or less, so Coop and ICA and Axfood.” (interview recording, 2019) 
 
Not necessarily a tool of influence in and of itself but rather a physical manifestation 
of their sustainability interpretation, NGOs developed a number of lists, guides, 
rankings and certification schemes – artefacts which they aimed to get other actors to 
confirm to. The reputational costs of non-conformity to these documents was 
perceived retailers as being very high, and as a result all four of the major 
supermarket chains in Sweden now based their fish and shrimp sustainability 
strategy around seafood guides, especially the WWF Red List. As a seafood manager 
for one of the ‘big four’ Swedish supermarket chains put it, “Its Sweden – we work 
with the WWF guide as a bible” (interview recording, 2017). A respondent from an 
NGO was aware of the influential nature of these artefacts and how they could be 
used to get “reactions”: 
 
Our seafood guide, which is a huge part of what we’re focusing our work around; 
talking to consumers and mainly business and fishing industry, on how they can 
improve their way of fishing, and their way of farming. Our guide is used by many 
stakeholders. And when we score something with red lights, or yellow lights, and say 
that it’s not sustainable, then we get reactions. 
(interview recording, 2019) 
 
Both the use of campaigns and artefacts had impacts across the entire value stream. 
While some targeted fishing companies and end-retailers, others targeted customers. 
The flow on effect from targeting any one actor was that the supply and/or demand 
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of shrimp would diminish. The influence of campaigns and artefacts was amplified 
and echoed through noise in media, which played a vital role in allowing NGOs to 
achieve such a level of dominance in the shrimp industry.  
 
4.1.4 The role of conventional and social media in amplifying NGO messages 
The WWF, Greenpeace and SSNC were able to use both traditional and social media 
in order to initially communicate, solidify and amplify their messages around shrimp 
sustainability. Through media amplification, they were able to quickly gain traction 
of their message and create unexpectedly high levels of public awareness of the social 
and environmental issues associated with shrimp consumption. This high public 
awareness had two profound impacts.  
Firstly, from the perspective of actors in the Swedish seafood industry, it quickly 
reframed the shrimp debate from being a minor peripheral issue to becoming 
something which had the potential to badly hurt the reputation of primary producers 
and distributors (or put them out of business altogether), as the Swedish public were 
now aware of the issue and were majority-sided with the NGOs. Secondly, positive 
feedback loops in television and radio coverage and social media algorithms meant 
that the NGOs were given a commanding voice in defining the scope of the debate, 
and perceived as being crusaders for good, while the primary producers and 
distributors were framed as being out of touch and needing to catch up with modern 
societal norms. Far less media coverage (if any) was given to the responses of the 
fishing companies and food retailers whose actions were the ones under scrutiny.  
 
Debate around the social and environmental sustainability of shrimp is a topic that 
has received and continues to receive significant media coverage in Sweden. While 
the debate peaked between 2011 and 2015 and has not since reached these heights in 
terms of the breadth and depth of media coverage, the topic of shrimp and questions 
abound their sustainability endure. This media coverage has taken two distinct 
forms. Firstly, coverage by both government-owned and private media outlets. This 
form of media attention has primarily consisted of supposedly-impartial, indifferent 
reporting of the key happenings of the shrimp debate, taking place through the 
conventional media channels of television, radio and newspaper. The second form of 
media coverage has been the use of social media by the actors involved in the shrimp 
debate in order to shape the debate to suit their narrative. This has taken place 
primarily over social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, and has 
consisted typically of actors using these social media sites to encourage the general 
public of Sweden to take a particular stance on the shrimp debate and translate that 
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stance through to actionable behaviours (such as buying or not buying shrimp, or 
even physically protesting in a store).  
At the onset of this study it appeared that the media was simply a platform or location 
where actor voices were projected. However, it has become clear that the media itself 
is (perhaps unintentionally) a prominent actor in the Swedish shrimp debate, and 
based on the significant role that the media has played it meets the criteria of a “a 
participant in an action or process” (the definition of ‘actor’ used in this study) as 
opposed to merely being a passive bystander or observer.  
This sub-theme provides a description of the role of the media in the Sweden shrimp 
sustainability debate. Part one considers the role of conventional media, drawing on 
data gathered in a library database archival study of key stories relating to shrimp in 
Sweden from 2008 to 2018, a period which has seen drastic changes to the shrimp and 
broader seafood market in Sweden.  Part two considers the role of social media, with 
the focus falling largely on the Anti-Scampi campaign from 2011 to 2014, given that 
this was the time period when social media came to the highest prominence. Both 
sections also make use of interview data.  
Conventional media 
Analysis of interview data revealed that some actors, especially seafood companies 
and retailers, had the perception that that throughout the shrimp debates the media 
had taken a very ‘pro-sustainability’ stance, choosing to side with the NGOs.  One 
respondent, a manager for a large retailer, described it as follows: 
I don’t think that we today had been where we are without NGOs or the media actually. 
It’s definitely media and NGO which have a part, which have pushed all the retailers 
and the business into more or less, accepted to work with sustainability. 
(interview recording, 2017)  
To investigate whether this comment and the dozen or so similar ones throughout 
the interview data set are merely anecdotal or in fact do paint an accurate 
representation of what happened, it was necessary to delve into some of the key 
media stories relating to the shrimp debate in Sweden between 2008 and 2018 and 
attempt to summarize the general tonality of the reporting. Otero and Baumann’s 
(2016) study of the Pandalus borealis ‘red listing’ raised an interesting caveat in regards 
to the role of the media, noting that the media “determines how much exposure a 
particular perspective gets, which in turn affects the perception of audiences.” (Otero 
& Baumann, 2016 p. 56).” The sentiment of such a point is that while the media may 
not directly take sides in a given debate and may portray a sense of impartiality, the 
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reality is that a story can easily be skewed simply by giving more air time and 
coverage to the side that is favoured. We must consider here that a media 
organization such as public broadcaster Sveriges Television AB (SVT) does not have 
direct associations with the seafood industry in Sweden, and as such there is no 
suggestion that any media organization has taken or would take a particular stance 
on shrimp for the purposes of their own advancement. However, what seems to have 
happened instead is that NGOs such as Greenpeace, the WWF and SSNC have 
through a variety of mechanisms been able to create a situation whereby they were 
able to successfully use conventional media to amplify their message, and in doing 
so making their stance on shrimp become the dominant narrative reported.  
While Sweden is a country that has frequently been an early adopter of technical 
breakthroughs and new forms of media, the three ‘traditional’ media forms of 
newspapers (physical and online), television and radio play a surprisingly significant 
role in day-to-day life. Media organizations in Sweden are generally very trusted. A 
recent study on Nordic Leadership, produced by the Nordic Council of Ministers, 
noted that “In the Nordic region, we emphasize the importance of companies having 
responsible relationships with peripheral actors and society more than in other parts 
of the world.” (Nordic leadership, 2018, p. 27). An analysis was conducted through the 
University of Gothenburg Library’s Newspaper, Audio and Video Database, which 
searches through a massive catalogue of the most common news television programs, 
newspaper articles and radio broadcasts. Search terms used were various 
combinations of shrimp, prawn, räka, räkor, scampi, Anti-scampi, hållbarhet , hållbar 
utveckling, Pandalus borealis, Litopenaeus vannamei, Melicertus latisulcatus, and Penaeus 
monodon. Results suggested that these terms featured around 1,840 times in major 
newspaper, radio and television stories between 2011 and 2015.  
Search results revealed extensive media coverage of the shrimp debate in Sweden 
between 2008 and 2018. The majority of stories presented a very ‘pro-environment’ 
stance, pushing Swedish consumers to minimize consumption of or completely avoid 
eating tropical farmed shrimp. A story from the 2011-08-25 edition of newspaper 
Göteborgs Posten written by Adrianna Pavlica perhaps best summarizes the ‘typical’ 
coverage of the shrimp debate in Sweden: 
Headline in Swedish:  
Kampanj mot jätteräkor: Jätteräkorna förstör miljön och skapar sociala problem. Nu drar 
Naturskyddsföreningen igång en anti-scampi-kampanj. 
 
 
 
83 
English translation of headline: 
Campaign against Scampi: The giant shrimp destroy the environment and create social 
problems. Now the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation is launching an anti-
scampi campaign. 
English translation of the article: 
Tiger shrimp, gampas, tropical shrimp, scampi. The giant prawns have many names, 
and have become increasingly popular. – It's very problematic. The giant shrimp is the 
worst food I can imagine, it's time to deal with it once and for all, says [name withheld 
for privacy reasons] of the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation, who is the marine 
ecosystem and fisheries manager. There are both fished and cultivated giant prawns. 
Fishing is done with trawls and provides great by-catch. – For every giant shrimp you 
can get a hundred other fish that are just thrown away, says [name withheld for privacy 
reasons]. But it is the cultivated shrimp that create the biggest problem. Cultivation 
takes place in Asia, and it is common to cut down a lot of mangrove forest. – The forest 
is an important resource where people find food and firewood. And it protects against 
storms and tsunamis. Mangrove forest is one of our most important ecosystems, says 
[name withheld for privacy reasons]… A lot of chemicals are pumped into the crops, 
which therefore has to change place after a while and destroys even more forest. In 
addition, the giant prawns themselves get a lot of antibiotics for preventive purposes, 
as they easily get sick. But the cultivations also have major consequences for the 
residents of the area. – People can't fish, for example, they can't access their beach. 
Usually you do not get through the cultivations, there are usually heavily armed 
guards there. There are eco-labelled giant prawns, but according to [name withheld for 
privacy reasons] they are no alternative. – Nobody has managed to produce a giant 
shrimp that you can eat with good conscience, she says. The Nature Conservation 
campaign started on Wednesday. By the afternoon, it had already received nearly 1,700 
"likes" on Facebook. A short film, Antiscampi – The Movie is now available online, and 
hopes that more people will choose the giant shrimp from the plate. 
While the apparent purpose of the above article was to simply report on the launch 
of the Anti-Scampi campaign rather provide an in-depth analysis of the state of 
shrimp in Sweden, on the surface it fails the most basic impartiality test of journalism 
by not offering any counter-voices to that of the spokesperson from the NGO. It is 
not said whether this was due to lack of availability or interest of a spokesperson or 
simply whether efforts to find a counter-voice were not made. Some of the 
suggestions made by the spokesperson from the NGO in this article are arguably 
exaggerated, such as suggesting a clear causal relationship between shrimp-farm 
caused mangrove swamp clearing and an increased danger from tsunamis. While it 
 
 
84 
is indeed true that mangroves do offer protection against tsunamis (Kathiresan & 
Rajendran, 2005), it is debatable as to the effect that shrimp farms have. 
The above news story, which is emblematic of dozens of others, perhaps only tells 
one side of the shrimp debate, and is typical of the sorts of articles which proved 
influential in amplifying the messages of the environmental NGOs and creating high 
levels of public awareness.  
Social media 
Social media played (and as of 2020, continues to play) a significant role in the shrimp 
debate in Sweden, and served as an important mechanism for the three NGOs to 
achieve a commanding level of influence over the narrative by generating public 
awareness of and support for their stance on shrimp. This momentum was then used 
to launch contests to the legitimacy of corporations in the industry. Sites like 
Facebook, YouTube and Twitter allowed NGOs to communicate their interests, 
engage in virtual protests or lobbying of other actors, to mobilize the public behind 
their stance, and as a way of openly showing off the support that they have for their 
stance through the number of ‘likes’ on a status, page or video.  The prominence 
social media came to light especially during the Anti-Scampi campaign, where the 
activities of SSNC and their heavy use of Facebook posts and Twitter hashtags lead 
to rapid and significant awareness amongst Swedish consumers of the apparent 
social and environmental harms of Shrimp consumption. These organizations were 
perceived as being able to effectively utilize media in order gain the support of the 
seafood buying public, and as a result achieve levels of influence far beyond what 
their size or membership base would typically be able to command. 
Empirical material collected during interviews suggested that campaigns played a 
prominent role in determining how what constituted sustainable or legitimate 
behaviour in the Swedish shrimp industry between 2008 and 2018. The interview 
data suggested that both traditional media and social media acted as ‘amplifiers’ of 
these movements and allowed them to gain a level of traction and size that would 
have not been possible otherwise. One respondent from a major international 
environmental NGO reflected how “Social media has made a massive difference.” 
(interview recording, 2019)  
 
The purpose of social media campaigns during the height of the shrimp debate in 
Sweden seemed to be primarily to generate public support for the cause of the three 
NGOs (especially the SSNC, who lead the debate), which could be translated to 
“target the retailers” to remove “unsustainable” shrimp from their stores, as one 
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respondent from a Swedish NGO put it (recording, 2019).  The respondent reflected 
on the success of the Anti-Scampi campaign in 2011 as being partly due to the fact 
that campaigns run through Twitter, Facebook and YouTube were back then 
somewhat unusual, and puts down the success of the campaign partly “because we 
were early” (interview recording, 2019).  The respondent pointed out that as of 2019 
it has become much more difficult to run campaigns over social media due to noise 
and high demand for the attention of the viewer, which was not as prominent in 2011 
when social media was still in (relative) infancy:  
 
You have to compete with all the kinds of other message. And furthermore, now the 
algorithms are punishing you if you have too broad a message. They’re supporting you 
if you have an almost populistic message. 
(interview recording, 2019) 
 
To summarize, media – both social and traditional – played a significant role in 
allowing NGOs to rise to a position where they could unfreeze existing industry 
norms and mount challenges to the social acceptability of the actions of corporations 
and in turn contest their legitimacy.  
 
4.1.5 NGOs perceived as failing to understand the realities of business 
A prominent theme throughout nearly all interviews conducted was that of the 
tensions present between achieving social and environmental sustainability whilst 
also achieving immediate financial interest. During interviews, actors would 
sometimes accuse another actor in the industry another of failing to understand 
‘their’ world, and accuse the other side of being overly idealistic and nor in touch 
with the ‘real world’.  This was especially the case for primary producers and 
distributors, who often claimed that the NGOs were out of touch with ‘reality’, and 
sought goals that were overly perfectionistic and not grounded in common sense. 
 
A Swedish seafood company owner argued that some environmental NGOs ignored 
the realities of business and did not understand how markets worked:  
 
That's why some people here, like environmental organizations, they don't understand 
the mechanism behind the market. They just think green. That's good, but we also have 
to have the mechanism to make it work. 
(interview recording, 2017)  
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A similar sentiment was noted by a sustainability coordinator from a major 
Swedish food retailer, who reflected on how “It cannot be that way [that 
sustainability should be put first]. We are a business, we are not WWF. But we 
really try to do the best we can. (interview recording, 2017) 
 
Another respondent, a manager at a different major Swedish food retailer explained 
that sometimes NGOs did not understand the timeframe that was required for 
businesses to bring about changes, and that there were sometimes unintended 
negative consequences of NGO pressure, such as perfectly good fish and shrimp 
going to waste:  
 
WWF thought like you can maybe just get rid of it and you're like... it's already been 
fished, just going to be labelled and sent to us. We already have orders all this amount, 
the fish is already dead. But in the way that they are talking to the consumer, sometimes 
then it will be hard for us to sell it. 
(interview recording, 2017) 
 
Other respondents also flagged the fact that seemingly noble causes also had oft-
forgotten consequences when sudden changes were demanded. One pondered on 
what happens“…if you throw out all of the shrimps in Swedish supermarkets or 
Norwegian supermarkets…” (recording, 2017).  
 
On the other side of the table, a policy officer at a Swedish environmental NGO 
illustrated a polar-opposite view, suggesting that sustainability was essential for 
business to operate, due to the limits of the natural environment: 
 
I'm not interested − you can never run a business that makes money on behalf of the 
environment or the people who need these resources in order to survive and to make 
a living. 
(interview recording, 2017) 
 
Another respondent working for the fisheries department of a different NGO 
acknowledged the impact that their actions had on producers, and realised that it 
did create limits on their access to markets: 
 
So, I guess that’s a good thing because it means that we’re actually having an impact. 
But of course, it’s also impacting on producers’ possibility to sell their products and 
access to markets, so… 
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(interview recording, 2019) 
 
The owner of a Swedish seafood business felt that it had reached a point where their 
company and others were getting “fed up” (interview recording, 2017) with NGO 
pressure (and carry through pressure from retailers) and reflected upon why it was 
even worth bothering going through rigorous certification schemes like ASC when 
there is less and less commercial benefit in doing so. 
 
Another respondent, a C-suite executive of a major international seafood certification 
scheme, felt that some of environmental organizations had made a lot of noise about 
seafood but made no real tangible or helpful contribution:  
 
They [NGOs] have a part to play in terms of raising awareness, but as far as I'm aware, 
there's no evidence they've made a blind bit of difference whatsoever in terms of 
consumption let alone change on the water. 
(interview recording, 2017) 
 
Over the course of several interviews, the owner of a Swedish seafood company 
which imports shrimp from Asia reflected on frustrations in dealing with NGOs. This 
respondent believed that NGOs were unreasonable and overly perfectionistic: 
 
I have reasoned with those people for many years now. I say, ‘I would like discussion. 
Tell me what I can do?’ I have the impression that they are more − Some people in this 
organization [NGO] when I spoke to them last time… It seems that they are just 
fighting this question [about farmed shrimp sustainability] for historical reasons . They 
don't want to drop it. They said last time, "We are doing it for our members." I said, 
"They are misinformed”. They think that the worst thing you can do is eating vannamei 
or black tiger shrimps… I have the impression that some of those issues that they 
[environmental NGOs] − For instance now the shrimp issue that they − they come up 
with facts that are actually good for them to promote this − How should I say? − boycott 
against the shrimp. They don't, for instance, take up that 98% of the issues are actually 
solved by ASC.” 
 (interview recording, 2017) 
 
A manager at a seafood certification scheme (working in the Swedish regional office) 
reflected similar sentiments in terms of being concerned by NGO pressure, especially 
in terms of them wanting a standard whereby the bar was raised too high: 
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How do we avoid getting into trouble with the NGOs because they're critical of our 
operations?’ Mostly the issue is about that the NGO's want the bar to be higher. In a 
way, it's a strange way of being critical because that's implicitly arguing that you're 
already doing a good thing but you should be doing it more. You should have higher 
expectations of fisheries then getting MSC labels should be even more – you should 
have to be even better from the start while the MSC program is also including learning 
and improving aspect. 
(interview recording, 2017) 
 
One Swedish fishing company described growing tired of meeting the constantly 
changing demands of the NGOs, and alluded to a point in the future where they 
might not continue with their efforts unless the NGOs were more reasonable: 
 
Suppliers like myself may not want to continue this effort and all the attention they’re 
actually paying for this program (gaining certification so as to meet the requirements 
of the NGO lists) today if they don’t any benefits out from it or volume. 
 (interview recording, 2017) 
 
The NGOs themselves realised the pressure they were placing, but emphasized the 
voluntary aspect of complying with the artefacts. When asked specifically about the 
pressure placed on retailers and fishing companies by the lists that NGOs created, a 
fisheries specialist at an NGO reflected: 
 
Yeah, I mean I can definitely understand that point of view. Still I think it’s important 
to remember that our recommendations – they are recommendations, they are not 
mandatory. So, it’s up to each company if they want to follow it or not. We don’t set 
the legislation framework. I mean we give these recommendations and then everyone 
can decide if they want to follow them or not. 
 (interview recording, 2019) 
The inference here that the lists were merely recommendations was in strong 
opposition with how they were perceived by corporations, who felt they had little 
choice but to abide to them.  
 
Also raised was the theme that the lists were by nature unfair and demanded a level 
of perfection that was simply too high. A respondent from a Swedish government 
agency fisheries department reflected on how the high expectations of NGOs on 
fishing companies were indeed sometimes unfair: 
 
 
 
89 
But for the individual fisherman of course, it creates a problem in that well, “I’ve done 
everything, I’ve followed all the rules, but still I get a red light.” It definitely creates a 
sense of unfairness in some cases, I think. 
(interview recording, 2019) 
NGOs such as the SSNC claimed that some third-party certification schemes like the 
ASC, MSC and others lacked rigor, and therefore they could not endorse them. Such 
arguments were put to individuals working at these certification schemes during 
interviews. They frequently acknowledged that their schemes were far from perfect, 
but that progress had to start somewhere. A director of one such certification scheme 
noted that perfectionism straight away was impossible: 
 
You can't start 100%, you have to start somewhere and try to increase it. And if you can 
get the first 15, 20%, the highest performers, and then work down from there. I mean, 
you have to start somewhere, that's what we want to do. 
(interview recording, 2019) 
 
When asked ‘What would you say to the argument that some people would make, 
that having some standards is better than nothing – that the ASC is not perfect but 
it’s a start’, a respondent from an NGO suggested that such an argument was 
flawed, as in their judgement some certification schemes were fundamentally below 
the standard needed to achieve sustainability that it didn’t even represent a starting 
place but in fact a step backwards. According to this respondent ,the ASC was 
“Legitimizing destruction, environmental destruction, the… Social…  You know, 
the irresponsible way of… And you’re legitimizing corruption, legitimizing 
everything. (interview recording, 2019) 
This was not the case for all NGOs, however. Some actively worked with the 
certification schemes (and with other NGOs) to improve the sustainability criteria. A 
respondent from one of the NGOs which retailers had deemed as more reasonable to 
work with described this multi-actor working relationship during an interview:  
 
When this critique started about the shrimp industry in Sweden, we had long 
discussions – both [NGOs], with the industry… And what we saw then was… I mean… 
People didn’t stop consuming shrimp, as I said. I mean there was still consumption, 
and that’s why we felt like, okay, we need to change strategy, we need to… This is 
apparently not working, just to say, “Stop eating…” Because people will still consume. 
So, we should find another path. And that’s why we decided to work with the standard 
owners. We have a close collaboration both with ASC and MSC… And we’re always 
trying to look at ways that you can sharpen the sustainability criteria in these 
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standards. And also working directly with producers – I mean we have offices in Asia 
that are helping shrimp farmers to go into certification processes. That’s the way we 
feel we can shift the industry to become more sustainable. 
 (interview recording, 2019) 
Other NGOs were more hard-line about their view that business models must work 
within the ecological carrying capacity of the planet – and must do so immediately. 
During an interview with a respondent from international environmental NGO, a 
question around the realities of business was directly posed to the respondent: 
 
‘One of the claims that business has made is that they think that all of you in the NGO 
world don’t understand the realities of business. And of course, as a neutral, impartial 
researcher, my job is to sit on the fence and to not take sides. They sort of say that these 
NGOs, they couple you together with the others because they see you all in the same 
category and they say, “Well, they come and they make these lists every year and they 
demand that we do this and that. They don’t understand how the world works. We 
can’t keep up with the changes that they want. It’s all happening too quickly for us. 
There’s too much pressure on us and they don’t understand the realities of business 
that we have to make money, in order to be viable in the future. Yes, we care about 
sustainability but unless we’re making a profit, we can’t be sustainable anyway.” So, 
what would you say to a business owner in Sweden who comes across as saying things 
like that?’ 
 
The respondent answered as follows: 
 
I don’t know, like, are you fishing yourself out of business? It’s not going the right way, 
so it’s like there’s very little evidence and now with the latest report from the west 
coast, the collapse of the Baltic cod stock, I’m like, “Guys, this is not a very good 
business model that you guys have.” “And if you’re not willing to change, you’re going 
to be out of business.” But like for me, that change isn’t necessarily by being certified; 
it’s by looking at these fisheries and how we do this way differently. Because I do think 
that we have seen many certified fisheries on the west coast of Sweden and in the 
Baltics that now have collapsed or are on the brink of collapsing. 
(interview recording, 2019) 
 
Other respondents, such as a supply chain manager at a seafood certification scheme, 
outlined the nuances and complexity of the sustainability debate, and the fact that 
there were indeed tensions between business realities and aspirational sustainability 
goals: 
 
 
 
91 
It’s very realistic tension, and there’re two sides of that story. It’s absolutely true that 
that the only way businesses can contribute to sustainability is by being also financially 
sustainable, right. They do need to run a business, a profitable business, otherwise, they 
cannot provide to jobs, investing in health and safety, investing in the environment if 
they’re not also making a profit. I think that’s also a valid point that maybe sometimes 
some NGOs forget. 
(interview recording, 2017) 
 
The theme of the realities of business was highly significant in terms of attempting to 
answer the research question of the study of how legitimacy is contested, as it 
brought to surface the fact that interpretations of social and environmental 
sustainability were heavily shaped by the need for organizations to be financially 
sustainable. On one side, environmental NGOs felt that it was inherently wrong for 
an organization to profit from shrimp production that produced what they perceived 
as an unacceptably large level of social and environmental harm. On the other side, 
commercial fishing companies and retailers felt that NGOs placed unrealistic 
expectations on them in terms of asking too much in terms of being sustainable, and 
not being aware of the realities of running a business and that an organization must 
be able to survive financially in order to have any sort of sustainability policy. 
 
4.2 The contextual idiosyncratic uniqueness of Sweden, and the 
seafood and fishing industry 
Thematic analysis of empirical material revealed that there was something unique 
and unparalleled about both Sweden, and the seafood and fishing industry. This 
contextual uniqueness had implications for how contests to legitimacy manifested. 
This theme was on numerous occasions explicitly raised (usually unprovoked) by the 
majority of the respondents during interviews, and further reinforced through 
analysis of secondary data. Many respondents felt that the culture and history of 
Sweden had created an operating environment that demanded a very high level of 
environmental and social responsibility from all actors in all capacities of society – 
but especially those operating in food production, and especially in the fishing and 
seafood sector. It was seen that this industry was regarded as being different and 
unique, and that the shrimp had come to symbolize much of what was seen as being 
wrong with the food industry. Four sub-themes contributed to the overall formation 
of the broader theme of idiosyncratic uniqueness: the high social and environmental 
operating standards expected of all actors in Sweden and the historical and cultural 
reasons for this; the uniqueness of the fishing and seafood industry; personal 
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connection of the individuals representing each actor to fishing and marine life; and 
finally, the sense of optimism (or lack thereof) about the future of the world’s oceans 
and waterways. These four factors seem to have led to a situation which made 
contests to societal acceptance of corporations more easily achievable than in other 
contextual domains.  
 
4.2.1 The uniqueness of Sweden  
Empirical material suggested that Sweden was perceived as being a country where 
high levels of social and environmental awareness and performance was expected of 
business, government, NGOs and private individuals. While such expectations 
existed in other countries (especially neighbouring Nordic countries), data suggested 
that there was something unique about Sweden, that this uniqueness was partly due 
to the history of the country and that it had significant impacts in terms of how social 
and environmental issues were framed and debated within Sweden. These high 
levels of expectations led to a situation where SLO and environmental issues were 
intrinsically connected, and contests to legitimacy were more possible than in other 
industry settings.  
 
A director at a Swedish environmental NGO offered the suggestion that part of the 
reason why NGOs were able to achieve such a level of influence in shaping what 
constituted sustainability in terms of shrimp was due to historical, social and political 
reasons which have made matters of the natural environment a constant issue of 
importance amongst the Swedish population. NGOs in Sweden with an 
environmental focus have been, according to this respondent, able to play on this 
historical importance of nature in order to amplify their impact and command a 
dominant role in public discourse: 
 
I don’t think it was a coincidence that all of this happened to be in Sweden…We had a 
period of almost, I think 40 years of, well, consecutive Social Democratic governments. 
There was a huge focus on trying to even out the balance between the production and 
the consumer side., Nature has always been like the church, for Swedes and protecting 
it is something which came into play when we started seeing that stuff happened.. The 
end of the ‘80s, when the seals started dying on a massive scale here on the West Coast, 
it was around the same time as the sentiment of, okay, what we’re doing is having an 
effect on the environment. Silent Spring came in the ‘60s and that also affected Swedes 
a lot. We had the first Human Conference for Environment in ’72, in Stockholm… All 
of this has meant that organizations such as ours have had and maybe always will have 
a big role in shaping the conversation around environmental issues. It’s all this cultural 
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thing, all this. We’re the most individualistic people in the world and we love collective, 
the collective society. 
 (interview recording, 2019) 
 
Moreover, it was said that the unique history of Sweden in regards to matters of 
environmental concern, social equality and egalitarianism meant that the conditions 
for the launch of contests to legitimacy, such as the 2011 Anti-Scampi campaign, were 
optimal. One respondent, a director a Swedish NGO, described this as follows, 
making a comparison between Sweden and the United States:  
 
You have the folk school movement, for example. And then social concern for more 
egalitarian society. Co-op was also a big movement. All of these social and historical 
matters. These set the tone. And they said, you know, like bananas, if they went to the 
United States, they would be concerned about if there was anything damaging in the 
banana, for the consumers. While the Swedish would say, ‘How is it with the workers, 
how is it for the environment’? And they would ask me, but you know, “Have you 
found any antibiotics in the shrimp?” I’m not really… That’s of little interest really. 
(interview recording, 2019) 
 
Another respondent emphasized the unique culture in Sweden, a culture where 
societal expectations of business are very high, and consumers want to know where 
their food comes from and how it was produced. The respondent, a director at an 
international NGO, told of a seafood company selling in Sweden who was initially 
against the idea of gaining MSC certification of their products, but eventually was 
pushed into it due to consumer and retailer pressure: 
 
They were really against eco-labelling. After a couple of years, they found the pressure 
that consumers, retailers, would not buy something unless they had the transparency, 
unless they could provide and really prove that they had sustainable stocks. And 
therefore, the fishermen went in and got their fisheries certified.  
 (interview recording, 2019) 
 
The fact that Sweden was one of the first countries in the world to have ‘eco-label’ 
schemes in place has meant that there has historically been fairly high consumer 
awareness of these labels and trust in them. In the words of a program director for 
an International NGO operating in Sweden: 
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The existence of labels so early in the Swedish market has pre-empted a lot of green 
claims coming in. There was already a benchmark in there. The confusion is less, 
whereas if you ask a U.S. customer what they think is green, you have such an 
abundance of green claims. 
(interview recording, 2019) 
 
A project lead at an international environmental NGO made comparisons to Norway, 
and suggested that although culturally and geographically similar, Norway and 
Sweden in fact had quite different approaches to sustainability: 
 
I think, like we’re [Sweden] a smaller population. I think we have quite a lot of space. 
I think we have a closer relationship to nature. I think we’re also very trend sensitive, 
we that live in Sweden… I think also, if you look at Norway for example, going into 
supermarkets it’s like super depressing. Everything in Norway, we put the Norwegian 
flag on the product, it’s enough. It’s not always a sustainability label because 
everything in Norway is sustainable by definition, being Norwegian. While, in 
Sweden, we’ve had Göran Persson, a former Prime Minister way back, saying that he 
was sceptical even to eat the meat that was produced in Sweden if it wasn’t sort of 
certified. So, I think it’s a huge difference in Sweden. A Swedish flag on a product 
doesn’t necessarily give Swedes the confidence that that product is good. We want 
additional insurance of that. But like in Norway, the flag is like, yoo-hoo! 
 (interview recording, 2019) 
 
These above-average social and environmental standards of operation were picked 
up and responded to by foreign seafood companies trying to sell their product in 
Sweden, such as an Australian shrimp cooperative which realized that an eco-label 
was essential to “get a foot in the door” (interview recording, 2017) in Sweden. 
 
A similar response was ascertained from an export director for a commercial shrimp 
farming operation based in Vietnam, which sought to farm their shrimp in a certain 
way and with certain certification (ASC) to access “Northern European markets, 
including Sweden” (interview recording, 2017). With the knowledge of the strict 
sustainability requirements of the Northern European markets, this company 
oriented its entire business model towards achieving this aim of gaining market 
access by setting up amongst the most high-tech, environmentally sustainable shrimp 
farming operation in Asia. 
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Sweden was described by one respondent, a director at an international certification 
scheme, as being a “frontrunner” in terms of sustainability, and reflected on the 
strong “emotional ties” that Swedes have to the natural environment:  
 
Sweden, you're in the right country I think for sustainability and they're always 
frontrunners. And it really resonates with the consumers in Scandinavia, in northern 
Europe in general… If you're a developing country, if you're Indonesia or some African 
nation, they don't have the luxury to think about sustainability sometimes… We have 
this in Sweden where you can walk and enjoy the nature, and it's for everyone. I think 
that has really played a role, because everybody feels like they have a stake in the 
environment, because it belongs to everyone.. They have such strong emotional ties to 
the environment in the Nordic countries.  
 (interview recording, 2019) 
 
Similar sentiments were echoed by a fisheries expert at an international 
environmental NGO, who also emphasized the generally positive perception that 
social and environmental NGOs in Sweden have: 
 
One thing, I think Sweden is a country where we have consumers that are very aware 
and informed about sustainability issues. So, I mean we have a very mature market 
here, which makes it easier for us to do our work… And I mean in Sweden in general 
we are a very open society, and any NGO has – I mean there are a lot of civil society 
organisations working in Sweden that have a good reputation. So that might also have 
something to do with it. 
 (interview recording, 2019) 
 
The high levels of environmental awareness of Swedish consumers, combined with 
their supposedly positive interpretation of NGOs, may have created a synergistic 
positive feedback loop which allowed such a sudden and dramatic rearrangement of 
hierarchical relations between actors in the shrimp industry from 2008 to 2018. 
 
 
A program director at an international environmental NGO reflected on how quickly 
Swedish fishing companies were to take up certification schemes, due to the societal 
expectations within Sweden: 
 
They [fishing companies] were really against eco-labelling. After a couple of years, they 
found the pressure that consumers, retailers, would not buy something unless they had 
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the transparency, unless they could provide and really prove that they had sustainable 
stocks. And therefore, the fishermen went in and got their fisheries certified. 
 (interview recording, 2019) 
 
A notable concept which arose from data was trust, cohesion and cooperation – traits 
which are well-established in literature as being hallmarks of the Nordic model of 
capitalism but seemed to hold even greater significance in Sweden compared to 
Denmark and Norway. A director at an international NGO spoke of how in Sweden 
there was a level of cooperation which was not seen elsewhere:  
 
And Sweden is so advanced in the fact that, at the moment, these big retailers have 
actually come together and signed an agreement that they want to sell only sustainable 
sourced products by I think, 2050 or something like that. 
 
And just that is incredible. I mean, these are competitive companies that are coming 
together and I mean, just that is quite an incredible stance. If we could see some more 
of these types of initiatives all around the world, that people realise that it’s not about 
competition anymore and about your own economic growth, it’s something that we all 
kind of have to take responsibility, I think we will be well ahead of trying to change 
some things. 
 (interview recording, 2019) 
 
This is a very interesting reflection, because the level of cooperation alluded to by this 
respondent is specifically about companies working with other companies, rather 
than companies working with NGOs.  
 
Another respondent from a different NGO also spoke of this desire for cooperation. 
The respondent suggested that the aspiration for consensus was an asset when trying 
to achieve sustainability goals, as was the somewhat informal nature of interactions 
due to the relatively informal nature of how Swedes are: 
  
I think also just the Swedish mentality is very much about finding consensus and 
driving things forward. They’re a very progressive culture, I would say, with 
everything. I mean, just generally I think in Sweden people are not settled with just 
how things are. They’re always seeing how they can improve things and I think that 
quality comes about. And I think because it’s a small nation, it’s very easy to kind of 
infiltrate these different sectors. Everyone knows each other. So, within the food retail, 
everyone kind of knows each other. We’re on a first name basis, we don’t have 
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hierarchies, you can talk to a Minister on a first name basis and just that is quite unique, 
I think. 
(interview recording, 2019) 
 
Working on the basis that others will usually do the “right thing” was a theme that 
arose several times during interviews, with the below quote emblematic of several 
more not included here. A senior analyst in the fisheries department of a Swedish 
Government agency put this as: “You trust the system [in Sweden]. You trust others 
to do the right thing” (interview recording, 2019). 
 
Sweden as a global role model, trend setter and opinion-leader 
The uniqueness of Sweden in terms of its unusually high levels of social and 
environmental awareness and expectations on all organizations and individuals fed 
into another directly related yet subtly different sub-theme: that Sweden’s biggest 
impact could be achieved as being a global role model, trend setter and opinion 
leader, rather than through the actions of 10 million people making a significant 
difference on a planet of seven billion and counting.  
 
Analysis of interview transcripts suggested that numerous respondents felt that 
Sweden had an important role to play as being a leader in terms of being at the 
forefront of progressiveness in social and environmental practices, but that in terms 
of materiality the biggest impact Sweden could have was as a trend-setter. A 
director at an international environmental NGO pondered on the role of Sweden on 
the global scale, reflecting on the question of  “If these 10 million consumers in 
Sweden do their part, will it change something? It will have a little impact and 
hopefully influence others. (interview recording, 2019) 
 
Another respondent, from a different NGO, felt that Sweden had an important role 
to play, but should stop indirectly outsourcing environmental problems abroad by 
importing foreign products which were unsustainable: 
 
I do think there is an impact that a country like Sweden can have. And I think, actually, 
the reality is that we should not be eating as much seafood and it’s the same thing with 
meat. I mean, the fact that we rely on 80% of our seafood from abroad. Why should we 
be ravishing ourselves in fisheries from other places? So, we’ve been very spoiled and 
not very responsible. 
 (interview recording, 2019) 
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In response to the question “Does it matter if Sweden looks after its own fisheries 
well if it’s importing an increasing amount of seafood from countries that might not 
have this strict processes for managing their own sustainability?”, an analyst in the 
fisheries department of a Swedish Government agency reflected: 
 
Well, it depends on what you mean by ‘matter’. Of course, it matters for the state of the 
stocks in Swedish waters. But as to the global sustainability, of course it’s really 
important that we somehow have a check on what we import and what the rules 
around that is.  
(interview recording, 2012)  
 
A project lead at an international environmental NGO offered the observation that 
because of Sweden’s small size it could not compete on every front, but had to find 
its “place in the world” by choosing a niche: 
 
We have found our place in the world by saying this is where we can be powerful, like 
we make big contributions to the UN’s environmental programmes. They can kind of 
trade on our ability to do that, because we can’t compete on other things as well, I think, 
as other bigger nations. But we want to be there in the lead with the rest of them, then 
we niched ourselves into a corner. 
 (interview recording, 2019) 
 
In regards to fisheries, the leadership Sweden had taken on cod management in the 
Baltic Sea was cited as an example by one interview subject: 
 
I think the Baltic cod is a great example now where Sweden is showing great 
leadership… And you actually see that countries are following, and there are many 
countries – I mean some are completely against closure of the fishery, but some are sort 
of balancing… So, they won’t take the lead, but as soon as one country sort of says 
“This is what we want to see…” They are more on the verge of… Like they don’t really 
know where they are – if they are against or for. It’s easy for them just to follow.  
So, I think I mean Sweden definitely has the possibility to take the lead on many 
different issues. And just the fact that… I mean I think what’s happened with Greta 
Thunberg, I think that’s an amazing example of where you can have a huge impact. 
Like one little girl from Sweden is travelling across the world and meeting with 
different leaders. It’s amazing. So, I definitely think that things can change.  
(interview recording, 2019) 
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In summary, the collected empirical material was clear that something was atypical 
about Sweden. It seems that the unusually high level of knowledge, interest and 
expectation regarding social and environmental issues from multiple different 
parties (including society-at-large) and ideas of Sweden’s place in the world as a role 
model played an important role in setting the scene for the contests to the legitimacy 
of seafood companies during the shrimp debates.  
 
 
4.2.2 The uniqueness of the fishing and seafood industry 
In a similar way to the empirical material suggesting that there was something 
peculiar about Sweden, data also pointed to there being something unique about the 
fishing and seafood industry. This uniqueness had implications regarding the 
contestation of legitimacy. 
 
A prominent theme throughout the data was that some actors – especially primary 
producers – felt as though there were unreasonable and unrealistic expectations 
placed on the seafood industry, expectations far greater than those placed on other 
sectors, especially land-based agriculture and food production. The net result of this 
was, according to respondents, that commercial seafood companies felt that they 
were required to meet a higher level of sustainability and corporate social 
responsibility than their counterparts in other food industries such as meat and 
vegetable production. Three main reasons for this were noted: the fact that the 
seafood industry is comparatively younger than other food industries, that seafood 
production involves a higher level of complexity, and that commercial seafood 
organizations in Sweden (especially those involved in shrimp production) lack the 
lobbying influence present in other food industries like meat. The owner of a Swedish 
seafood company reflected on this during an interview: 
 
Also, one thing, which is of course not maybe correct to say, but the seafood industry 
also has much smaller companies than for instance the meat industry. They [the meat 
industry] can lobby when there is problem. 
(interview recording, 2017) 
 
The suggestion that “they can lobby when there is a problem” seemed to suggest that 
this respondent felt that they couldn’t lobby as successfully when challenges were 
mounted by external actors (such as NGOs).  
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During informal discussion after the formal part of the interview was over, the 
respondent also suggested that the Swedish seafood industry tended to have a less 
powerful lobby group than compared to Norway, due to the less conglomerated 
nature of the industry. 
 
According to another respondent, a Swedish seafood importer, the seafood farming 
industry is much newer than more established and traditional animal farming 
practices, and because of this people are not as educated as to how it is done and it is 
therefore placed under a higher level of scrutiny.  
 
It’s a young industry. I think that many people, they have not the correct information 
of things that are going on, especially, let's say, Pangasius, shrimp, Tilapia, shrimp, you 
have to have them somewhere. It's moving up on land. People don't say anything about 
cows or that you have pigs or that you're cultivating rice or whatever. Of course, 
aquaculture also needs space…You must do it somewhere.  
(interview recording, 2017) 
 
The respondent continued, reflecting on how they felt as though NGOs applied 
“extra pressure” to the seafood industry: 
 
I have the impression that a lot of those environmental organizations, they put some 
extra pressure on the seafood industry to be better than everything else... Of course, 
when you cultivate pigs or chicken, you will have things that is coming out from the 
production, which is not good that you have to take care of. It's the same with the 
seafood industry. 
(interview recording, 2017) 
 
This sentiment appeared elsewhere. An analyst in the fisheries department of a 
Swedish Government agency commented on how fishing was unique to traditional 
agriculture in the sense that it is a “system that’s already established” – a possible 
reason for the higher scrutiny placed on the industry: 
 
I mean, I think my vision, the way I see it is I still believe in having sustainable fisheries. 
I think fisheries are a good way of… just like you have hunting in Sweden, like venison 
and wild meats, it might be something that you’d be… it’s still a good way of raising 
animals.  
 
Also, in the extent that you can, so I don’t really see… it would be very interesting to 
see in the future of course, it [fishing] can ever replace the kind of industrial scale, 
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agriculture and rearing industry that we have at the moment to a great part. But I think 
it can be a complement. And I think there’s definitely a lot of positives when it comes 
to being able to harvest a system that’s already established, rather than having to make 
your own replaced because usually what happens if you make your own system you 
replace a natural system that’s already there. 
 (interview recording, 2019) 
 
Another respondent, a marine scientist, touched on how fishing raised unique 
emotions within people due to the fact that live animals were involved, but noted 
that this also existed in other forms of food production and was “not exclusive to 
fish”: 
 
Yes, kind of. We of course get negatives in agriculture too … It's not exclusive to fish. 
That goes for any form of intensive farming, once people actually get an entry and look 
at it, they usually get quite upset. We're quite disconnected from the food chain, so we 
don't see it, we don’t really care. 
(interview recording, 2017) 
 
A manager of a Swedish food labelling scheme commented that it is often forgotten 
that “Carbon dioxide from meat production is very high” and this is something 
which is often forgotten about or ignored by those who worry about the 
environmental impacts of the seafood industry. (interview recording, 2017). The 
implication here (and in the preceding comments) was that equal scrutiny was not 
being applied, and the seafood industry was being singled out.  
Somewhat ironically however, fish and seafood also seemed to be framed in terms 
have the advantage that if looked after properly, they could be sustainable. It was 
suggested by a project lead at an international environmental NGO that fish and 
shrimp, unlike domesticated agricultural species, had in theory the ability to be 
sustainable forever: 
 
The weird thing with fishing, compared to like meat production, I think fish can sustain 
us forever. One billion people rely on fish as their main source of protein, or seafood 
and if we do it right, we have all the chance in the world to have a healthy ocean, a 
healthy diet and fish.  
 (interview recording, 2019) 
 
A member of fish policy board for a certification scheme suggested that a reason as 
to why the seafood industry gets a disproportionate degree of scrutiny is due to its 
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complexities and the huge variety of species involved. Trying to make sustainability 
decisions around “thousands of species of fish” was described to be significantly 
harder than for pigs and cows: 
 
With these thousands of species of fish, they won't fit into a rule book in a way that the 
normal agriculture species like the pigs and cows. It's much simpler there. This is how 
we need to do it, but with fish there are so many things that everything cannot be 
covered. 
(interview recording, 2017) 
 
This idea of fish and shrimp not fitting into a rule book is interesting, and perhaps 
had this debate been around beef production rather than shrimp it would have not 
resulted in actors having such different interpretations of what constitutes 
sustainability.  
 
In summary, comparisons made by interviewees between seafood with other forms 
of food production highlighted that the expectations as to what constitutes 
‘sustainable’ are in general greater for seafood. This seemed to carry through to 
judgements on the social acceptability of actions taken by corporations operating in 
the seafood space, and opened up avenues for contests to legitimacy.  
 
The mystery of the ocean and marine life 
A specific sub-theme to emerge from the empirical material in regards to the 
uniqueness of the seafood and fishing industry was the unknown, mysterious nature 
of the ocean and the species within it, causing people to think about the ocean and 
waterways of the planet (and the fishing activities that take place within them) in a 
different frame of reference to other environmental issues. This seemed to have 
implications for the contesting of legitimacy to organizations associated with the 
industry, due to the fact that any actor in the seafood space had to deal with this 
perception of specialness, awe and uniqueness of marine life.  
 
A project lead at an international environmental NGO reflected on the unknown of 
the ocean: 
I think the ocean is still very much unknown and I think that also makes that little 
group of, ocean, almost animals, and then the ecosystem. It’s like easier and more 
difficult when it’s the high seas, it is half of the surface of the planet. 
 (interview recording, 2019) 
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It was suggested by another respondent from the same NGO that because of the vast 
size of the ocean, historically it had been neglected because of the belief that it “can 
sustain us forever” no matter how it is treated (interview recording, 2017). However 
recently there has been a significant change and many people have realised that this 
is not the case, and as such are increasingly aware of the importance of protecting 
oceans and the species that reside within them: 
 
People care deeply about the oceans, that’s what we see, when we communicate about 
oceans, about how much people care. And of course, the plastic issue has helped, like 
getting people even more attention to the oceans, but I think there hasn’t been as much 
political will, I think, and energy going into the ocean system because the ocean has 
just been that sort of vast thing out there, that people thought can sustain us forever. 
 (interview recording, 2019) 
 
This respondent then described the strangeness of many of the species that inhabit 
oceans and serve as a food source for humans: 
 
It’s interesting because it’s of course different in different cultures, how people perceive 
life in the ocean but I think generally, people are amazed by it. Like its size, like 
mystery, strange things like shrimp. 
(interview recording, 2019) 
 
Shrimp was also specifically singled out by owner of a Swedish seafood company as 
being  “some kind of symbol for bad cultivation.” (interview recording, 2017). 
 
Due to the world’s oceans blurring across artificial boarders created by humans, it 
was felt that a level of consensus was needed to achieve sustainability that was 
greater than most other environmental issues – especially in terms of combatting 
illegal fishing. This seemed to be described in terms alluding to some sort of ‘tragedy 
of the commons’ type situation. A respondent from a Swedish Government agency 
described this as follows: 
 
There are other countries that have illegal fisheries, but actually getting these countries 
to take responsibility for ships and citizens involved in the illegal fisheries… 
Addressing the illegal fisheries and getting some kind of consensus around that is 
going to be really key. 
 (interview recording, 2019) 
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Empirical material suggested that the oceans and inland waterways of planet earth 
were unique, mysterious and special, and as such any species sourced from them for 
human consumption were subject to a higher than usual degree of scrutiny. This 
above-average level of scrutiny seemed to have implications regarding the speed and 
significance of contests to the legitimacy of organizations deemed to have not fully 
appreciated this uniqueness.  
  
4.2.3 Personal connection to the fishing and seafood industry 
As a final question to close off nearly all of the 37 formal recorded interviews 
conducted in this study, respondents were asked for their thoughts on the optimism 
of the future of global fish and shrimp stocks. This theme is dealt with explicitly in 
Section 4.2.4, but first it is important to consider another sub-theme which arose from 
this line of questioning around optimism: the notion of a strong personal connection 
to fishing, seafood and the ocean. Often in answering the optimism question, 
interview subjects shared personal stories of why they ended up in the fisheries 
industry, what they studied at university, memories of family holidays as a child or 
pet fish.  
 
This theme brought to the surface the notion that interpretations and enactments of 
sustainability occur not only through strategies but also through the individual 
people who speak for and act on behalf of organizations and their own philosophies 
and worldviews. This in turn shapes how these organizations relate to other 
organizations. The differences that exist between people have an impact upon how a 
definition of sustainability is portrayed, and while formal definitions are emphasised 
in documents such as annual reports which may govern overall direction, it is 
ultimately those who work within organizations that must speak the policies and 
enact them.   
 
A respondent working for an NGO recounted their childhood fishing experiences in 
Sweden, and how this contrasted with the lack of fish in 2019: 
 
I used to fish plaice and cod in the Gothenburg Archipelago when I was a kid. There 
was enough fish for everyone. Now we have, they bottom trawl larger and larger areas 
and use more and more nets to get less and less fish and the fish we get, we can’t hardly 
eat.  
(interview recording, 2019) 
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Another respondent from a different NGO also spoke of their childhood in the 
Archipelago, this time in Stockholm, rather than Gothenburg: 
  
We had boats when I was a kid. I spent much time in the Archipelago, much of the time 
we had sailboats. So, I grew up spending every summer holiday sailing around the 
Archipelago. So, my parents, at least my Dad, has a very strong relationship to the 
ocean.  
 
So, the ocean has always had quite a central part in my family, in terms of how we 
define what vacation is and what’s relaxing and spending time together. I love the 
interface between science and politics and that’s always been something that interests 
me a lot. So, I’m not a marine biologist, I didn’t go to school to dig into the nitty gritty 
details. But I have a mix of political science and nature studies and for me, that’s kind 
of a mix of understanding enough of being able to understand marine science and 
understand how the world’s natural system works, but couple that with also 
understanding politics and change. 
 (interview recording, 2019) 
 
Another respondent shared their experience of spending time in Asia and reflected 
on how seeing the “craziness of overfishing there” shaped a longer-term interest in 
fisheries, as well as identifying that their interests and skillset could be best utilized 
by working for an NGO: 
 
I did my project in Asia, looking at fisheries there, compared to marine protected areas. 
I really saw the craziness of overfishing there and just going to the seafood markets 
where they want everything fresh and you would just see these baby groupers in these 
bowls that were being sold. So, I really had the hands-on experience of seeing how this 
huge nation was just exploiting the resources and how the water was just awful and 
pretty nitrified, and it was in bad state. So, that got me really interested in the fisheries 
issues and then I just knew what I wanted to do now was to work for an NGO and I 
want to work with fisheries. 
 (interview recording, 2019) 
 
Organizations are entities made up of people, and as such it is hardly surprising that 
interviews indicated that each person brings with them a history and worldview 
which both shapes and is shaped by the organization for which they work.  
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4.2.4 Optimism about the future sustainability of the world’s oceans 
The notion of personal philosophy was also prevalent in the concluding question in 
interviews that was asked of all respondents regarding their optimism for the future 
of global fish stocks. Many felt that their entire purpose of being in the industry was 
to ensure the long-term sustainability of the world’s oceans, and that their own 
interpretation of sustainability and the one that they spoke for on behalf of their 
organizations was deeply influenced by this passion for this. 
 
All interview subjects were asked to reflect on their personal level of optimism about 
the long-term sustainability and overall viability of the planet’s oceans and 
waterways.  
 
A respondent from an NGO felt some optimism about the future of the world’s 
oceans and waterways, but was overwhelmed by the enormity of the task at hand: 
 
I do think that they’re sort of signs of hope or that things can change, but then they’re 
way too small and isolated and it doesn’t come in a systematic manner like we see 
clearly that stakeholders are massively failing to manage the high seas. 
 (interview recording, 2019) 
 
A manager at a major seafood certification scheme described their level of 
optimism, due to the people in the fishing and seafood sector. They reflected “I am 
optimistic because I've met so many enthusiastic people who see only 
opportunities. There's some very amazing people in the industry. (interview 
recording, 2017) 
 
Another interviewee from an NGO broke down optimism by locations in the world 
and pointed out the somewhat sobering reality of overfishing the Atlantic, Baltic and 
Mediterranean oceans and seas:  
 
I would like to say that I’m optimistic, but I must admit that sometimes it’s difficult. 
Because things are moving slowly, and when it comes to regulation, I mean it takes… 
It’s long term processes, and it will take time. And I think the difficulty now is that 
there are so many different issues that are interacting. 
 (interview recording, 2019) 
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On the other hand, a respondent from a Swedish Government agency pointed to the 
Baltic Sea as a small success and a sign for optimism going forward: 
 
There’s a lot of unknowns here, I’d say. I think we definitely… I mean there’s a lot of 
work going on and I think a lot has happened in the last 10, 20 years and it’s definitely 
going in the right direction. And if we look at close seas here, like North Sea and also 
the Baltic, I think there has been quite a lot of improvement, but there’s also a lot of 
work left to do, but I would totally not… I wouldn’t paint it totally black… So, I’d say 
I’m definitely positive and globally, I think we have some major challenges.  
(interview recording, 2019) 
 
The rise of China as a major player in global fisheries (and the largest seafood 
consumer in the world) was also cited by this respondent as being a critical factor 
shaping the overall future viability of global fish stocks. One respondent put it in the 
following terms: 
 
If you don’t get China on board, where you know, you can clearly see that a large part 
of the illegal fisheries is happening in the world, many of them aren’t Chinese fishing 
boats or maybe they’re not Chinese but somehow there’s some connection to China, 
and many other… and some other Asian countries. 
 (interview recording, 2019) 
 
A respondent from an international environmental NGO spoke of how their drive to 
“go to work every day” was motivated in part by a level of optimism about the future 
viability of global fish stocks, as well as a belief that they could bring about change: 
 
Yeah, we have to, otherwise I would probably work for the… no. Of course, I think, I 
couldn’t go to work every day and think, I don’t have a chance to change anything. I 
think it’s wonderful, you have to believe in your ability to punch above your weight 
and I think to find that crack in the system or weak spots that you can make sure that 
things change. 
(interview recording, 2019) 
 
This idea of ‘making a difference’ was brought up by others, such as during an 
interview with a supply chain standards manager at a seafood certification scheme, 
who commented that “Yes, I do believe that what I do makes a difference even if it's 
only a small difference”( recording, 2017). 
 
 
 
108 
Another respondent, – a director at another seafood certification scheme– spoke of 
how 2019 was somewhat of a “crossing point” with fisheries management, as well as 
other global environmental challenges such as climate change. The UN SGDs were 
mentioned as one of the supranational frameworks capable of bringing about a “large 
change” (interview recording, 2019).  
 
Concerningly, it was marine scientists – arguably the best informed of any of the 
respondents – who displayed the lowest levels of optimism about the future of the 
world’s oceans. This reflection of one marine scientist is emblematic of several other 
responses from experts holding PhDs in the field: 
 
I think it would be really difficult to prevent it from further declining [the state of the 
world’s fisheries]. Like you said before, it's interconnected because a lot of the fish feed 
in agriculture, for at least some species come from the wild. It needs to be worldwide 
agreement. Lately, it's not look like anyone can agree on anything in the worldwide 
level. No, I'm a bit pessimistic, unfortunately. 
(interview recording, 2017) 
 
A respondent from a Swedish environmental NGO displayed similar levels of 
pessimism, alluding to UN FAO data: 
 
Eighty per cent of the world fish stock are being over fished towards unsustainable 
levels. It's quite depressing… In a sense, it's quite disgusting but at the same time, I 
think that over the past couple of years we've seen some improvements. 
 (interview recording, 2017) 
 
The levels of optimism (or lack thereof) from respondents towards the future viability 
of the natural ecosystems of the planet’s oceans and waterways varied considerably, 
but in general pointed to an understanding of the severity of the current situation 
with a cautious level of hopefulness towards a better future.  
 
4.3 Different interpretations of sustainability and use (or disregard) of 
information and ideology  
Thematic analysis of the empirical material – especially interview transcripts – 
revealed that actors in the industry had significantly different interpretations of what 
‘sustainability’ actually meant. These differences between actors were substantial, 
and were typically showcased through the decision of each actor to either embrace 
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or reject various ranking systems, guides, lists, and certification schemes. Directly 
connected to this was the prominent theme of tensions between how decisions 
around sustainability were made, relating specifically to the use or disregard of the 
best available science on shrimp farming and fishing as well as emotion, subjective 
opinion and ideology. Ultimately, it was these differences in interpretation which led 
to the contestations to societal acceptance and legitimacy which took place. The word 
‘sustainable’ often even became synonymous with the word ‘legitimate’.  
 
Three sub-themes are explored underneath this broader theme. Firstly, how actors 
differentiated in their interpretation of sustainability. Secondly, tensions between 
information and ideology and how and why actors operationalized (or disregarded) 
this to rally for their interpretation of sustainability. Finally, the role of shrimp as a 
central actor in the contestation of legitimacy.  
 
4.3.1 How actors differentiated in their interpretation of sustainability 
Interviews with key individuals in the Swedish shrimp industry triangulated with 
formal sustainability definitions offered by each actor, as well as the actual 
interpretation that was ultimately practiced by each, showed that between 2008 and 
2018 there was significant differences in how actors in the Swedish shrimp industry 
interpreted sustainability. Respondents speaking on behalf of NGOs had and 
continue to have what many perceived as a ‘hard-line’, black and white stance on 
shrimp, declaring that tropical shrimp could never be produced sustainability, no 
matter how it was done. One respondent put it in the following terms: 
 
With shrimp, there is absolutely… As it is, it can never be sustainable, if it is in the 
intertidal area in the tropics. It can never be sustainable. 
(interview recording, 2019) 
 
This statement was broadly in line with what this NGOs actual sustainability 
interpretation regarding shrimp was.  
 
Other respondents dismissed such interpretations by NGOs as being unreasonable, 
and simplifying a debate deserving of nuance and detail into one of ‘good or bad’. 
One respondent from a commercial fishing company suggested that much of this was 
due to NGOs being out of touch with the grassroots reality of shrimp farming and 
production: 
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Sometimes some of those things that coming from those environmental organization is 
just bullshit… I say to them, “How many times have you been visiting Vietnam 
yourself?” No times, they said. I myself have been there 25 times … maybe I have more 
knowledge about what is right and wrong.  
( recording, 2017) 
 
Some respondents, such as a supply chain manager at a seafood certification 
organization, took a more middle-of-the-road type response, suggesting that all in 
the industry were essentially striving for the same goal even if they didn’t realize it: 
 
I think often they [different actors] do actually realize everyone is trying to achieve the 
same thing. They just have to represent different interests and the only way how we 
are going to get it is if all the interests are met sufficiently. 
(interview recording, 2017) 
 
An analyst in the fisheries department of a Swedish Government agency reflected on 
the various tools available to each actor to inform their interpretation of 
sustainability: 
 
Yeah, I mean you can see that you have very different tools depending on whether you 
work in an authority or if you work in an NGO or as a commercial company. And 
clearly, within the world of authorities it’s all about legislation and regulation and also 
possibly incentives. Of course, we can also work with awareness raising, but if you talk 
about like hard tools, it’s mainly the incentives and the regulations. So that’s why I 
refer a lot to those kind of tools, but of course certifications such as MSC and 
collaborations. Those are the key tools that we have. 
(interview recording, 2019) 
 
The same respondent then described how there is indeed a ‘best available science’ for 
shrimp (ICES data for wild caught shrimp) and that any sort of success requires a 
shared definition to work towards: 
 
I think that the really key question is in having joint definitions for what sustainability 
is, and in the fisheries world, at least in this part of the world, the ICES advice is pretty 
much the bible. 
(interview recording, 2019) 
 
In an interview with a director from an NGO, it became apparent that some actors 
make no secret of the fact that they intend to have their interpretation of 
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sustainability as the dominant one in the shrimp industry. When asked about who 
should get to decide what constitutes sustainable, they responded as follows: So, 
who gets to decide? Well, we would like to get to decide, but usually, it’s always a 
compromise. (interview recording, 2019) 
A sourcing manager for a major Swedish retailer offered a more broad, philosophical 
interpretation, noting that: 
 
For us, the word sustainability is about what's behind the product and how the product 
is produced, by whom, under which conditions and where in the world the product is 
produced. 
(interview recording, 2017) 
 
This definition offered is largely in line which the formal definition used by the 
company for which this individual worked.  
 
While most of these interpretations offered during interviews matched up with the 
organization’s more formal definition, the primary means through which this study 
ascertained the sustainability interpretation of each actor was by looking at what each 
actor actually did in practice. In reality, the ‘interpretation’ of sustainability in could 
be best ascertained by seeing whether an actor produced, sold, endorsed, or 
consumed a certain species of shrimp, and what rankings, certification schemes, lists, 
and scientific information they drew upon to validate such a decision. The stance of 
each of the 12 main actors in relation to certification schemes, environmental NGOs 
and scientific data as of mid-2019 are summarised in Table 3, over the following 
pages. 
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Table 3:  The stance of the 12 main Swedish actors in relation to certification schemes, environmental NGOs and scientific data, mid-2019 
ACTOR/ 
STANCE 
World Wide 
Fund for 
Nature 
Sweden 
 Greenpeace            
Sweden 
Swedish 
Society for 
Nature 
Conservation 
(Naturskydds-
foreningen) 
 
Aquaculture 
Stewardship 
Council 
Marine 
Stewardship 
Council 
KRAV ICA Coop Axfood − 
Willys 
and 
Hemköp 
Swedish 
seafood 
importer 
Australia 
shrimp  
co-op 
 
 
 
Swedish  
government 
agencies 
and 
research 
institutes 
Formal 
publicly 
conveyed 
stance on 
ASC-
certified 
shrimp 
Supports (co-
founded the 
ASC in 2010). 
Highly 
sceptical but 
supports in 
some cases. 
Does not 
support. 
However, 
between SSNC 
respondents 
interviewed, 
stances ranged 
from 
passionately 
against ASC to 
neutral / 
slightly 
supportive. 
N/A (is own 
label). 
Supports. Sceptical but 
supports. 
Complex. 
ICA 
previously 
sold large 
quantities of 
ASC-
certified 
tropical 
shrimp but 
does not any 
more (except 
in a few 
limited 
locations 
across 
Sweden 
where ASC-
certified  
Litopenaeus 
vannamei are 
still 
available). 
Bases overall 
seafood 
strategy 
heavily on 
WWF’s 
guide. 
 
 
Complex. 
Coop 
previously 
sold ASC-
certified 
tropical 
shrimp but 
does not 
any more. 
Coop bases 
its  overall 
seafood 
strategy 
heavily on 
WWF’s 
consumer 
guide and 
Greenpeace 
Sweden list. 
Aims to 
make all 
decisions 
based on 
best 
available 
science. 
Uses the 
artefacts 
developed 
by NGOs, 
MSC, ASC 
and KRAV 
to inform 
own 
fisheries 
policy. 
Supports. 
Has ASC-
certified 
Litopenaeus 
vannamei and 
Penaeus 
monodon 
in product 
range. Prior 
to SSNC 
pressure, 
supplied all 
of the 
Swedish 
retailers with 
Litopenaeus 
vannamei and  
Penaeus 
monodon. 
Presently, 
only  
supplies one 
of the big 
four retailers. 
N/A − Not 
relevant as 
only 
produces 
wild-caught 
shrimp. 
No clear 
stance − 
claims to 
support best 
available 
science 
rather than 
specific  
certification 
schemes. 
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ACTOR/ 
STANCE 
World Wide 
Fund for 
Nature 
Sweden 
 Greenpeace            
Sweden 
Swedish 
Society for 
Nature 
Conservation 
(Naturskydds-
foreningen) 
 
Aquaculture 
Stewardship 
Council 
Marine 
Stewardship 
Council 
KRAV ICA Coop Axfood − 
Willys 
and 
Hemköp 
Swedish 
seafood 
importer 
Australia 
shrimp  
co-op 
 
 
 
Swedish  
government 
agencies 
and 
research 
institutes 
Formal 
publicly 
conveyed 
stance on 
MSC-
certified 
shrimp 
Supports. Highly 
sceptical but 
supports in 
some cases. 
Supports but 
also critical of 
certain aspects. 
Supports 
(certification 
schemes are 
related to one 
another – share 
some 
processes).  
N/A (is own 
label). 
Supports but 
also critical of 
certain aspects.  
Supports. 
Extensive 
range of 
Pandalus 
borealis 
products 
available in 
stores. 
Supports. 
Extensive 
range of 
Pandalus 
borealis 
products 
available in 
stores, 
including 
own private 
labelled 
product. 
Supports. 
Extensive 
range of 
Pandalus 
borealis and 
Melicertus 
latisulcatus 
products 
available in 
stores, 
including 
own 
private 
labelled 
product. 
 
Does not 
produce any 
MSC-
certified 
shrimp 
products. 
Supports. 
Gained MSC 
certification 
in 2011 for 
Melicertus 
latisulcatus, 
which are 
sold in both 
ICA and 
Willys.  
No clear 
stance − 
claims to 
support best 
available 
science 
rather than 
specific 
certification 
schemes. 
Formal 
publicly 
conveyed 
stance on 
other 
certification 
schemes 
(KRAV, Bra 
Miljöval) 
Judges each 
on their own 
merit, 
supports 
KRAV. 
Judges each 
on their own 
merit, 
supports 
KRAV. 
Produces Bra 
Miljöval so 
supports it; 
sceptical but 
somewhat 
supportive of 
KRAV. 
Judges each on 
their own 
merit, supports 
KRAV. 
Judges each on 
their own 
merit, supports 
KRAV. 
N/A (is own 
label). 
Supports 
KRAV (has 
some KRAV 
certified 
Pandalus 
borealis 
products 
available in 
stores).  
Supports 
KRAV 
(Coop 
private 
label 
Pandalus 
borealis 
product are 
KRAV 
certified).  
Supports 
KRAV 
(Axfood 
Garant Eko 
private 
label 
Pandalus 
borealis 
products 
are KRAV 
certified). 
Both Willys 
and 
Hemkop 
sell these. 
 
Highly 
sceptical of 
SSNC in 
general 
(producers of 
BM scheme). 
No KRAV 
certification 
of shrimp, 
nor clear 
stance on 
KRAV.  
No stance 
since 
Australian 
based.  
No clear 
stance − 
claims to 
support best 
available 
science 
rather than 
specific 
certification 
schemes. 
Relationship 
with the 
three major 
environ- 
mental 
NGOs in 
WWF 
acknowledges 
that it plays a 
different role 
to 
Greenpeace. 
Greenpeace 
acknowledges 
it plays a 
different role 
to WWF. 
Respondents 
Critical of 
Greenpeace 
and WWF for 
not taking a 
strong enough 
Co-founded by 
WWF in 2010, 
so in general 
supports. 
Works closely 
with and 
supports the 
WWF (who 
founded the 
MSC). Engages 
Mixed. Bases own 
seafood 
guide 
heavily off 
WWF list. 
Bases own 
seafood 
guide 
heavily off 
WWF and 
Bases own 
seafood 
guide 
heavily off 
WWF list. 
Highly 
critical of all 
three, 
especially 
SSNC.  
No direct 
engagement. 
Indifferent. 
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ACTOR/ 
STANCE 
World Wide 
Fund for 
Nature 
Sweden 
 Greenpeace            
Sweden 
Swedish 
Society for 
Nature 
Conservation 
(Naturskydds-
foreningen) 
 
Aquaculture 
Stewardship 
Council 
Marine 
Stewardship 
Council 
KRAV ICA Coop Axfood − 
Willys 
and 
Hemköp 
Swedish 
seafood 
importer 
Australia 
shrimp  
co-op 
 
 
 
Swedish  
government 
agencies 
and 
research 
institutes 
Sweden 
(WWF, 
Greenpeace, 
SSNC) 
Respondents 
in interviews 
reflected that 
SSNC was 
perceived as 
being extreme, 
black and 
white. 
 
in interviews 
reflected that 
SSNC was 
perceived as 
being 
extreme, 
black and 
white. 
stance on 
shrimp. 
in robust 
dialogue with 
MSC.  
Greenpeace 
list. 
Primary 
medium 
through 
which 
shrimp 
sustainability 
stance is 
conveyed 
Annual WWF 
Sweden 
Consumer 
Fish Guide. 
Traffic light 
system of red, 
orange and 
green is used 
to 
communicate 
to consumers 
which 
products to 
avoid, re-
consider and 
buy 
(respectively).  
Globally, 
Greenpeace 
produces the 
‘Greenpeace 
International 
Seafood Red 
list’. Regional 
Nordic office 
of 
Greenpeace 
can slightly 
alter this list 
to suit 
specific 
countries.  
Bra Miljöval 
certification of 
food retail 
stores (which 
cannot take 
place if any 
tropical 
shrimp are 
sold); 
campaigns 
such as Anti-
Scampi; 
reports such as 
the ‘Murky 
Waters’(critical 
of farmed 
shrimp).  
Certifying 
fisheries for 
ASC-
certification; 
appearance of 
ASC label on 
shrimp 
packaging. 
Done through 
rigorous 
process using 
an independent 
certifier which 
assesses farm 
against 
Fisheries 
Standard. 
Certifying 
fisheries for 
MSC-
certification; 
appearance of 
label on 
product. Done 
through 
rigorous 
process using 
an independent 
which assesses 
fishery against 
the Fisheries 
Standard.  
KRAV label 
and underlying 
board which 
draws on the 
opinion of 
experts to make 
judgements. 
Seafood 
policy 
conveyed in 
annual 
report, 
sustainability 
report, and 
website; 
decision to 
sell or not 
sell a certain 
variety of 
shrimp.  
Seafood 
policy 
conveyed in 
annual 
report, 
sustainab-
ility report, 
and 
website; 
decision to 
sell or not 
sell a 
certain 
variety of 
shrimp. 
Seafood 
policy 
conveyed 
in annual 
report, 
sustaina-
bility 
report, and 
website; 
decision to 
sell or not 
sell a 
certain 
variety of 
shrimp. 
Sustainability 
information 
on website; 
decision to 
sell or not 
sell a certain 
variety of 
shrimp, ASC 
certification. 
Sustainability 
policy 
covered in 
annual 
report, 
sustainab-
ility report, 
decision to 
catch or not 
catch certain 
variety of 
shrimp, 
MSC.  
 
Use of 
scientific 
data 
pertaining to 
shrimp 
capture and 
farming 
(primarily 
ICES and UN 
FAO) 
According to 
the WWF 
Sweden it 
bases its 
decisions 
around 
shrimp on the 
best available 
science and 
has extensive 
procedures to 
ensure this 
happens. 
According to 
Greenpeace 
Sweden it 
bases its 
decisions 
around 
shrimp on the 
best available 
science and 
has extensive 
procedures to 
ensure this 
happens. 
According to 
SSNC it bases 
its decisions 
around shrimp 
on the best 
available 
science and 
has extensive 
procedures to 
ensure this 
happens. Some 
respondents 
from other 
Comprehensive  
scientific 
process in place 
to assess 
sustainability 
of fishery and 
make nuanced 
judgements on 
how many 
shrimp can be 
caught, what 
species and 
using what 
Comprehensive 
scientific 
process in place 
to assess 
sustainability 
of aquaculture 
operation and 
make nuanced 
judgements on 
the social and 
environmental 
impacts of 
shrimp 
Comprehensive  
scientific 
process in place 
to assess 
sustainability 
of fishery, 
using 
independent 
experts on a 
fish advisory 
board. Draws 
on ICES data. 
Aims to 
make all 
decisions 
based on 
best 
available 
science. Uses 
the artefacts 
developed 
by NGOs, 
MSC, ASC 
and KRAV to 
inform own 
Aims to 
make all 
decisions 
based on 
best 
available 
science. 
Uses the 
artefacts 
developed 
by NGOs, 
MSC, ASC 
and KRAV 
Aims to 
make all 
decisions 
based on 
best 
available 
science. 
Uses the 
artefacts 
developed 
by NGOs, 
MSC, ASC 
and KRAV 
Aims to act 
in 
accordance 
with best 
available 
science while 
being 
realistic 
about the 
time needed 
to bring 
Extensive 
process in 
place 
(including 
yearly 
engagement 
with 
Australian 
Government) 
to ensure 
best practice 
grounded in 
science. Also 
Strongly 
supports 
using best 
available 
science for 
all decision 
making, 
including 
ICES and 
UN FAO. 
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ACTOR/ 
STANCE 
World Wide 
Fund for 
Nature 
Sweden 
 Greenpeace            
Sweden 
Swedish 
Society for 
Nature 
Conservation 
(Naturskydds-
foreningen) 
 
Aquaculture 
Stewardship 
Council 
Marine 
Stewardship 
Council 
KRAV ICA Coop Axfood − 
Willys 
and 
Hemköp 
Swedish 
seafood 
importer 
Australia 
shrimp  
co-op 
 
 
 
Swedish  
government 
agencies 
and 
research 
institutes 
According to 
the WWF 
(2019), “These 
methodologies 
are risk based 
and are 
regularly… 
relevant and 
scientifically 
robust” (WWF 
Sustainable 
Seafood 
Guides 
Methodology, 
2017, p. 1).  
According to 
Greenpeace 
International 
(2019), 
“Defining 
which 
fisheries 
should be on 
a red list is a 
complex task 
submitted 
through a 
methodology 
with very 
specific 
criteria.”  
organizations 
claimed 
during 
interviews that 
this was not 
the case. 
method of 
capture. Draws 
on ICES data.  
farming. Draws 
on best practice 
guidelines. 
fisheries 
policy.  
to inform 
own 
fisheries 
policy. 
to inform 
own 
fisheries 
policy. 
about 
change. 
Also places 
high trust in 
ASC 
certification 
process  
places high 
trust in MSC 
certification 
process.  
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4.3.2 Scientific data and their ideological interpretation: how and why actors 
operationalized (or disregarded) information and/or emotion 
A highly recurrent theme that arose from the data was that of significant differences 
in how scientific data pertaining to the fishing and farming of shrimp was interpreted 
and operationalized by each actor. Despite there being few disagreements regarding 
opinions on the quality and correctness of available scientific information (namely, 
ICES stock data for wild caught shrimp, and various UN FAO sustainability 
guidelines for farmed shrimp3) and also stating that they made decisions based on 
the best-available science (as shown in Table 3) there were major differences in how 
each actor viewed what constituted ‘sustainability’ in terms of the science.  
 
Some actors, such as the SSNC, believed that tropical shrimp farming could never be 
sustainable, no matter how it was done or what certification schemes (such as ASC) 
were in place. Such a perspective was perceived by several actors – especially 
Swedish seafood businesses – as being an irrational, emotive view of shrimp farming 
which was based on ideology rather than best available science.  Similar happenings 
occurred in wild-caught shrimp. For example, a large international NGO with a 
presence in Sweden made an interpretation of ICES stock data that other actors 
perceived as overly conservative and unscientific. This interpretation was then used 
as grounds for ‘red listing’ Pandalus borealis, which stunned many fishing businesses 
in Sweden. The empirical material revealed some instances where science was used 
as a mechanism for supporting and furthering the interests of an actor, rather than 
being used to make neutral, impartial and objective decisions about social and 
environmental matters. This was done by either fully-disregarding or cherry picking 
best-available science to support the objectives of the actor. This theme of tensions 
over what constitutes science and what constitutes emotive ideology, is explored in 
the following pages.  
 
The debate around sustainability tended to break down into one over emotion, 
ideology and tradition versus science and evidence. In the majority of the 
interviews with producers and sellers of shrimp, respondents felt that the NGOs 
made decisions based on emotional reasons and ignored the facts, and used 
campaigning methods and language stronger than what could be justified if a 
neutral standpoint on the issue of shrimp was to be taken. The description by SSNC 
website of tropical shrimp as being “one of the world's worst environmental 
 
3 UN FAO guidelines on sustainable shrimp farming include the International Principles for Responsible Shrimp 
Farming, Best Practices in Shrimp Aquaculture and other documents.  
 
 
117 
hazards” was mentioned by the owner of a Swedish seafood as being emblematic of 
the black-and-white, reductionist stance on the topic taken by NGOs. The same 
respondent also argued that SSNC were fighting tropical shrimp on a historical 
basis, and even when presented with evidence that contradicted their claims, they 
would double-down rather than concede that they were incorrect so as to save face, 
arguing that “It seems that they are just fighting this question [about farmed shrimp 
sustainability] for historical reasons. They don't want to drop it.” (interview 
recording, 2017) 
 
A Marine scientist interviewed during the study, amongst others, suggested that the 
emotional-based campaigning done by NGOs was done partly as a mechanism of 
self-preservation and profiling: 
 
I don't think everything that they [environmental NGOs] do is purely science-based. 
They have some very strong campaigns and they like to profile themselves. They have 
this anti-scampi campaign- and that doesn't distinguish between-- There are so many 
ways of farming shrimp. There are terrible ways. There are much better ways, really 
extensive ways. They don't support ASC because they don't think it's rigorous enough 
and also the other certifications. Their conclusion is basically, you shouldn't eat tropical 
shrimp at all. That's the simple conclusion. That is a decision or recommendation that 
certification doesn't do. It doesn't tell you what to eat or what you shouldn't eat ... It's 
all about maximum sustainable yield, impacts within ecological limits, evidence based. 
(interview recording, 2017) 
 
Another respondent, a C-suite executive of a major international seafood certification 
scheme, criticized the ambiguity in many of the ‘rating systems’ created by some of 
the NGOs, suggesting that many reduce complex phenomena into over simplistic 
categories which don’t do justice to the nuance of the topics: 
 
A student could simply release some year-old data, decide whether fish is green, 
yellow or red producer card, try and influence consumer behaviour, but there's no 
traceability, there's no action plan to improve, there's no accountability. 
(interview recording, 2017) 
 
An interview subject working for an NGO claimed that their NGO didn’t have any 
agenda, stating that “Because we don’t have a specific interest – our interest is in 
nature and people.” (interview recording, 2019) 
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On the other hand, the owner of a Swedish seafood business believed that many 
Swedish NGOs did in fact have specific interest; namely, to maintain and grow their 
membership base and financial resources: They (SSNC) have used this question (of 
shrimp sustainability) as one of the biggest tools to survive, by getting new young 
people to their organizations”. (interview recording, 2017) 
 
In terms of making sense of the available science on shrimp stocks, farming and 
capture levels and other measures of sustainability associated with shrimp 
production, while the marine scientists interviewed in this study suggested that there 
were cases where accurate judgements could not be made due to a lack of 
information, on the whole the majority of marine scientists specializing in shrimp 
tended to agree regarding what constituted sustainability. One of the marine 
scientists, holding a doctoral degree specifically in shrimp and fish stock forecasting, 
put it as follows:  
 
No, I wouldn't say that we disagree (with defining what is sustainable and what isn’t). 
Normally the problem is that either there are sufficient facts, or there are not sufficient 
facts to support. If there are sufficient facts, then that is normally evident. Whether this 
is good or it's bad. There is, of course, weighing of different things. I haven't 
experienced that we actually had different opinions in the end. Because normally 
someone is responsible for presenting a case, and then it's discussed. Maybe some 
additional knowledge someone has is taken in. Normally, then, everyone accepts it. I 
haven't experienced that we have totally different views. 
(interview recording, 2017) 
 
This would suggest that the lack of agreement between actors in the industry was not 
due to there being high levels of discrepancy and uncertainty in the science, as might 
be the case with other environmental issues. It became apparent that all of the NGOs 
had marine scientists working for them, many of whom holding PhDs specifically in 
topics relating to fisheries and forecasting, suggesting that it was not an inability to 
interpret data that influenced stances as to what constituted sustainability. The fact 
that the science is somewhat ‘settled’ and the fact that there was not an inability of 
actors to be able to interpret the science, suggested that influence dynamics between 
actors – rather than availability of and ability to interpret good quality data —was 
the driving force behind the widely different conclusions reached on sustainability 
by the different actors within the shrimp industry. These dynamics were fuelled by 
some actors taking an ideological, emotional or historical stance on shrimp in order 
to use the shrimp debate as a mechanism to achieve other aims. A C-suite executive 
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of a large seafood certification scheme, who was interviewed in this study, suggested 
that while the science may be settled in many cases, emotion around bycatch such as 
dolphins could often overpower science. This emotion was propagated by NGOs and 
in many cases supported by the public. One customer interviewed while purchasing 
seafood in Gothenburg spoke of emotive imaging regarding seafood sometimes 
being used as a “guilt trip” (author’s notes, 2017). A seafood manager alluded to the 
idea of their supermarket chain being “shamed” into complying with the wishes of 
the NGOs, even though they believed that their own interpretation of the shrimp 
debate was already scientific (interview recording, 2017).  
 
So, while it may have been the case that a producer or seller was legally and ethically 
(in their mind) following the best available science involved in the value chain of 
shrimp production, this licence to operate could still be contested if another actor 
could successfully generate a swell of emotion and momentum. 
 
A C-suite executive of an international seafood certification scheme described this 
interplay between science and emotion as follows: 
 
Am not passing a judgement one way or the other, but from a science perspective, if 
the dolphin population is healthy and if that by-catch is not detrimentally affecting 
their reproductive health and recovery of that dolphin species, it could probably meet 
our standard. 
(interview recording, 2017) 
 
This quote is interesting because it captures the idea that following the best available 
scientific advice on any given environmental issue does not mean perfection; rather 
it means that the action is sustainable because it allows the entity or ecosystem 
capacity to recover, even if something is harmed or killed in the process.  
 
A respondent at an international NGO reflected on some of the tensions between 
scientific data and emotion and ideology when making decisions around seafood 
sustainability, including giving weight to certain issues over others when weighing 
up information: 
 
I mean if you think that animal welfare is the most important issue, of course you will 
react to that information. We are a nature conservation organization, so we’re focusing 
on the stock and the biology. So, I mean the seal issue is a great example now, where 
some people get really upset when you talk about protective hunting. 
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But otherwise I think just basing your messaging around best available science is very 
important, and I mean science is like the best thing we’ve got. 
  
And then I mean our messaging has always been the same; it’s like we need to look at 
the science and follow the scientific advice. And if we should diverge from that path 
and say something completely different we would lose our trustworthiness. 
   
So, I think like basing your messaging on science is definitely important. But that said, 
I mean science also has its limitations. So, I think I mean it’s tricky, I definitely think 
where there is available science, you should definitely use that and listen to that, and 
take that in. But you should also be open to look at other factors, because I mean science 
isn’t complete, there are knowledge gaps… And I mean that’s where the positions and 
the arguments come in, and the feelings. Because if we had perfect science we wouldn’t 
really have an issue. But the problem is that we have limited knowledge but we still 
need to act. And how do we do that, because we can’t wait until we have all of the 
information because that would take forever. 
 (interview recording, 2019) 
 
There were cases of black-and-white, absolutist, all-or-nothing mentality shown by 
some actors. When asked ‘Do you think a standard could ever be made that could 
assure the sustainability of farmed shrimp?’, a respondent from a Swedish 
environmental NGO replied with “It can’t be done, no.” (interview recording, 2019) 
 
A director of certification schemes at a Swedish NGO spoke about how the 
formulation of a sustainability interpretation is inevitably a political one to some 
degree: 
 
It’s always a political decision. Usually we would have a sort of agreement on, for 
instance, a hierarchy of issues in relation to each other. Where you draw the line is a 
political decision and that will always be a political decision. 
(interview recording, 2019) 
 
A similar sentiment was echoed by a project lead at an international environmental 
NGO, who reflected: “Sadly it’s definitely not science…. it’s like science and politics.” 
(interview recording, 2019). 
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A fisheries specialist at a different international environmental NGO emphasized 
that their sustainability interpretation was based only on independent advice that 
was scientifically rigorous: 
 
It’s really important that our advice is correct, and that’s why we are using researchers 
to do these assessments for us. So, it should be an independent… And all of the 
information comes from scientific journals. So, I mean we have… It should either be 
documents and reports from government agencies – that they have published – or 
scientific journals. Those are the only types of report and documentation that we use 
in our assessments. 
 (interview recording, 2019) 
 
Interviewees noted that discussions with other actors in the industry were often 
respectful, but that the levels of compromise, cooperation and strive for ‘win-win’ 
that are often flaunted in the sustainability and stakeholder literature were not 
representative of what actually happens in practice. One respondent described this 
as ”it doesn’t always work, sometimes opinions are just too opposite” (interview 
recording, 2017). 
 
4.3.3 Shrimp as a central actor and key stakeholder 
The four species of shrimp around which all debate was based were found to be a 
central actor (albeit unknowingly) and prominent participant in legitimacy contests 
in their own right, both affecting and being affected by the debate and subsequent 
decisions. One respondent noted how shrimp had become emblematic of the broader 
sustainability debate, noting that  “the shrimp has been in Sweden some kind of 
symbol for bad cultivation (interview recording, 2017). A Stakeholder manager at 
international wild-caught seafood certification scheme reflected that “I would say the 
fishes and shrimp are also stakeholders for me.” (interview recording, 2017) 
 
While shrimp were acknowledge by many to be a genuine actor in the process, they 
were often ranked lowly in terms of emotional appeal and concern for their welfare, 
due partly to their small size and unusual appearance.  
 
A respondent from an international NGO suggested that creating public awareness 
about small crustaceans such as shrimp and krill required explaining it in a way that 
the general public would find more relatable, such as showing the relationship 
between crustacean and other larger animals, which have more ‘emotional’ appeal: 
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It’s like when you talk about krill, people wouldn’t necessarily relate to krill, but if you 
talk about the food for whales, then people go, “Huh.” I think it’s the same on the 
Savannah. We would care way more about a giraffe and an elephant than a wild dog. 
It’s just something that we have and I think also it’s of course up to us to use that to 
our advantage. Like when we talk about krill, if we want to make people concerned 
about krill and the future of it, and krill management for example, then if you talk about 
the food for penguins and whales, you get more people interested. And then of course 
you have to make sure that you then take them through the whole, why certain things 
are important and talk about the ecosystem. 
(interview recording, 2019) 
 
Another respondent, from an international seafood certification scheme, noted that 
there had been increasing pressure to develop some sort of animal welfare standard 
for the shrimp themselves: 
 
Something that people have criticized as well, that we didn't have animal welfare 
standards. That's something in the pipeline and we have one full-time person who's 
only working on the animal welfare. I don't know when it's going to be launched yet, 
but it's in the pipeline and this improvement programme I also talked about, just to 
harness the more small-scale farmers and the lower performers. 
 (interview recording, 2019) 
 
A theme raised by several respondents was that because shrimp were indeed 
legitimate actors, they, like other marine species, needed consideration in regards to 
matters of animal welfare. Commercial seafood organizations were seldom 
concerned with the welfare of shrimp, and more concerned with quality, while 
several marine scientists spoke of the difficulties in measuring the welfare of 
shrimp.  
A Swedish seafood company owner who imports large quantities of shrimp from 
farms in Asia said that the wellbeing of shrimp was a minimal priority, noting that 
as humans we put “different valuations”(interview recording, 2017) to different 
animals, and shrimp are of low concern to people compared to horses, cows, and 
pigs for instance. The most important factor in killing shrimp humanely, according 
to the respondent, is maintaining their quality: “They put it [the shrimp] in ice 
water, of course it's to protect the quality. It's not because of animal welfare or 
anything like that”. (interview recording, 2017) 
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However, the respondent reflected that there are still concerns about maintaining a 
‘good’ image of treating shrimp well and that negative photos or videos could harm 
the reputation of the company: 
 
I was [at a shrimp farm] and they [the employees] took photos holding up the live 
shrimps by the tentacles. Of course, when someone saw that picture I thought it was a 
nice-looking picture. They say, “Don’t put that on the internet.” Because it’s still a live 
shrimp that someone will have the feeling that they are [being harmed]. 
(interview recording, 2017) 
 
The above statement is interesting as it suggests that any sort of dealing with live 
animals carries with it a higher level of potential for reputational harm when 
compared to other materials used in the production of goods and services. This 
potential for reputational harm may be a reason why the shrimp debate could be so 
effectively leveraged into successful challenges against the societal acceptability of 
the actions of particular organizations.   
 
One of the marine scientists interviewed noted that animal welfare can have 
implications for product quality, citing the case of salmon: 
 
Also, from the aquaculture literature, there’s several papers showing that with salmon, 
more intense stress during the time up until death, that has effects on the colour of the 
meat… Also, things like storage time, shelf-life, once you get them out in the storage, 
so it's actually decreasing the time before they go bad with these. 
(interview recording, 2017) 
 
In response to the question “How do you measure the welfare of the fish and 
shrimp”, the same respondent noted: 
 
Well, that’s one of the reasons why it is so complicated. But really, just looking at 
mortality, if you use traps or gill nets, and like how sensitive they are at each step. If 
we could get past those means, and then start discussing how much pain is with the 
hook in the lip. In my world, we’re so far from that yet, because there's all these fishes 
suffocating in the boat and stressed to death in gill nets. 
(interview recording, 2017) 
 
Interpretations of what constitutes sustainability in regards to shrimp capture levels, 
methods and species types was shown to be influenced by recognition by some actors 
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as to the fact that shrimp are indeed living creatures. However, it became apparent 
in interview that due to the subjective ways that people categorize and place value 
on animals, shrimp were ranked lowly in terms of their appeal beyond simply being 
a food item. Shrimp were viewed by many actors as more of a commodity or crop as 
opposed to an animal. Nonetheless, the recognition of shrimp as living creatures and 
having intrinsic value both for themselves and in their broader ecosystem context 
seemed to play a part in framing the overall tone of the debate, which arguably would 
never have reached such a level of ferocity had it been about a topic not as closely 
related to the natural world. 
 
4.4. The operationalization of sustainability in practice 
The third major theme from the data explored in the preceding pages showcased the 
fact that there were major differences in how sustainability was perceived by actors 
in the Swedish shrimp industry. The fourth and final major theme to emerge from 
the data is that of actor descriptions of how these interpretations of sustainability 
were actually operationalized in practice, and the connotations of these 
operationalizations for legitimacy contestation. Five sub-themes are explored in  
Sections 4.4.1 to 4.4.5: Firstly, the creation and use of guides, lists, rankings and 
certification schemes. Secondly, the way in which some actors engaged in hedging, 
absolving responsibility and surrendering control by outsourcing the practice of their 
own sustainability strategy to third parties. Thirdly, consideration of dialogue, 
roundtables and day-to-day actor engagement. Fourthly, the practice of 
sustainability at the point of production: sustainability on board shrimp trawling 
boats and at shrimp farms. Finally, the practice of sustainability at the point of sale: 
consumer attitudes towards and knowledge of shrimp sustainability.  
4.4.1 The creation and use of artefacts and outsourcing of sustainability 
The data revealed that by far the most common way for each actor to demonstrate 
their day-to-day practice of a sustainability interpretation was through the use of 
various seafood artefacts such as lists, guides, rankings and certification schemes. 
Some actors, such as certification organizations and NGOs, created these artefacts. 
Other actors, such as seafood business and retailers, drew heavily on these artefacts 
to operationalize their sustainability interpretation and to illustrate a practical 
manifestation of their concession to NGO demands. This was done by seeking formal 
certification from other actors (primarily ASC, MSC and KRAV) and/or by either 
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partially or fully basing their own lists, guides and rankings on those artefacts 
produced by the NGOs.  
 
Data suggested that sustainability artefacts such as lists and guides came into 
existence based significantly on the environmental protection agenda of the NGOs 
producing them, and served as playing a major role in shaping relations between 
actors in the shrimp industry by indirectly forcing them to comply with the lists. 
Complying to the artefacts became essential to maintain societal acceptability. Not 
complying to the artefacts was grounds for having this acceptability revoked, and in 
some cases having the overall legitimacy of the business contested (as happened to 
several seafood companies).  
 
A fisheries specialist  at an international environmental NGO described during an 
interview how certification schemes, lists and guides were the ”main tool that 
companies are using today to work with sustainability” (interview recording, 2019). 
 
In a similar manner, a director at a Swedish environmental NGO described how their 
organization “endorses the MSC, we relate to the WWF list of fish in our criteria” 
(interview recording, 2019).  
 
The WWF Sweden’s approach to enacting its interpretation of sustainability takes 
place through the publication of an annual Consumer Fish Guide in Sweden, which 
ranks shrimp and fish species according to the WWF’s internal sustainability 
methodology and uses a consumer-friendly traffic light colour system in the guide to 
portray the rankings. A respondent spoke of the significant time and effort it has 
taken to get their seafood guide to its current status.  
 
The WWF seafood guide, the national Swedish one, has been existing for quite a long 
time. I think the first one was launched in 2001. So, it’s taken a while to get it to the sort 
of recognition it is at the moment. And just to explain that we also have seafood guides 
in the other countries; quite a lot across Europe but also around the Baltic region, as 
well as Norway. But it’s true that Sweden has been quite successful. The WWF Sweden 
has been quite successful to really get this to be a guide for the retailers and producers 
to follow. And the question of why, I think it is because it’s been a guide that we’ve 
used for a very long time. I have to say, from the beginning, we got a lot of pushback, 
a lot of criticism, a lot of tough dialogues with the fishing sector. And I think also 
because we work on both ends, so we also work with the markets and the producers 
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as well as the fishery sector. Furthermore, we (in Sweden) rely on 80% of our seafood 
from abroad. So, this list needs to make judgements of places far away. 
 (interview recording, 2019) 
 
The mention by the respondent of how “we work on both ends” was a finding which 
was unique for the NGOs Greenpeace and the WWF, who seemed to convey a more 
‘balanced’ understanding of business necessities compared to the SSNC, which was 
portrayed by several respondents (all fishing and seafood companies) to be primarily 
concerned with pushing against business rather than trying to work with business. 
However, the WWF like most other actors made no secret of the fact that they 
believed that their stance on sustainability should become the dominant one in the 
Swedish shrimp industry. The way that they sought to negotiate sustainability in 
practice was publishing the list and using it to push and influence the retailers and 
the producers and by doing so also indirectly put “pressure on the fisherman to 
change their habits and look to alternatives” (interview recording, 2019).  
 
Managers interviewed from the four largest Swedish grocery retail outlets including 
ICA, Coop and Axfood (the parent company of Willys and Hemköp) reflected on the 
degree to which NGO-created lists influenced their practices and decisions in regards 
to seafood. One sustainability manager described the operationalization of their 
shrimp and fish sustainability strategy as follows: 
 
Basically, for us in Sweden, we have once a year we do a new update of fish list which 
is very similar to the one that WWF produces. If we say as a company that we don't sell 
these products, then no one should sell it from our 674 stores...Our fish list is like the 
law. 
 (interview recording, 2017) 
 
Religious metaphors were used by some retailers to describe the esteem to which 
they held NGO lists in, with the sustainably coordinator of one of the big four 
retailers in Sweden described using the list as “a bible” for the practice of their own 
seafood sustainability strategy (interview recording, 2017).   
 
This theme highlighted the fact that a recent trend in the Swedish shrimp industry 
(and more generally in the fisheries sector globally) was the usage of artefacts as the 
primary means through which organizations that practiced sustainability certify 
sustainability. And also, perhaps the primary means through which NGOs ascertain 
the SLO of firms. Beyond the organizations that actually designed schemes, actor 
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knowledge about how they operate and what they mean was surprisingly limited, 
including amongst the seafood managers from retailers who so adamantly supported 
their organizations adopting such schemes. However, most actors knew that eco-
labels in some way represented a more responsible environmental choice, and thus 
were happy to engage with them due to the reputational benefits for doing so, and 
the mitigation of risk (damage to brand image due to NGO pressure). This led to an 
unusual phenomena: the outsourcing of sustainability strategy and practice to third 
parties.   
Sustainability outsourcing and hedging  
Thematic analysis of empirical material brought to light a specific phenomenon in 
relation to the question of how sustainability strategy was formulated and executed 
in practice: that many actors in the Swedish seafood industry (primarily producers 
and distributors – that is, seafood companies and retailers) would essentially 
outsource the formulation of their own sustainability strategies to third-parties; 
namely, environmental NGOs, and certification schemes. This was done by ‘hedging’ 
their own strategy on the guides, lists, rating schemes and certification labels 
produced by environmental NGOs, and certification and eco-labelling organizations 
(such as the MSC, ASC and KRAV). It seemed that primary producers and 
distributors partook in this outsourcing strategy as a means of protecting their own 
interests: namely, in terms of minimizing future risks of NGO campaigns and 
associated reputational and financial costs, and minimizing the time, effort and 
financial costs needed to seek out sustainability data and make decisions for 
themselves. 
  
Numerous interviewees spoke of how they were acutely aware of the fact that many 
businesses in Sweden were using their sustainability guides to not only inform their 
own sustainability strategy, but in many cases copying it word for word and in 
essence inferring that ‘our sustainability strategy for seafood is whatever the NGOs 
tells us it is’. One respondent referred to this as the “outsourcing of sustainability” 
(interview recording, 2019). 
 The hedging of an actor’s sustainability strategy on that of another actor was seen as 
a way of keeping the peace. One respondent described it as follows: 
 
We’re not always in agreement with WWF, but it would be a waste of time to try and 
launch your own list in parallel. Sometimes acceptance is best, and then try to work 
with them to improve it… But we will never agree with them on ASC. 
 (interview recording, 2019) 
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Supermarkets especially seemed eager to concede to the NGOs and conform to their 
wishes in order to put an end to the campaigning and negative media coverage. A 
project lead at an international environmental NGO described how “Some 
supermarkets just panic and just go, ‘Tell me what to do. Tell me who I should buy 
from.’” (interview recording, 2019) 
 
Some NGOs even pushed back against the Swedish supermarkets’ concessionary 
tone, noting that they had become overly placid and given over too much authority 
to NGOs. A respondent from one such NGO was aware of how primary distributors 
had essentially outsourced their sustainability strategy and practice to NGOs, but 
was critical of it in the sense that it absolved them of responsibility and placed the 
onus on the NGO rather than them: 
 
I’ve said to many supermarkets, “We’re not here to tell you what to…” Like, “You have 
to make sure that you have systems in place. When people come into your 
supermarket, that they’re not buying anything that is sort of tainted with, like slavery, 
like tuna, human rights abuse, using the tuna cans or chemicals in your kitchen sprays 
that are bad.” It’s like, “It’s your job. It’s not my job to walk around with 15 guys and 
a scanner and check your stuff”  
 
So, guys, I think, and all of that kind of stuff and these lists, people go, “Oh look, they’re 
super effective,” and I was like, “Are they? Where’s the evidence, more than like a 
media peak?” Yeah and they also receive massive criticism for some of the work that 
they do with some of their lists and for the staff. So, it’s like I wouldn’t… That’s the 
WWF approach and of course they’re different from us, but I think also you create 
financial ties, because, of course, that also comes with a financial transaction. 
(interview recording, 2019) 
 
Interestingly, a respondent working for a large seafood certification scheme reflected 
that during the early days of the establishment of the scheme, it was important to 
communicate existing links to NGOs in order to establish credibility: 
 
I remember when I had to write the emails to say, "Hello, I'm from the [international 
seafood certification scheme], we were set up by the WWF." And I always used to 
mention it, just because otherwise people would think, “Who is this person? What's 
this organization? Never heard about it!” As you would, you know. So, I used to stress 
the dialogues and the links to the WWF for example. So, it's really changed. 
(interview recording, 2019) 
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A critique of outsourcing sustainability to a third party is that it sometimes means 
that a company will jump ship and fickly change suppliers, rather than seek to work 
with the supplier to fix the issue which the third party identified. A respondent 
international environmental NGO described how long-term partnerships where 
large businesses would work with their supplier on a long-term basis to fix their 
problems rather than abandon them were often more meaningful and beneficial than 
simply going along with the lists and rankings produced by NGOs: 
 
So, McDonald’s, they’ve worked with the same fish supplier for like, I don’t know, 20 
years, with the same salad suppliers, the same… so they have a very small set of 
suppliers, but they work with them on improvement programmes and I think that’s 
actually a really nice thing to do. So, they’re not just sort of jumping from one thing to 
the other because the environmentalists are screaming, because the only way of 
changing over time is to have businesses that are willing to invest in overtime and use 
their powers. 
I’m certainly not the greatest fan of McDonald’s, but I think they understand their size, 
they understand their influence and they do these long-term partnerships. And I would 
like to see more of this, because the thing that really annoys me is like when these 
rankings come some people go, “I’m going to stop tomorrow.” That goes a bit back to 
the McDonald’s situation. Like, it would have been interesting if Coop or ICA or 
Hemköp had decided to go like, “No, no. We’re going to have a small section of it, 
we’re not going to sell lots of it, but we believe that this can be and we are willing to 
invest to work with these people.” But they all chose the easiest option out and then of 
course the problem is when you then come in with like, “Oh but you can eat it if it’s 
certified.” I think we know that it’s only the big players that can afford to certify, then 
you like squeeze the small-scale guys even more. 
(interview recording, 2019) 
 
When asked about the pressure of having retailers in Sweden hedge their seafood 
sustainability strategy almost entirely on the lists produced by NGOs, a respondent 
from an NGO noted that this meant there was increasing pressure on their 
organizations to ensure that the advice was accurate and based on science: 
 
I mean it’s definitely a pressure, and we have a huge responsibility of course to make 
sure that our advice is correct. And I mean I think it’s important as well to say that 
we’re not defining what’s sustainable and what traffic light we should give a specific 
fishery; we are using experts that have experience, and that are educated fisheries 
biologists, to do these assessments for us. 
 (interview recording, 2019) 
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This partial or full absolving of responsibility seemed to be a trend that was becoming 
increasingly common in the seafood industry within Sweden, and carried with it 
significant connotations in terms of establishing legitimacy.  
 
4.4.2 Dialogue, roundtables and day-to-day actor engagement 
Beyond artefacts schemes to inform sustainability practice and change that of others, 
actors also practiced sustainability in other ways. These included planned dialogues 
and multi-stakeholder roundtables, routine day-to-day engagement, and informal 
discussions, which often came about due to the small size of the sector in Sweden 
meaning that individuals over time came to know each other on a more personal 
level. It was also found that individuals would also from time to time swap roles 
within the industry, such as working for a fishing company and later in their career 
for an NGO, and that this would carry implications regarding how the individual 
viewed sustainability. Furthermore, it was found that specific individuals within 
organizations could have a disproportionally large impact over the formulation and 
execution of sustainability strategy.  
 
One respondent, a fisheries specialist at an international environmental NGO, 
stressed just how important dialogue with other actors in the seafood industry was: 
 
Our dialogue with the industry is super important. And I mean we of course want them 
to continue to use our guide, and if they feel that we’re not updating and we’re not… 
We’re only talking about the negatives all the time, and when there is a positive change 
we’re not changing our assessments, it doesn’t look good. And we all have the same 
purpose and are striving towards the same goal, and that’s sustainability. And I think 
just having a strong collaboration with the industry, and having their trust and feeling 
that our information is reliable, that’s super important. 
 (interview recording, 2019) 
 
Another respondent, from a different NGO, described a similar style of relationship: 
 
For instance, we’re working very closely with Axfood around seafood, and we’re 
supporting them in terms of their goal to have only seafood on green light. So, there 
we have a specific formal co-operation, so we’re working very closely with them… all 
the big food producers and retailers in Sweden, we have a network with them. And 
that of course focuses on a range of different sustainability topics. So, it’s not only 
covering seafood, but it’s also meat and vegetables and all types of issues that we 
integrate and discuss with them. So, I mean and they meet once in a while, I think 
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around four times per year – it’s colleagues of mine who are facilitating this dialogue, 
with the companies. So, we also have that. And from time to time they are discussing 
seafood, and they want to have input from me as a seafood expert, to that discussion. 
(interview recording, 2017) 
 
The framing of this relationship as constructive and being based around its dialogue 
is interesting.  Dialogue by definition suggests two-way, consultative discussion. 
Such a framing of the communication style is in direct opposition to how much of 
this relationship was perceived by supermarkets and fishing companies, who viewed 
the NGO mode of communicating as less consultative and more commanding, with 
one supermarket manager describing how the NGOs “… more or less they just forced 
us to take away the shrimp” (interview recording, 2017). 
 
Respondents from NGOs also spoke of more ad-hoc, day-to-day consultation with 
actors who had queries regarding judgement calls that had been made on certain fish 
and shrimp stocks. One respondent described this as follows:  
 
And then of course I mean I get daily emails and calls about specific assessments; 
someone wants to know about pike perch, from Swedish lakes, or usually it’s about 
understanding why a specific species is on a specific light. Because we don’t have that 
information in the guide, because it would be… It would be too much information… 
But I still get like phone calls and emails where people want to know, what are the 
main issues here? And I think that’s definitely something we’re welcoming. Because 
when companies are calling me, and being like, “Hey, we’re talking to our supplier 
now, and we want to understand why you think this is not sustainable…” And I can 
give them support in that dialogue, and hopefully get their suppliers to improve, then 
that’s terrific; that’s how we want these things to work. 
 (interview recording, 2019) 
 
A supply chain manager from a major seafood certification scheme reflected on how 
the current popularity of the term ‘stakeholder’ and forming stakeholder groups and 
committees in the industry has led to confusion and oversaturation, noting that 
within their organization there is often misunderstanding as to the difference 
between what the “Stakeholder Advisory Group” and the “Stakeholder Council” do 
(interview recording, 2017). This sentiment was furthered by another respondent 
from the same organization: 
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On the battle of wave of, "Let's get more dialogue. Let's also take stakeholder 
participation into the fisheries policy world." Those advisory councils will create in to 
feed in to that process. Okay, checkbox. We have stakeholder participation now. There 
was a lot of work to do to manage expectations. What are they really supposed to do? 
I come here with my recommendation, but are anybody listening? How should that 
recommendation look to be useful for policy-makers? 
(interview recording, 2017) 
 
Such a sentiment was also echoed by one respondent from an NGO, who argued that 
sustainability roundtable discussions and stakeholder dialogues were nothing more 
than façades of democracy, and that unpopular opinions were in reality not taken 
into consideration. A respondent described their experience at an industry-led 
stakeholder dialogue on shrimp as follows: 
 
It’s called a dialogue – Shrimp Aquaculture Dialogue. It was all from the beginning, it 
was all the industry and WWF, nothing else. It was in lush, you know, very nice, big 
hotels – very expensive…. And if you wanted to enter, you had to be able to say that 
you believed in certification. Yes. You cannot come in there, you cannot go in there if 
you do not say you believe in certification. And we didn’t believe in certification, so we 
could not participate in the dialogue. So, they had put a name for this group – it was 
called the critical outsiders. You know, to show that we’re outside, you know. And we 
gave very detailed criticisms, to each criteria, to everything, you know. And the only 
thing that the consequence of this, the result of this was just that they adapted their 
marketing. 
 (interview recording, 2019) 
 
A senior analyst in the fisheries department of a Swedish Government agency 
described some of the ways that the government engages in fisheries sustainability 
dialogue with actors, both recreational and commercial fishers: 
 
So, for each one of these areas of Sweden, we have regular meetings with these parties 
and we discuss the latest advice, so there’s constant fisheries monitoring going on. And 
based on that, the scientists then present the advice for the fish stocks and there’s a 
discussion of trying to make a priority of which regulatory measures might be required 
and which ones to prioritize. Because we don’t have any endless resources so in some 
cases, it might take some time before you actually can put a regulation in place, even 
though you see the need for it. 
(interview recording, 2019) 
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One interesting point raised by a respondent was that of not giving one particular 
actor special treatment, so as to minimize any perceptions or actual occurrences of 
corruption or backroom dealings. Given that this person worked for an organization 
owned by a state government, this was of perhaps of more concern than to other 
organizations which are privately owned. A practical manner for getting around this, 
according to the respondent, was to only see everyone together:  
 
You should try only to meet them in in meetings, where all different companies are 
present. We don't negotiate with only one company or with only one interest group 
because then, if we would have only one on one, then they would have much more 
possibilities to lobby on us. 
(interview recording, 2017) 
 
Sometimes, dialogue between actors was made challenging due to ‘language 
differences’ (both in terms of actual languages, but also in terms of vocabulary, 
metaphors and terminology). A stakeholder manager at an international seafood 
certification scheme described how “They [fishers] know their own world but they 
don't know the policy world and then you serve them graphs and things and... it's a 
big learning curve for them.” (interview recording, 2017). This of course carried 
implications regarding how sustainability was actually practiced at the point of 
production.  
 
4.4.3 The practice of sustainability at the point of production: sustainability on 
board shrimp trawling boats and at shrimp farms 
While many of the respondents had strong beliefs about what should and shouldn’t 
happen in regards to environmental issues associated with shrimp capture and 
farming, only several respondents had actual first-hand experience from being on a 
shrimp trawling boat or visiting a shrimp farm. This is not in any way to say that 
their opinions are less valid. We know in academia for instance that someone can be 
a world-leading expert on Egyptology without having ever been to Egypt and seen 
the Giza Pyramids with their own eyes. However, some might raise questions as to a 
possible gap between theoretical understanding and sensory experience with the 
phenomena in question. 
 
The respondents interviewed who had actually spent time involved in the grassroots 
practice of sustainability at the point of production of shrimp described a number of 
interesting things. Some of these things showed congruency between high-level 
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sustainability policies. Others showed a significant gap between what was said to 
happen and what actually did happen. 
A marine scientist who had spent extensive time on shrimp trawling vessels provided 
an interesting description of ‘what happens’: 
 
The bigger shrimp are boiled on board. The smaller ones are landed and they go to the 
processing. Because they're so small, they their process then and sold as salads or 
products… If there is any fish taken on board that, that fish is usually dead. It's a deep-
sea fishing [pressure changes kill fish]. You can really count on the zero survival rates 
[of bycatch]… And they're just thrown overboard. There's no demand for them. There 
is also this confusion with the EU Landing obligation. That people think that means 
that everything has to be brought ashore. The landing's obligation only concerns quota 
species. 
(interview recording, 2017) 
 
The respondent then reflected that it is extremely hard to monitor and enforce 
sustainable fishing practices, given the nature of what fishing entails: 
 
It is very tricky to enforce and actually control fisheries. Fishing by nature takes place 
far away and at sea and the fisherman is alone. It's a tricky part to enforce fishes' 
regulations. You have all the problems with the boats going out, and even airplanes 
involved. Filming and then spotting where different boats are fishing, and then what 
I'm filming. There are also these CCTV cameras. Having them installed on their fishing 
vessels is also one way of enforcing the landing obligation. 
(interview recording, 2017) 
 
In an unrecorded interview with a fisher who had worked for several years on a 
shrimp trawl vessel, they spoke of how cold and non-nimble fingers on the hands of 
the fishers due to the climatic conditions meant that sometimes the bycatch was not 
sorted as quickly or properly as it was supposed to be.  
 
An Australian shrimp trawling cooperative officer suggested that over time, fishers 
became somewhat desensitized to seeing bycatch trash around in the sorting trays 
during a shrimp trawl: 
 
Naturally with bycatch, I'd say fisherman are less sensitive to it. Of course, because 
they've been living it for years, and they've seen that, and they know, it comes up, it 
goes down. 
(interview recording, 2017) 
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The respondent also described how sometimes plans would deviate from the official 
management plan, depending on how things were out on the ocean (as judged from 
results during early trawls).  
 
We’ve got rules in place and we have a committee of fishermen plus a government, 
and a scientist. The management plan, which sets out the rules, the umbrella under 
which you got to operate… But we change this sometimes. For example, they’re 
looking at early March fishing as opposed to late March, and the scientist will say, your 
shrimp grow really quickly in early March, you might get early you're taking smaller 
shrimp if you just wait three weeks, they'll be much bigger: you’ll get more money. 
(interview recording, 2016) 
 
It is interesting here to note how the benefits are framed in financial terms as well as 
environmental sustainability terms: that by listening to scientific advice and waiting 
a few more weeks, the population would be healthier and the individual shrimp 
would be larger and produce a better financial return.  
 
A stakeholder manager at a seafood certification scheme spoke of the gap between 
those who design policies and those who have to actually implement them, and the 
various challenges associated with different ‘languages’ being spoken: 
 
How is this some new research going to be packaged and served to them [fishers] in a 
way that they can actually use in their daily jobs? 
 
Part of that part of that development is that some of those guys have stayed with it for 
10−15 years and they are becoming experts in both ‘Brussels language’ and science 
language so they are they are building these bridges themselves. But it took 15 years, 
so they are very, very valuable sort of in-between people, but the closer they move to 
the other afters the more and more they become for from… Because here's this guy in 
suit and tie and his old buddy on the fishing boat when this guy start speaking science 
and-and-and Brussels language. It feels like, are you really representing us? People 
speaking different languages in the meeting and not understanding each other.  
(interview recording, 2017) 
 
Another respondent reinforced this sentiment, reflecting that sustainability at the 
point of capture relies on a shared understanding of a common ‘language’: “They 
[commercial fishing companies] are trying to learn the language of Brussels and 
science. It's strategically smart for them to do so.” (interview recording, 2017) 
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While companies would often claim that transparency of sustainability practice was 
a key value, in reality this was not always the case. A mismatch was found between 
what many companies claim to want in terms of transparency and openness of 
supply chains versus reality. One respondent, a supply chain manager at a wild-
caught seafood certification scheme, noted that a high level of transparency can give 
an advantage to competitors: 
 
For competitive reasons, organizations are not necessarily very keen for the supply 
chain steps to be transparent. Which is different from an Amazon package where the 
mailman doesn't really matter, you don’t care that they can see that he had a package 
and brought it from whatever place. But in this case, it does matter because they 
basically give their commercial advantage away by saying who they source it from. 
That is something that is one of the challenges to get this traceability done. 
(interview recording, 2017) 
 
Furthermore, this point was reinforced in a follow up email exchange with a seafood 
manager for a major Swedish retailer. During the interview it was repeatedly claimed 
that the organization strives for openness and traceability of all products. In an email 
several days after interview, some information relating to a shrimp product produced 
by the company was requested.  
 
Email extract: 
For example, the [removed for privacy] branded Räkor states on the pack "packed in 
Norway for [removed for privacy] Sweden." Would you possibly have any more 
information regarding exactly where the product was caught, the fishing company 
involved, transportation to Sweden etc. I am more than happy to chat over the phone 
if this suits you better than email. 
 
The response from the email was: 
 
I am sorry to inform you that this information is nothing I can share with anybody 
outside my company. 
(email, 2017) 
 
While this in itself is perhaps just an anecdotal example, it goes directly against the 
oft-cited claims by the four supermarkets in Sweden of supply chain transparency 
and points to a mismatch between high-level policy and operational practice of said 
policy. 
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It is necessary to conclude this sub-theme with a brief overview of the actual process 
involved in shrimp capture and farming. 
 
How shrimp are caught in the wild: Pandalus borealis trawling 
Pandalus borealis is usually found on soft muddy ocean floors, at depths of around 
1000 metres.  
Figure 2: Pandalus borealis resting on the muddy ocean floor − its preferred habitat 
 
Source: United Nations Food and Agriculture Species Factsheet, 2017, used with permission. 
It is caught primarily using a method of fishing known as bottom trawling, whereby 
large nets are dragged along the ocean floor. After being pulled for a period of 
between 5 to 10 hours, the nets are pulled up to the boat and the contents are poured 
into the sorting tray. While technological advancements such as GPS systems and 
depth finders have aided fishing companies in locating shrimp, the actual method of 
shrimp trawling has changed little over the past 100 years. In broad terms, bottom 
trawling is deemed by the SSNC, the WWF and Greenpeace to be an environmentally 
destructive method of capture. Despite this, two of these organizations are generally 
speaking supportive of trawling if it follows best practice and has MSC certification, 
as there is almost no other viable method of catching these shrimp otherwise. Figure 
3 shows a bottom trawl net set up for Pandalus borealis. 
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Figure 3: A bottom trawl net set up for Pandalus borealis 
 
Source: United Nations Food and Agriculture Species Factsheet, 2017, used with permission. 
One significant issue raised by a marine scientist interviewed in this study (interview 
recording, 2017) relates to the sustainability at the point of production of Pandalus 
borealis. The respondent suggested that a prominent problem in Pandalus borealis 
trawls is that only shrimp of a certain size will be sellable, and hence the smaller ones 
are useless to the fishing company in an economic sense. Under the EU-landing 
regulations, all target species caught are supposed to be landed, no matter what size. 
However, there have been many claims of fishing vessels in Swedish and Norwegian 
waters throwing back small shrimp, as they take up valuable space in the cargo hold. 
These shrimp are dead by the time they return to the water, as they have usually been 
in the sorting tray for too long, as well as the fact that the sudden change in pressure 
from bringing up the net by several hundred metres kills most. So, a situation exists 
whereby shrimp that are perfectly edible are being returned to the ocean dead, 
because of a lack of economic incentive to keep them.  
Pandalus borealis is the most consumed species of shrimp in Sweden, and the most 
readily available at retail outlets and restaurants. A wide range of different Pandalus 
borealis products are available, produced by different companies, at different price 
points, sizes, featuring different labels and in various states of processing (such as 
peeled, unpeeled or semi-peeled leaving only the tail on). Increasingly, a trend in 
Sweden and globally is for private labels – that is supermarket chains – to brand 
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products of their own. In most cases this involves buying from a wholesaler and then 
packaging and branding it under the name of the supermarket, but in a few cases it 
involves a degree of vertical integration, as in acquiring the shrimp themselves 
through company-owned fishing operations. In coastal cities in Sweden, especially 
on the West Coast near the fisheries, such as Gothenburg, it is common to find fresh 
Pandalus borealis which have been caught the same day, in the supermarket seafood 
aisle. These shrimp usually come to the Gothenburg Fish Action. This was confirmed 
during fieldwork at an ICA store in Gothenburg. The price varies depending on the 
market conditions on any given day, and hence it is common to see a chalkboard 
outside this particular ICA store saying “fresh shrimp!” (färsk räkor) and the price per 
kilogram in Swedish Krona. 
The journey from the sea floor to supermarket shelf typically takes the form of the 
following steps. This information was ascertained primarily through extensive 
analysis of the MSC certification guidelines for Pandalus borealis, as well as 
discussions with fishing companies.  
1. Optimal fishing conditions are identified, based on moon cycles, weather, month 
of the year and compliance with regulations and requirements of certification 
schemes if present. 
2. Fishing boat leaves port in early evening. 
3. Trawl nets are lowered to the ocean floor. Nets feature bycatch reduction devices, 
so as to give non-target species such as fish, turtles and dolphins the opportunity 
to escape.  
4. Trawling takes place for 5 to 10 hours, depending on weather conditions and 
geography of ocean floor in target area. 
5. Trawl nets are pulled from the ocean floor. Nets are opened on a sorting tray. 
Bycatch is discarded in the discard chute. 
6. Shrimp to be sold fresh are boiled on board, and then put on ice. Shrimp to be 
frozen are washed and then sorted by size. 
7. Boat returns to port. Fresh shrimp are often taken to auction within several hours 
of boat landing, such as the Gothenburg Fish Auction. Frozen shrimp are washed 
and then frozen. 
8. The frozen shrimp are proceeded according to the specifications of the company 
itself, or of the client of the fishing company is acting as a wholesaler. In many 
cases, shrimp are peeled outside of Sweden. 
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9. Shrimp are packaged with appropriate labels/certification logos, and distributed 
by truck to supermarkets if within EU. If shrimp are exported to a country outside 
of the EU, transportation usually takes place by a bulk freight vessel. 
10. Shrimp arrive in retail outlet freezer aisle ready to be purchased by the consumer. 
How shrimp are farmed: Litopenaeus vannamei 
The majority of Litopenaeus vannamei produced, are raised in shrimp farms. Farming 
takes place primarily in South America, and South East Asia, with China, Thailand, 
Vietnam, Ecuador and Peru being the top producers, respectively.  
Shrimp farming is a form of aquaculture in which juvenile shrimp are introduced 
into an artificially created body of water, fed intensively, and then, once they reach a 
large enough size, removed from the pond and sold for human consumption. Since 
Litopenaeus vannamei is a marine species requiring saltwater, farms are usually located 
in coastal areas, and seawater is pumped directly from the ocean into the farms. 
Figure 4 shows the basic principles of farming Litopenaeus vannamei. 
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Figure 4: Litopenaeus vannamei farming 
 
Source: United Nations Food and Agriculture Species Factsheet, 2017, used with permission. 
The process of farming is quite energy intensive in terms of the ratio of food needed 
for tropical shrimp such as Litopenaeus vannamei to grow it to an edible size. This is 
known as the Food Conversation Ration. The average ranges for farmed shrimp of 
between 1.6–2.0 is higher than all other commonly farmed seafood such as salmon, 
and comparable to other farmed animal species including chickens and pigs: 
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During an interview with a Vietnamese based Litopenaeus vannamei farming 
company, it was noted that increasingly, sustainable methods of farming are being 
used to counter the perception or actuality of shrimp farming as being 
environmentally harmful. One such method mentioned by the respondent was using 
fish rather than chemicals to condition the shrimp ponds. Before shrimp are put in to 
mature, the water must have the correct balance of natural chemicals. This process 
can be achieved either through the use of inorganic chemicals, or else naturally by 
placing fish in the pond. The company now uses Tilapia fish to condition the ponds, 
which not only speeds up the process but also removes the need for chemicals. This 
practice is endorsed by the literature, as evident in studies such as Kuhn et al. (2008). 
The journey of Litopenaeus vannamei from a shrimp farm in Vietnam to a supermarket 
shelf in Sweden typically takes the form of the following steps. This information was 
ascertained through extensive analysis of the ASC certification guidelines for 
Litopenaeus vannamei, as well as from data obtained during interviews with the CEO 
of a Swedish seafood importer:  
1. Broodstock (the breeding pairs which are selected based on best genetic features), 
often caught from the wild, are bred in tanks to produce shrimp eggs. These are 
transferred to hatching tanks.  
2. Once the shrimp reach the post-larval size after two weeks, they are placed in a 
large outdoor maturation ponds (known in the industry as ‘grow out ponds’). 
These are between 2 and 30 hectares in size. Anywhere between 100,000 to 300,000 
shrimp are stocked per hectare. Paddlewheel aerators are used in order to break 
surface tension and oxygenate the water.  
3. Shrimp are fed three times a day using a machine which sprays food around the 
pond. This is far more often than they would eat naturally, and the frequency of 
feeding is in place so as to grow them as large as possible, as quickly as possible. 
Shrimp are fed special granulated pellets, which consists of a mixture of ground 
fish meal and cereals.  
4. After three to six months (depending on the size required by the customer), 
shrimp are removed from the pond. This is done by either completely emptying 
the pond and picking out the shrimp, or by using large nets to capture them. 
5. Shrimp are killed by being put on ice. Once dead, they are either left whole, totally 
peeled, or peeled only to the tail, depending on the product being produced. 
Interviews with marine scientists in this study ascertained that it is extremely 
difficult to assess the welfare of shrimp experienced in this process. No 
certification scheme currently has a criteria for shrimp pain/welfare.  
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6. Prior to freezing, shrimp are injected with water. This is so that they maintain 
their size, some of which is lost when frozen.  
7. Shrimp are packaged at a processing facility nearby, placed in boxes and stored 
in a freezer, ready for shipping 
8. Shrimp are shipped to Sweden by container freight vessel, arriving at the port in 
Gothenburg. 
9. Shrimp are repackaged and distributed to supermarket chains as per their orders. 
The fact that there was sometimes a disconnect between the translation of 
sustainability policies and vision statements into practice was a notable theme arising 
from interviews with actors in the Swedish shrimp industry. Many respondents 
suggested that a significant gap existed between what was said to happen in formal 
sustainability reports and statements and then what actually happened on board 
shrimp trawlers and at farming facilities. This gap was suggested to exist partly 
because of the lack of congruency and integration between those who design 
sustainability policies and those who have to enact them on a day to day, operational 
level.  
 
4.4.4 The practice of sustainability at the point of sale: consumer attitudes towards 
and knowledge of shrimp sustainability 
The purchasing decisions of the end-consumer of the seafood products were notably 
absent topic during interviews, with most discussion centring on the supply rather 
than the demand side. Swedish consumers were perceived by respondents to have a 
good understanding of sustainability issues pertaining to seafood – especially when 
compared to other consumers in developed economies (such as the United States, 
and interestingly, also Norway). These consumers were mobilized by NGOs as a 
major driving force in the uprooting of existing norms around shrimp and the 
solidification of new norms.  
 
A fisheries specialist at an international environmental NGO described how it was 
ultimately consumer behaviour that held the key to change, especially in terms of 
putting pressure on retailers:  
 
So, I mean I think it’s all about consumers and the general public believing in our brand 
and supporting us. And that’s also why the retailers and producers want to follow our 
messaging, because it’s consumer pressure that makes them move forward in their 
work. 
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 (interview recording, 2019) 
 
In terms of consumer awareness of specific eco-labels and certification schemes, a 
respondent from another NGO reflected that most consumers in Sweden recognized 
the various labels and knew that they stood for something ‘good’, but got lost in the 
details: 
 
People recognize the labels, and they sort of can say that it has to do with animal 
welfare, it has to do with environmental sustainability, it has to do with social 
sustainability. So, I mean I think at that level the knowledge and awareness is relatively 
good. But when you go into details, most people are lost I would say. And especially 
when it comes to differences between different sustainability schemes, I think very few 
people can explain like what’s the difference between MSC and ASC. 
 (interview recording, 2019) 
 
In terms of customer awareness of the various labels on seafood products, one retail 
manager claimed that within Sweden recognition of MSC was high, while lower for 
ASC: 
 
We did a survey quite recently and I think it was 56 to 60% of our customers recognize 
MSC and know what it stands for. If they did a survey on ASC I wouldn't say that it 
would be that big as we don't carry that much farm products. 
(interview recording, 2017) 
 
Another respondent reflected on how there was considerable pressure and 
expectation placed on the consumer, some of which was perhaps too much: 
 
And I do feel that for consumers, there’s too much responsibility in having to 
understand all the different labels. And I think it’s unrealistic. So, I also think it’s a 
matter of the regulations and policy to help the consumers. I do get frustrated when 
retailers or politicians say that it’s the consumers that need to make the choices, but it’s 
not fair on the consumers to have to be able to understand all this…. I’m not surprised 
that they’re a little bit lost with all their eco-labels, because there’s so many.  
 (interview recording, 2019) 
 
Observations and short casual interviews were conducted in the seafood freezer aisle 
of Swedish retailer in Gothenburg, on 2017-06-20, which gave an interesting insight 
into customer awareness of and engagement with seafood labels. Ten out of the 12 
 
 
145 
customers interviewed noted that they would be willing to pay more for a seafood 
product sourced in an environmentally responsible manner, with most saying that 
20% was the maximum price difference they would pay. When shown a packet of 
Spencer Gulf King Shrimp with the MSC logo on, 11 out of 12 said they recognized 
the logo. However, seven respondents noted that they were not very clear as to 
exactly what the label meant and were more confident with labels on meat, and fruit 
and vegetables. 
 
In summary, the customer was an important actor who was seemingly less discussed 
by industry actors during the shrimp debate. While some of the NGO campaign 
efforts were indeed shaming-based campaigning targeting the customer (for 
example, SSNC’s ‘one small thing’ advertisement during Anti-Scampi), the majority 
of efforts seemed to be on NGOs targeting firms and using the momentum of the 
customer (and the broader Swedish public) to indirectly support these efforts.  
 
4.4.5 Small sector, role swapping and the prominence of specific individuals 
The final sub-theme to arise from empirical material was that actors felt that the 
Swedish seafood industry was especially small (and the shrimp industry even 
smaller), and this had implications for both how sustainability was interpreted and 
practiced, and how individuals perceived and engaged with other actors in the 
industry.   
 
The swapping of roles within the industry, and the fact that many people seemed to 
stay in the fisheries and seafood sector for life (as is the case in many other industries), 
seemed to have implications for how sustainability was interpreted and practiced. It 
became apparent that some people throughout their career have worn several 
different hats. For instance, when this study commenced, one of the persons 
interviewed worked at the WWF Sweden. A year later, they worked for the ASC. 
Many jumped between commercial fishing, certification, academia/science, eco-
label/certification and NGO. For example, a respondent interviewed in 2016 at a 
seafood certification scheme works for an NGO as of 2016. This individual’s old job 
was taken by another individual, who previously worked at SSNC with another 
individual interviewed in this study. It seemed that the Swedish seafood industry 
(and especially the shrimp sector) was very small, and most of the key people knew 
each other very well. This is why perhaps the ‘snow ball’ warm-calling style of 
interviewing worked so well in this study: once a foot was in the door and actors 
became aware that this was a serious, legitimate study, they were all happy to 
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accommodate and introduce to their colleagues and broader networks. One of the 
interesting themes that may arise here is the idea of ‘role playing’, and what the 
implications might be in terms of negotiating sustainability with other actors when 
you once yourself (in many cases very recently) represented that actor. 
  
It seemed that these social networks and personal connections served as an informal 
mechanism for getting things done quickly. A C-suite executive at a large commercial 
shrimp fishing cooperative noted that many personal connections in the industry 
were formed years ago in a previous role as a manager of a marine national park. 
These connections were of great use in terms of knowledge for navigating the “Who’s 
who” of the seafood industry (interview recording, 2016).  
 
One respondent described networking as being the most important aspect of their 
job, suggesting “I think of networking as pretty much my most important work too. 
To build those networks that makes things happen somewhere down the line.” 
(interview recording, 2017) 
 
Another respondent, a seafood manager for one of the large Swedish retailers, 
emphasised the role that major trade fairs and events play in establishing contacts 
with peers in the industry. These events often served as the location where many 
decisions were taken in regards to selecting suppliers: 
 
At Brussels Seafood Fair each year, all of the seafood industries is mixing together for 
three days. It's the biggest event. Naturally you establish some contacts with your 
peers, including potential suppliers. 
(interview recording, 2017) 
 
In terms of role swapping, one respondent suggested that people in the seafood 
industry sometimes take on the ‘persona’ of the organization and role that they work 
for and in doing so may disregard their personal beliefs or beliefs from former job: 
 
It’s interesting where last week someone who was an ex-colleague and he worked for 
a long time at [seafood certification scheme], now she worked for another organization 
and she was defending the position of that organization with a lot of passion and then, 
over drinks out there.  
 
You can have a chat and you can say, “I know. But I 100% believed in what I said, and 
I know it wasn’t a 100% convenient for [seafood certification scheme]. But this is my 
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role now and I believed every word I said.” I think many people recognize that as well, 
that you can if you defend another part of the parcel, it doesn’t make an instance here 
if you hold another position. 
(interview recording, 2017) 
 
This theme highlighted that ultimately it is individuals that contest sustainability on 
behalf of organizations, and the personal philosophes of each person (including their 
experiences from previous roles) can and often does influence how they act.  
 
Furthermore, there were found to be occasions of significantly different stances 
between employees working for same organization on matters of what constituted 
sustainability in terms of shrimp and fish species and methods of capture/farming. A 
respondent working at Swedish NGO noted the separation between the views of 
individuals in the Stockholm and Gothenburg offices of the same organization, 
suggesting that “If you ask the colleagues in Stockholm who work with tropical fish, 
there’s nuances there.” (interview recording, 2019). Individuals were capable of 
having a significant and sometimes decisive say over how sustainability was 
interpreted and practiced. A director at a Swedish environmental NGO spoke of how 
an individual leaving led to the cessation of a key sustainability initiative, and a 
significant change of direction of one aspect of their seafood policy: “There was a 
change of chairman, and ceasing of activity” (interview recording, 2017). 
 
To conclude, a key finding of the data was a seemingly simple and obvious yet often 
forgotten one: that organizations are made up of people, and that while individuals 
may speak and act on behalf of an organization, it is still an individual person with 
agency, autonomy and opinions. This becomes especially prevalent in smaller 
counties like Sweden, where it becomes possible to get to know individuals. 
Individuals can (and often do) leave organizations and work for others in the same 
industry, and the ‘baggage’ that they bring from their previous role carries subtle yet 
real implications for how decisions around sustainability might be made and how 
contests to the sustainability strategy and overall legitimacy of other organizations 
may be launched.  
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4.5 Summary 
The data presented in this chapter illustrates the four major themes which emerged 
from the empirical material. Several of the sub-themes beneath these broader themes 
on initial appearance seem to be particularly interesting – and in some cases novel 
and unusual. In order to make sense of what these themes may mean in relation to 
what we currently know and do not know about contests to organizational 
legitimacy, we must carefully analyse and discuss these, drawing on the primary 
conceptual framework of the study. This is done in the following chapter.  
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5. How legitimacy is contested 
5.1 Overview 
Analysis of the empirical material in relation to the focal research question of the 
study − how is legitimacy contested? – reinforces many of our existing 
understandings regarding the complex interplay between actors in a value chain in 
contesting legitimacy, while also bringing to light several novel occurrences which 
can contribute to our theoretical framing and practical understanding of the territory. 
The Swedish shrimp case between 2008 and 2018 illustrates a somewhat unusual 
occurrence: a situation where NGOs have been able to – in a short space of time – rise 
to command a dominant position in an industry and dictate the prevailing 
interpretation of who and what constitutes sustainability, and in turn what is 
‘legitimate’. This chapter of the thesis tells the story of how norm entrepreneurs – 
through shaming – can uproot old norms and instil new ones by contesting the SLO 
of corporations and re-establish new ideas of what should constitute legitimacy, and 
in turn convince corporations to change their behaviour accordingly. These contests 
often manifest around debates as to the meaning of ideologically, politically and 
scientifically loaded terms – in this instance, sustainability, which became a synonym 
for the broader contest around legitimacy. This story is told in three parts. Firstly, the 
interplay between norm entrepreneurs, corporations and society (Section 5.2). 
Secondly, what the contesting of legitimacy looks like in practice and the 
consequences that arise from shaming-based contests (Section 5.3). Finally, the role 
of lists, guides and rankings as markers of legitimacy and stabilizers of social norms 
(Section 5.4).  
 
5.2 The interrelationship between norm entrepreneurs, corporations 
and society 
Legitimacy by definition represents a judgement call: an interpretation by one group 
of the moral righteousness and acceptability of the actions and/or existence of 
another. Legitimacy theory aims to explore this judgement call, particularly the 
interplay between for-profit corporations and society (Shocker & Sethi, 1974). While 
it is challenging to measure or quantity legitimacy, it can be identified – and its 
occurrence (or lack thereof) has consequences for multiple different actors (Deegan, 
2019). This section of the analysis chapter describes the interrelationship between 
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society, norm entrepreneurs who contest legitimacy, and corporations which want to 
be seen as legitimate and protect their interests.  
 
5.2.1 The unusual case of NGOs achieving a norm cascade and successfully 
challenging and changing what constitutes legitimacy 
Under legitimacy theory, there exists a sort of ‘social contract’ between corporations 
and society (Guthrie & Parker, 1989; Shocker & Sethi, 1974). It is assumed that 
corporations have been vested with a unique privilege: the resource of society’s 
acceptance and goodwill, and thus in turn have an obligation to ensure that they 
maintain congruency between their own actions and the expectations of the society 
in which they operate (Preston et al., 1995). If the actions of a corporation fall too far 
out of line from congruency with societal norms, this may prompt challenges to its 
legitimacy, and in some cases can develop into an existential threat for the 
corporation’s continued existence. In the case of corporations working with natural 
resources (such as fish and shrimp), the literature suggests that they have an even 
more delicate relationship with society, which has endowed them with a social 
licence (Murphy-Gregory, 2018). This delicate relationship makes them more 
susceptible to legitimacy challenges, depending on the level of their core business 
activity that is reliant on the SLO topic in question (Lenox & Eesley, 2009; Bell & 
Hindmore, 2014; Tracey et al.,2013). This SLO may be ‘revoked’, which in turn creates 
a serious challenge to the ongoing legitimacy of a corporation and therefore its right 
to exist. Revoking an SLO requires an actor to mobilize significant resources against 
a corporation (or to at least create a perception of significant resources) (Cullen-Knox 
et al., 2017). Some actors seeking to mount a challenge against SLO may believe that 
minor corrections and adjustments are not good enough, and may seek to bring about 
larger changes relating to major questions around the overall right to exist of some 
organizations.  
 
A selection of these actors we can classify as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ under Sunstein’s 
(1996, p. 909) interpretation of actors “interested in changing social norms”. Contests 
to legitimacy do not necessarily manifest around particular vocabulary pertaining to 
legitimacy. Rather, they either take place through a range of synonyms which may 
be ‘manager’ speak for legitimacy (Deegan, 2019), or instead through a number of 
‘proxy’ terms which may in and of themselves not be immediately linked to 
legitimacy but carry connotations which may pose a real threat to legitimacy. In this 
case, the debate between corporations and secondary actors manifested around the 
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term ‘sustainability’, which became akin to SLO. This in turn, in many cases, then 
transcended through to challenges to legitimacy.  
 
The case of the Swedish shrimp case between 2008 and 2018 is an unusual story which 
documents how three NGOs, playing the role of norm entrepreneurs, were able to 
partially and in some cases fully revoke the SLO of corporations though sustained 
and highly effective shaming-based campaigns, and in doing so successfully 
challenge the legitimacy of seafood business and the retailers selling their products. 
These shaming-based tactics saw NGOs employ the mediums of both traditional and 
social media, in conjunction with lists and guides, in order to project a message to 
four groups that some or all of their shrimp-related operations were illegitimate. 
These groups were fishing corporations, the end-sellers of their products (that is, 
supermarkets and restaurants), seafood consumers, and the broader Swedish public. 
These campaigns were highly effective, and fundamentally reshape the operating 
norms, or ‘rules of the game’ of the Swedish shrimp industry, allowing NGOs to 
achieve a dominant position in determining what constituted the SLO for any actions 
associated with shrimp – both in the present moment and for at least a decade 
afterwards (at the time of writing this thesis in 2020, their norms are very much still 
in place). This is a rather rare and infrequent occurrence in a literature full of 
examples of NGOs lobbying business but often with limited, slowly-progressing or 
non-permanent success (Deighan & Jenkins, 2015; van Huijstee, & Glasbergen, 2010; 
Corell & Betsill, 2001).  
This case is perhaps one of the early documented examples of a recent claims of a 
new trend in the seafood industry of developed countries of an increasing ability of 
NGOs to shape the operating norms of the industry and mount successful legitimacy 
challenges by gaining control over what norms confer SLO, and in turn legitimacy. 
Roheim et al., (2018, p. 395) describe this trend as being about a “shift in the roles that 
extra transactional actors, including both NGOs and governments, play in markets 
demanding credence attributes.” This paper (and several others like it) are pointing 
to a ‘sea change’ which seems to be occurring (especially in the Nordic countries, 
Germany and the Netherlands), whereby NGOs have a more significant role to play 
and can influence the course of events around seafood and fishing issues more 
readily than a decade earlier. While this trend has been identified, there has been 
lacking a detailed, in-depth example. It is possible that the events in Sweden between 
2008 and 2018 written up in this study provide the first comprehensive description 
of this phenomenon.  
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The Swedish shrimp case saw a significant rearrangement in terms of the 
arrangement of actors, and in terms of viewing the industry using a hierarchal lens 
over control of the norms that confer legitimacy. Empirical material suggested that 
in 2008, the dominant actors in the industry were the seafood and fishing 
corporations, followed by food retail corporations. This was ascertained during 
interviews, where respondents from across the spectrum (corporations, NGOs and 
so forth) alluded to a ‘before’ and ‘after’ type situation – in the same manner as people 
do when referring to any major historical event which changed the trajectory of 
events. Just four years later, it was the NGOs who were in charge, and as of 2020 this 
remains. One respondent from a Swedish NGO described this dominance through 
an interaction with a corporation who asked that the NGO “Tell me what to do. Tell 
me who I should buy from.” (interview recording, 2019). It seems to be a David and 
Goliath tale, where NGOs started off as David but quickly found themselves rising 
to become Goliath – and maintaining that position. From the empirical material, it 
seemed to be the case that NGOs were able to achieve such a significant degree of 
influence and rise to the status of industry-shaping norm entrepreneur due to four 
main factors, both planned and accidental: the effective use of shaming-based 
strategies, tapping into a high level of social and environmental awareness within the 
Swedish public, successfully amplifying their message through effective use of 
television, radio, social media and membership base (that is, members of the NGOs), 
and the use of artefacts such as lists and guides as physical manifestations of contracts 
for corporations to abide by.  
 
The findings in this study are inline with existing literature regarding the symmetry 
of the contestation topic to the core activities of the corporation (Lenox & Eesley, 
2009). To those corporations whose entire existence was central in the shrimp debate 
(such as the Swedish seafood importer interviewed in this study), the NGO campaign 
efforts represent a very real threat to their SLO, and in turn their legitimacy.  Under 
the presumptions of the effect of NGO pressure based on corporation size (King & 
Soule  2007; Lenox & Eesley, 2009; Ingram, Yue, & Rao, 2010), this would mean that 
a smaller seafood company would have a difficult time to manage such contests. Such 
a finding was seen in the empirical material. To this smaller shrimp importer 
interview in this study, the owner of the corporation was “fed up” (recording, 2019) 
with NGO activities and realised that their protests represented a very real threat to 
the viability of their business.   
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Under Sunstein’s (1996) model of norm entrepreneurs, it seems to be the case that in 
this case the NGOs were able to create norm bandwagons, where efforts by one or more 
actors lead to initially small shifts, which grow increasingly larger as more people 
pile on the bandwagon. This coincided with a norm cascade, which is characterized 
according to Sunstein by “rapid shifts in norms” (Sunstein, 1996, p. 909). Like the 
chicken and the egg, we cannot from the data clearly articulate the sequence in which 
this occurred (that is, whether the bandwagon preceded the cascade, or vice versa). 
And perhaps this exposes an oft-cited critique of theoretical models: that rarely do 
things in reality pan out as simply as models suggest they do. But what we can say is 
that the Swedish shrimp case did clearly feature both phenomenon. If we couple this 
finding together with what we know about SLO, we can add to Sunstein’s concept 
by proposing that both norm bandwagons and norm cascades seem to be a necessary 
prelude to ‘unfreeze’ existing SLO norms, and allow for new norms to be solidified. 
The Swedish shrimp case saw the norm that tropical farmed shrimp were acceptable 
to eat unfrozen, and a new norm solidified: that it is unacceptable. Moreover, 
elements of the empirical material from this study suggested that norm 
entrepreneurs do not always want to just change a social norm: in many cases, they 
want to change the social norm and have legal frameworks updated to reflect this 
new norm. This was explored in depth during an interview with a respondent from 
an NGO, who explicitly referred to the multi-dimensional aspects of NGO campaign 
work. Cullen-Knox et al., (2017) showed how challenges to SLO of corporations 
within the Australian marine industry simultaneously sought to shift social norms 
and update marine governance legislation. While in this case this did not happen, it 
is quite possible that in the future new Swedish fishing legislation may come more 
quickly, and more in the interests of NGOs, due to the ‘Goliath’-type status which 
NGOs have achieved and (at least at the time of writing in 2020, maintained) within 
the Swedish seafood industry. The overall hierarchy of relations between actors – that 
is, the influence hierarchy in terms of ability to achieve ones desired outcomes ahead 
of another – seem to be able to be questioned, reset and rearranged based on pressure 
brought about by one group of actors: in this case, NGOs. We can see a distinct and 
clear alternation in the arrangement of the hierarchy of relations in the Swedish 
shrimp industry pre-controversy in 2008, and post-controversy, in 2018. 
 
It seems that NGOs were able to instigate a shift in norms by carefully tapping into 
the significant levels of environmental awareness and interest of the Swedish pubic 
in order to mobilize actors, and in doing so require compliance with new, updated 
norms and in turn alter the SLO required of firms in the seafood industry. Sweden 
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was an early and eager participant in the global environmental movement which 
started in the late 1960s, and since then issues of environmental sustainability have 
featured highly in public debate and policy decisions (McCormick, 1991; Mol, 2000). 
What this has meant is that Swedish society generally has a strong awareness of 
environmental issues, and holds organizations to high standards regarding what 
they can and cannot do − higher standards than might exist in other countries such 
as the United States (Boström & Klintman, 2006). The norm in Sweden is not that you 
have to follow the law; it is much more than that. While abiding by the law might 
give you the right to exist, it seems to be the case that if a corporation wants ongoing 
legitimacy it must go above and beyond legislative requirements and keep up with 
changing social norms.  
 
The voices of NGOs were significantly amplified and assisted though the mediums 
of both social and traditional media, and furthered through mobilization of 
membership base, consumers, and instilling fear of harm to reputation in the minds 
of firms – especially food retailers. The initial small-scale campaigns such as ‘Anti-
Scampi’ started by the SSNC were amplified through media and exacerbated by 
positive feedback loops – until they reached levels where they became self-sustaining 
and growing exponentially. The result of this was that NGO pressure on firms grew 
to become powerful enough to challenge the legitimacy of the fishing companies and 
supermarkets as the primary determiners of sustainability.  
 
The NGOs were able to break down an existing interpretation of legitimacy – through 
the synonym of sustainability – replace it with a new one, and reaffirm and solidify 
this interpretation as the new norm to which other actors must conform.  
 
This course of events in itself is not overly suprising, as it represents how change 
occurs in many different contexts. What is surpising, however, is the fact that it was 
NGOs who were able to achieve this: organizations whose impact on firms is usually 
documented in the literature as being moderate to minimal. One key finding from 
the Swedish shrimp case was how one actor (or group of actors – that is, the three 
NGOs) could essentially multiplity their actual and percrived influence through the 
leveraging of some public support, and – either intentionally or unintentionally – 
create a perception in the minds of other actors that the public support is large and 
overwhelming.  
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This case was not just an example of an industry which had a particular set of stances 
on environmental issues at one point in time which were unstabalized and then re-
stabilized (at a higher level of expectation) by secondary actor pressure. Rather, it 
showed the significant role that the public plays. It affirmed existing models relating 
to NGO-corporation such as Den Hond and De Bakker’s (2007), which takes an 
institutional-theory inspired approach to analysing how industry norms can be 
fundamentally reshaped through effective use of pressure tactics by NGOs against 
firms, but also exposes them on their limited description of how socteial norms and 
public sentiment play into the process. Such models theorize – despite having few 
practical cases to illustrate – that sustainability change in an industry or sector follows 
basic premise of an unfreeze-change-refreeze model (similar to works such as Lewin 
1951), and that NGOs can be the ones who bring about such changes.  
 
Some of the empirical material generated from interviews was startling in terms of 
how clearly and consistently it documented that primary producers and distributors 
were at the mercy of NGO – and unlike anything else in recent literature. It also 
reaffirmed that the language used to contest legitimacy is often not straightforward, 
and may take place through proxy words or metaphors. In collected empirical data, 
there were few examples of actors using direct phrases which called into question the 
right of another organization to exist. Instead, words like ‘sustainable’ ‘sustainability’ 
and ‘responsible’ were used. It seems to be the case that a challenge to a sustainability 
question can in some cases be akin to a challenge to overall legitimacy – especially to 
corporations already involved with natural resources, and as such have an SLO 
granted to them ( Cullen-Knox et al., 2017). 
 
5.2.2 Whole, part, some: the degree of exposure and the nature of the legitimacy 
challenge 
Legitimacy theory proposes that there are various degrees of seriousness in 
challenges to an organization’s legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). It is the case that “An 
audience may grant legitimacy to an organization for one of its roles but not for 
another.” (Ayling, 2017, p. 352). As such, it is not a black-and-white, yes-or-no matter 
of saying that an organization is legitimate or not – rather, it is more complex and 
nuanced, and relies on looking at the degree of exposure that an organization has to 
the social norm which is being challenged. A corporation may be legitimate and have 
SLO in the vast majority of its spheres of influence, but be called into question by an 
influential external actor who suggests that it is judged to be falling short in one area 
(Murphy-Gregory, 2018). In some cases, a challenge may represent a serious and real 
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threat to the corporation’s overall legitimacy (and hence their continued existence) – 
something which also reflects the blurring between the “perceptions and social 
constructs” of both the issue itself and the views of actor who is voicing concern about 
the issue (Ayling, 2017, p.  532). This may require the corporation to undergo a major 
soul-searching exercise, and to walk on the boundaries between order and chaos, 
between the known and the unknown as they seek to figure out who they are and 
how they can once again be seen as legitimate. In other cases, a challenge to 
legitimacy may be trivial and minor, and no response is necessary, other than the 
usual ongoing efforts of managers in organizations to use corporate disclosures to 
“manage or manipulate their relationship with society” (Deegan, 2019, p. 2316). Or 
in some cases an issue can be trivial and minor now, but if let alone could have the 
potential to grow into something serious. As such, in a space-time continuum 
organizations will rotate between seeking to extend, maintain or defend legitimacy, 
depending on what the situation calls for (Milne & Patten, 2002).  
 
The Swedish shrimp industry reinforced the fact that legitimacy threats are closely 
tied to the degree of exposure that the organization has to the social norm which the 
norm entrepreneur(s) is trying to change, as well as the level of status and authority 
of the norm entrepreneur(s) launching the contest (as perceived in the eyes of the 
corporation on the receiving end of their efforts). To several Swedish seafood 
companies, whose primary operation was importing farmed shrimp from Asia, the 
NGO-led campaigns and requirement of abiding by their artefacts represented a 
serious, real and immediate threat to their business model, and in many cases their 
ongoing existence. To other corporations (such as supermarket chains) the shrimp 
issue was more of a peripheral one, with shrimp representing just one of hundreds 
of products sold in their stores, and a small contributor to revenues. However, while 
the shrimp issue was not in itself a threat to the overall legitimacy of ICA, Coop and 
Axfood, the broader implications of the NGO movement seemed to have enough 
potential for harm that the supermarkets deemed the best course of action as 
conceding to the wishes of the NGOs and conform to the artefacts. This would make 
sense under recent framings of SLO as being primarily about situations “concerning 
corporate use of public natural resources” (Cullen-Knox, 2017, p. 70) rather than 
being just another word for legitimacy (Gehman, Lefsrund & Fast, 2017). The idea of 
fish and marine life being a public resource – and this being a defining feature of SLO 
– perhaps means that corporations will have a much more cautious approach, as they 
foresee that loss of SLO on the seafood question could open up broader challenges to 
their overall legitimacy. This could explain why conformity from Swedish 
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supermarkets to NGO-developed artefacts was achieved so readily. Moreover, we 
can suggest that perhaps corporations will be happy to fold on issues which represent 
a small area of their existing business but potentially larger threat to future 
legitimacy, while if the challenge represents a threat to most of all of their business 
area (and hence their immediate legitimacy) they will be willing to fight. This is 
especially the case in a context of increasing conglomeration, as well as global 
exposure and complexity supply chains, meaning that the chances of a corporation 
receiving exposure to a challenge is high. Perhaps the four Swedish retailers were 
happy to concede on shrimp because in the scale of things it represented such a small 
percentage of their revenues (one can anecdotally determine from the language used 
by retail managers during interview that shrimp products constituted less than 1% 
of overall revenues and it was not worth risking broader legitimacy over). Perhaps if 
a similar campaign was launched against a product with higher volumes and larger 
contribution to revenue, the push-back from retailers might have been much more 
significant. Such a hypothesis follows under the legitimacy theory assumption that 
“Managers’ efforts in undertaking legitimating actions are assumed to be motivated 
by survival or probability goals”, which in turn are “ultimately linked to the self-
interest of the manager” (Deegan, 2019, p. 2315). 
 
A final and very important aspect of this discussion is to understand the 
interrelationship between an issue-specific legitimacy, and broader legitimacy. It 
appears that it is increasingly becoming the case that the loss of legitimacy regarding 
one social or environmental issue can have ‘spill over’ effects in terms of the overall 
holding of legitimacy and a social license to operate (van Huijstee & Glasbergen, 
2010); Murphy-Gregory, 2018). This could explain why the four food retailers in 
Sweden were so quick to respond to the wishes of the NGOs – because they realized 
that this issue had the potential to challenge their overall legitimacy as organizations 
which take sustainability seriously and are a productive and important part of 
Swedish society. It seems that the reasons for a retailer such as ICA deciding to accept 
the demands of NGOs regarding shrimp and base their seafood guide around the 
WWF-developed list represents a concession from ICA: that they were willing to 
‘give up’ control of shrimp – in the scale of things a tiny proportion of its product 
range of several thousand – in order to not harm its broader legitimacy. 
 
5.2.3 Perception and representation 
A central premise of legitimacy theory is that achievement of legitimacy requires 
corporations to be “operating in conformance with community expectations” 
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(Deegan, 2019, p.  2315). Existing literature, however, is not overly precise as to how 
corporations are supposed to ascertain this, with recent voices such as Deegan (2019) 
calling for better practical toolkits for managers to work with these questions. 
Moreover, there remains ambiguity surrounding how to gauge whether the demands 
made by secondary actors such as NGOs, who sometimes assert to be representative 
of and speak on behalf of these expectations, are in fact representative of societal 
norms. Because legitimacy by definition exists within the context of a relationship, it 
flows both ways. Legitimacy is a “resource… on which the organization is dependent 
for survival and is conferred on the organization by society” (Deegan, 2019, p. 2315). 
Existing descriptions of legitimacy in the literature have clearly acknowledged this 
framing of legitimacy as a resource, dating back to O’Donovan’s (2002) mapping of 
the intersection between the two and even the resource dependency ideas of Dowling 
and Pfeffer (1975). This resource however, appears to be a complex to and fro 
between the dominant perception or judgement of the actions of an organization, and 
the quantifiable reality (in terms of a neutral, quantitative interpretation of 
information pertaining to its legitimacy). The fact that legitimacy is, by definition, 
embedded within a relationship means that it cannot be objectively quantified. 
Adams (2008, p. 366) puts it, “Legitimacy, like reputation, is subjective. “ 
 
This case documented several NGOs who at times inferred that they were speaking 
on behalf of the Swedish public. The majority of the Swedish public, according to 
these NGOs, had strong feelings towards shrimp sustainability and felt that current 
practices were not in line with their expectations. It was not the purpose of this study 
to gauge the opinion of the Swedish public on shrimp sustainability, and thus we do 
not have the data to say what their views on average are, and how close these were 
to what NGOs suggested they were. Nonetheless, preliminary evidence collected 
during interviews with customers seems to suggest that while indeed many Swedish 
consumers did have reasonable levels of awareness of seafood sustainability issues, 
they did not possess nearly the same levels of strong feeling or outrage towards the 
selling of ‘unsustainable’ shrimp as the NGOs who claimed to be speaking on their 
behalf said they did. The data suggested that consumers seemed indifferent or even 
apathetic, with shrimp sustainability not being nearly as high on their agenda as 
NGOs had claimed it was. By claiming to speak on behalf of the public, the NGOs 
were able to create in the eyes of primary producers and distributors the idea that 
they had their finger closely on the pulse of what society deemed as legitimate, and 
were able to harness this perception of being a figurehead and spokesperson of 
societal legitimacy in order to reshape the shrimp industry to their own liking. To 
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draw on a metaphor, in the eyes of the fishing companies and retailers the NGOs had 
an army of several thousand behind them, when in reality they perhaps only had a 
brigade of a few hundred.  
 
Furthermore, one could also suggest that the NGOs partly contradicted their own 
claim that the Swedish public had made up their mind about shrimp sustainability 
by the fact that many of the campaigns were targeted at the public themselves, such 
as the SSNC television and YouTube advertisements asking the Swedish public to do 
one small thing that is priceless to the environment – stop eating tropical shrimp.  
 
The role of the NGOs in the Swedish shrimp case may have some implications for 
our understanding of the way in which legitimacy is “conferred on the organization 
by society” (Deegan, 2019, p. 2315).  
 
From the data collected in this study, I propose that the ‘conferral process’ in practice 
perhaps can be best described in four stages. This conferral process is more iterative 
rather than linear in the sense that it in practice does not necessary follow step-by-
step sequence but instead may skip a stage, repeat a stage, or go back a stage. These 
four stages are as follows: 
1. Secondary actors make demands of corporations, which may or may not be in line 
with actual societal norms 
2. Corporations determine whether the claims being made are in line with 
community expectations 
3. Corporations (often unknowingly, and in a non-methodical manner) calibrate the 
legitimacy of the actors bringing about the demands, and make a judgement as to 
whether the secondary actor has enough authority and momentum to cause them 
harm (reputational harm, financial harm and so forth). 
 
If threat level is not serious, no further major action is taken by the corporation. If 
threat level is determined to be serious, the corporation moves onto step four: 
 
4. Corporation responds in any number of ways, primarily oriented around 
stopping/starting activity, disclosing further social/environmental information, 
publicly communicating past instances of good behaviour and so forth.  
Perhaps the process of ‘conferring’ actually takes place via the judgement of a 
corporation’s actions through the eyes of one or more actors who claim to be 
representative of and speaking on behalf of society, rather than society itself.  
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The second point of this list is especially important. Perhaps the perception of 
secondary actors representing community expectations is equal in importance as 
representation. What this means is that if a secondary actor can do a good job at 
making out as though they speak on behalf of the community, then in the eyes of the 
corporation it is essentially akin to them being representative of community 
expectations. 
 
While actors speaking on behalf of a society (which by definition has no single voice 
of its own) and corporations judging them is not a new concept in itself (and has been 
covered in related literatures such as stakeholder theory for several decades — see 
Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997, for instance), what is novel is the interplay between the 
dominant perception versus the quantifiable ‘reality’ (as judged through a neutral 
observer’s interpretation of information from sources such as annual reports). 
Achievement and maintenance of legitimacy may not necessarily be as much about 
being congruent with community expectations as much as appeasing the wishes of 
those who have the potential to do harm to the corporation’s interest and who claim 
to represent and speak on behalf of community expectations. And a corporation must be 
able to ascertain the legitimacy of the secondary actor themselves (and their potential 
to cause harm) when deciding whether to obey the wishes of the actor seeking to 
challenge its legitimacy. Thus, conceptual models within legitimacy theory (such as 
SLO) could be improved by better accounting for these nuances. This follows calls 
from recent papers such as Mitchell et al., (2015), which describes how NGOs – like 
any group of individuals – are subject to the possibility of using the guise of speaking 
on behalf of the public as a mechanism to achieve their own interests. It also partially 
responds to recent calls to address some of the short-fallings in legitimacy theory in 
terms of “how managers determine the existence, or degree, of legitimacy threats” 
(Deegan, 2019, p. 2311). In the opinion of the author, one such strategy could be 
incorporating the ‘reasonable person’ test used in English Common Law into SLO. 
This could be a way of ensuring congruency between the sentiments of society on a 
particular topic, and the sentiments expressed by any groups or individuals who 
claim to speak on behalf of society.  
 
5.2.4 Summary 
The interplay between norm entrepreneurs, corporations and society is complex and 
difficult to quantify, due to the very notion of legitimacy being a judgement call. A 
prelude for a contest to legitimacy seems to be secondary actors who can achieve a 
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belief in minds of corporations that they are speaking on behalf of what society wants. 
A contest to a corporation’s SLO may in some cases be minor, and easily and quickly 
resolved. In other instances, it may represent a serious threat to the overall legitimacy 
and therefore ongoing existence of a corporation. This seems to be based on the 
degree of exposure that a corporation has to the social norm under debate, as well as 
the balance and framing of the relationship between the corporation and secondary 
actors.  
 
5.3 What the contesting of legitimacy looks like in practice and the 
consequences that arise from shaming-based contests 
Under legitimacy theory, the granting of societal acceptance of organizational 
behaviour is a resource which must be continually earned (O’Donovan, 2002). If it 
occurs that the actions of an organization are judged to fall too far outside of societal 
norms, this may lead to an organization being ‘called out’ – typically by an NGO 
(Deegan, 2019; Murphy-Gregory, 2018). It may be the case that actions have indeed 
fallen outside of societal norms, or instead it could be the case that it is perceived that 
this has happened.  
 
As previously established in the first part of this chapter, the seriousness of such a 
call out depends on several factors, such as the perceived status and authority of the 
actor making the claim, and whether the claim represents a minor or serious level of 
threat to an organization’s right to exist. In domains where natural resources are 
consumed, there seems to exist an even greater obligation of organizations (especially 
corporations) to continually show that they are meeting societal norms. The 
contesting of the legitimacy organization in the natural resources sector (or specific 
industry within the sector, such as fishing) usually starts with a challenge to SLO 
(Cullen-Knox, 2017). In this section of the analysis, we consider how the contesting 
of legitimacy happens in practice and what the consequences of it are, with a focus 
on the role of shaming-based strategies utilized by NGOs against corporations. 
 
The 2008 to 2018 shrimp sustainability case in Sweden demonstrated how the 
legitimacy of corporations (in this case, fishing and seafood businesses and the 
retailers selling their products) can be successfully contested by secondary actors 
such as NGOs playing the role of norm entrepreneur (Sunstein, 1996) through 
shaming-based tactics oriented towards uprooting existing social norms and 
solidifying new ones. To corporations, these efforts to change norms manifest as a 
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challenge to their Social Licence to Operate (SLO) – a challenge which may be serious 
enough to pose a threat to their overall legitimacy. From the perspective of 
corporations (especially smaller ones), the efforts of norm entrepreneurs represent 
unreasonable overreach of authority by a secondary actor who has over-shamed a 
law-abiding corporation that was making sincere attempts (sincere when viewed 
through the eyes of a hypothetical reasonable person, that is, the man on the Clapham 
omnibus in English Common Law) to keep up with new societal norms. Once a new 
norm has been successfully stabilized, secondary actors then seem to act as 
gatekeepers of assessing ongoing corporation compliance, in some cases monitoring 
and enforcing by making it a norm in itself that corporation data on a particular topic 
(in this case, shrimp sustainability) be funnelled through the secondary-actor 
produced rankings, lists and guides. Secondary actors seem to leverage the 
corporation’s memory of past shaming and the latent threat of future shaming as a 
mechanism to keep ongoing compliance to these norms, and corporations may 
‘hedge’ their own internal strategy closely on these artefacts in order to appease the 
wishes of the secondary actor so as to ensure maintenance of SLO, and in turn overall 
legitimacy. 
 
5.3.1 Intentional overshoot in the eyes of secondary actors, but illegitimate overreach 
in the eyes of corporations 
The idea of legitimacy as being a flowing resource of “on-going acceptance or 
approval” (Parsons, Lacey & Moffat, 2014, p. 84) granted to the corporation by society 
is a central feature of legitimacy theory. It is far less clear, however, how this actually 
plays out in practice (Deegan, 2019), and even less clear as to how the strategic 
interests of challenges to legitimacy happen. Drawing on our understanding of both 
corporation-NGO interactions (van Huijstee & Glasbergen, 2010) as well as SLO 
challenges in regards to marine resources ( Murphy-Gregory, 2018) we could assume 
that an actor striving to change the behaviour of a corporation may perhaps 
intentionally overshoot their goal, on the basis that what they end up with will be 
scaled back somewhat. The empirical material from this study, however, showed the 
case of the NGOs pretty much getting exactly what they aimed for: the removal of all 
tropical shrimp from Swedish supermarket freezers, and making compliance to their 
lists, guides and rankings an essential element of SLO. From the data collected in this 
study, it is impossible to ascertain whether this was a calculated play by NGOs, that 
is, that they deliberately, calculatedly and intentionally overshot their goal on the 
anticipation of the final result being scaled back. There are some suggestions of this, 
such as during an interview when a respondent from a Swedish environmental NGO 
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reflected that “What society ends up with is a bit below what we aim for ”(interview 
recording, 2019). But what we can say from the empirical material is that the NGOs 
clearly got what they were striving for: a significant rearrangement of the rules of the 
game of shrimp in Sweden. While the NGOs did not work in unison (in fact in some 
cases they were against one another, as seen in one of the sub-themes in the Chapter 
4, Results), their three-pronged challenge to legitimacy seemed to create synergistic 
effects and reduce the effective size of the challenge.  
 
From the perspective of the corporations on the receiving end of these challenges to 
legitimacy, empirical material suggested that some actors, especially smaller Swedish 
seafood businesses, felt as though there was an illegitimate overreach of authority by 
NGOs. From their perspective, even when they followed the law, even when they 
speedily partook in voluntary certification schemes such as ASC, they were still 
shamed. But we know that following the law isn’t enough. In fact, the very basis of 
SLO is that compliance to the law is already assumed, and that further steps are 
required for SLO to be earned (Kelly, Pecl & Fleming, 2017).  
 
It is hard for us to ascertain exactly what these findings around overshoot and 
overreach mean for legitimacy theory, other than to say that perhaps the strategic 
goals of actors who bring about challenges to legitimacy are not as straightforward 
as has been accounted for in existing literature. There are some signs that the fishing, 
seafood and marine industry has a ‘uniqueness’ about it, an idiosyncratic aspect 
which seems to sometimes yield unexpected results in terms of challenges to 
legitimacy which go against some of the assumptions of legitimacy theory (Kelly, 
Pecl & Fleming, 2017). This has been documented in a growing body of literature, 
most of it coming out of Australia (see papers such as Murphy-Gregory, 2018; 
Haward, Jabour & McDonald; Kelly, Pecl & Fleming, 2017; Cullen-Knox et al., 2019). 
Perhaps it is the case that some actors may indeed be calculative and anticipate the 
scaling-back effect, and hence intentionally overshoot. It may also be the case that 
sometimes norm entrepreneurs themselves are surprised when they actually achieve 
what they were desiring. We must also consider the notion that some contests of 
legitimacy may in fact be illegitimate, unreasonable or unfair. Such a suggestion goes 
against the grain of the sustainability, CSR and legitimacy theory literature, which, 
roughly speaking work on the assumption that all scrutiny of corporations is an 
inherently good thing (Taebi & Safari, 2017). It may be the case that our 
understanding of legitimacy needs to better incorporate that not all challenges to 
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legitimacy are necessary ‘good’ or legitimate, even if it is the case that they achieve 
their goals.  
Empirical data from this study indicated that seafood businesses felt as though NGOs 
would continually push and push, and when demands were met, new ones would 
be set. A simplistic analysis of this situation would be something along the lines of 
the following: it is not a ‘good’ outcome to push a small seafood business to the point 
of seriously questioning their future in the industry. And especially not one who is 
behaving lawfully, and who in the opinion of most neutral onlookers would seem 
that they are doing their utmost best to respond to pressure and update their practices 
in a timely manner. Moreover, it is the case that if a norm entrepreneur truly is 
passionate about changing a norm that they genuinely believe will enhance society, 
then they must learn when they have achieved that goal – and not continually push 
for more just for the sake of it. 
However, such an interpretation only tells part of the story as it fails to adequately 
capture the nuances and complexity of the situation. In many ways, NGOs have to 
keep protesting – even when their demands have been met. They cannot just stop. So 
much of their identity, relevance, media exposure, and membership base is congruent 
with lobbying and campaigning. It is not just simplistic to expect them just to stop 
and back down, but also unrealistic. Here in lies a problem though. The empirical 
material from this study suggests that some seafood businesses were feeling fed up 
from NGO pressure, to the point where they were considering quitting the industry 
all together. How do NGOs balance out the need to manifest their purpose to lobby 
corporations into changing their behaviour, while not doing it to the point where 
corporations simply stop caring and quit? A corporation that no longer cares and has 
nothing to lose, or one who quits,  and leaves space to be filled by another (possibly 
environmentally worse actor) presents challenges. There is no ‘answer’ to this 
question. Except to say that the NGO-corporation relationship seems to be one of 
checks and balances, where pressure from NGOs should keep corporations on their 
toes in terms of complying with social norms. And NGOs are in a difficult position 
to find the right balance between campaigning hard enough to achieve their goals, 
while not pushing too hard that they have resentful corporations who feel that their 
efforts are not being appreciated and will stop trying and caring.  
 
5.3.2 How norm entrepreneur-led shaming can successfully contest SLO and create 
legitimacy challenges 
Norm entrepreneurs work to introduce and stabilize new norms by drawing on 
different tools, and will utilize whatever seems most effective to achieving their 
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desired chances (Sunstein, 1996). Assumptions within the firm−NGO relationship are 
congruent with this, suggesting that NGOs will draw upon an “interplay between 
contrasting strategies” (van Huijstee & Glasbergen, 2010, p. 1) to bring about their 
desired changes. This could be both a mix of activities which draw on both ‘carrot’ 
motivated (that is, ones designed to encourage corporations to make changes due to 
positive benefits, altruism and so forth), or ‘stick’ (activities which present perceived 
or actual threats to a corporations financial performance, reputation). From the 
empirical data we can conclude that the majority of NGO efforts to change the 
behaviour of corporations in the Swedish seafood industry between 2008 and 2018 
were ‘stick’ based, and drew heavily on shaming. Bloomfield describes how “shame 
campaigns aim to change industry practices by targeting the reputational value of 
individual firms” (Bloomfield, 2014, p. 263). The contextual domain for these 
occurrences is one where increasingly, private actors (as opposed to state-based) are 
playing a prominent role in bringing about social and environmental change 
(Bernstein & Cashore, 2007; Cashhore, 2002). Swedish supermarkets, seafood 
businesses and consumers were targeted with a multi-pronged shaming approach 
which sought to target their reputational value, both individually and collectively as 
an ‘industry’ associated with shrimp. The message was further amplified by 
involving the customer-end, and the broader Swedish public as an observer. This 
included shame-based campaigns (that is, the SSNCs ‘Anti-Scampi’ movement), 
shame-based lists and guides (that is, the seafood lists and guides produced by the 
WWF and Greenpeace), formal communication of policy stances (such as website text 
and annual reports), and in some cases direct shaming by physically going into stores 
and protesting (as happened when SSNC volunteers dressed up as giant shrimp and 
held signs and protested inside and in front of stores and restaurants selling/using 
tropical shrimp). This goes in line with what we know about challenges to SLO: “The 
withholding of a SLO may appear in the forms of market forces, campaigns and 
protest.” (Cullen-Knox et al., 2017, p. 70). We must again here reiterate the 
‘orientation’ of some recent framings of the SLO of companies operating in 
contentious environmental domains: that the burden of proof seems to be on the 
corporation to justify why it should be allowed to exist, rather than existence being 
the status quo. Recent articulations of NGO-corporation interactions suggest that 
SLO is “is often thought of in a negative sense: it is rare to hear of corporate actors 
who indeed possess a SLO. NGOs invoke the term to broadcast to governments and 
citizens that an actor has lost, or failed to achieve, a SLO.” (Murphy-Gregory, 2018, 
p. 326).  
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Some of the shaming campaigns seemed to use a carrot to reward businesses who 
conformed to the wishes of the NGOs, whilst simultaneously seeking to create some 
sort of critical mass which would lead to shaming of those who were not a part of the 
moment. One respondent from an NGO reflected on how “Our members went to 
different restaurants in Stockholm and the restaurants and stores had actually said, 
‘Okay, whoa. We didn't realize you have the issue with this." And they decided to 
not sell shrimps, then they got a diploma, they can put on the windows.” (interview 
recording, 2017). Under the assumptions of SLO, the diploma in the window 
showcases that this organization has confirmed to the new societal norms (or at least 
the norms that the NGOs deem acceptable). If enough stores had these diplomas, it 
could create a critical point where perhaps not having one would in itself could be 
considered a form of indirect shaming. Perhaps it is also the case that showcasing the 
costs of non-conformity to primary producers and distributors by ‘making examples’ 
of individual actors (both positive examples – that is, having a diploma, and negative 
– that is, not awarding one) was a mechanism through which NGOs could ensure the 
longevity of the effectiveness of shaming and that ongoing that conformity to 
artefacts was maintained. 
 
Friman (2015) notes that it is important to make clear distinctions between shaming 
of an act, and shaming of a person/organization, with the former according to Friman 
allowing for “opportunities for the targeted actor to re-join the community” while 
the latter focuses more on “condemnation” (Friman, 2015, p. 4). Analysing the 
empirical material with this distinction in mind, it would seem that in the shrimp 
debates there was a mixture of shaming specific acts (that is, of corporations involved 
in the production, sale or consumption of ‘unsustainable’ shrimp’), shaming of 
organizations, and both simultaneously. Some actors, such as the SSNC , seemed 
relentlessly hard-line, and not open to actors “re-joining the community” but instead 
determined to ensure that they were no longer in business. This was the case for those 
seafood companies selling tropical shrimp, and in the minds of one interview 
respondent there was no way that being in the business of selling tropical shrimp 
could ever be sustainable, even with rigorous certification.  
 
Perhaps the Swedish shrimp case also demonstrates an example of the ‘‘radical 
flank’’ mechanism (Anner, 2009). We could suggest that the most ‘radical’ of the 
actors, the SSNC (who campaigned for all tropical shrimp to be removed, regardless 
of certification) made the wishes of the other two NGOs (Greenpeace and the WWF, 
who wanted ASC and MSC certification to be put in place) look more respectable, 
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and increased their chances of corporations abiding by their wishes. It is especially 
interesting here to note that, from the perspective of some of the respondents 
interviewed working for NGOs, they felt as though their efforts to bring about change 
were not political. A director of certification schemes at a Swedish environmental 
NGO framed this as “We’re not a political organization, but we’re using political 
methods and we try to influence politics, but we don’t have a party politics.” 
(interview recording, 2019). 
 
Moreover, the effectiveness of shaming seems in part due to the arrangement of the 
actor being shamed in relation to others. Taebi and Safari (2017) suggest that evidence 
points to shaming being especially effective in cases where there is a business-to-
consumer relationship in place (as opposed to a business-to-business). This is 
perhaps due to some of the synergistic effects and positive feedback loops that come 
to be when both the corporation and its customers see the shaming campaign. This 
was well documented in some of the early ‘name and shame’ campaigns of the 1990s, 
such as when Nike was called out for its supply chain practices. As established 
already, in the Swedish shrimp case the shaming was targeted at multiple levels of 
the value chain.  
 
5.3.3 The conveying of a shaming-based campaign: the important role of social media 
Shaming messages invoke a challenge to the reputation or status of organization 
and/or individual, and in doing so call on them to change (Friman, 2015). Between 
the shamer and the shamee, there is a complex interplay of forces which may result 
in the reduction, amplification or distortion of the shaming message. Amongst other 
factors, the medium through which messages are conveyed will influence this 
interplay.  
 
When the works of Skeel (2001) on shaming were written, it was mostly the case that 
television, radio and print media were the mediums through which shaming-based 
campaigns were run. Just two decades later, rapid advancements in information 
communication technology have led to a situation where social media platforms are 
as influential as traditional media (if not more so) in running any sort of campaign. 
Social media has allowed for “…effortless boundless communication” (Cullen-Knox 
et al., 2017, p. 71). Murphy-Gregory (2018, p. 326) suggests that “successful 
prosecution of SLO campaigns is dependent upon rapid dissemination of 
information by NGOs, often via social media platforms, which allows them to access 
and engage the public, other NGOs and corporations in order to build common 
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understandings of appropriate behaviour and practices (Prno and Slocombe, 2012; 
Haward et al., 2013; Leith et al. 2014; Lester 2017).” 
 
The Swedish shrimp case showed how norm entrepreneurs (such as NGOs in this 
case) can draw on multi-pronged approaches to amplify and exacerbate their 
message through social media, traditional media, and membership base and create 
the perception (from the perspective of a corporation) that their claims are important 
and urgent, and that they are speaking on behalf of societal norms. As already 
established, this may or may not have been the case here. But that is beside the point. 
What is important is that enhancement of the significance of ones claims seem to 
become increasingly possible through online activism, where the actuality or façade 
of a large number of people being involved and concerned can be created quickly 
and in large numbers, due to the relatively low costs and effort of being involved in 
shaming activism, such as clicking a ‘Like’ button (Karpus, 2018). A corporation may 
perceive such a campaign as being large and a genuine threat to their legitimacy, 
when in quantifiable terms it may be far smaller and less serious, due to the possible 
‘smoke and mirrors’ effect of social media creating a gap between the actual state of 
affairs (in terms of quantifiable variables) versus the dominant narrative or 
perception. Online protests allows “A particular view can appear to be widespread 
at a significantly quicker rate compared to traditional forms of protest.” (Cullen-Knox 
et al., 2017, p. 71). The role of social media in campaigns and in legitimacy challenges 
is a young field and there is still much that we don’t know. As Fine (2019, p. 257) 
notes, “The new media, evolving over the past two decades as purveyors of 
scandalous information, have only started to be examined.”  
 
The Swedish shrimp case also contributes to literature on firm-NGO relations by 
documenting examples of operational tactics and strategies which worked – 
especially in terms of an early example of the successful utilization of social media. 
The start of the Anti-Scampi campaign in 2011 came about at a time when social 
media-led campaigns were still in their infancy (Gomez-Carrasco & Michelon, 2017). 
Since then, sites like Facebook and Twitter have allowed actors to communicate their 
interests, engage in direct dialogue with one another, to mobilize the public behind 
their stance, and as a way of openly showing off the support that they have for their 
stance. They have also created problems for firms in terms of the speed at which they 
are expected to respond to social media pressure regarding a particular issue. 
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Deegan (2019) points out that a gap within the legitimacy theory literature is 
understanding what channels of communication provide the best mediums for 
disclosures. While the data from this study cannot be used to make claims about the 
best mediums for firms to discourse to external actors, what we can conclude is that 
that corporations will increasingly be targeted by social media-based campaigns and 
be required to respond – a response which may sometimes have serious implications 
for legitimacy.  
 
5.3.4 The consequences of the overuse of shaming, and illegitimate use of shaming 
Shaming-based challenges to legitimacy have a valid role to play. Harnessed 
effectively, shaming can be a legitimate instrumental tool for bringing about a desired 
goal. Recent contributions such as Bloomfield (2014) acknowledge the effect that 
NGO led shame-based campaigns can have against corporations. 
 
Shaming however – like any sort of reputational attack – has consequences. These 
consequences are very real, and extend not just to the group or individual being 
targeted, but also across broader dimensions of society. This section of the analysis 
considers both: consequences of shaming for specific organizations, and 
consequences for broader society.  
 
There exist within the literature questions regarding the morality of shaming. One 
angle, offered by Taebi and Safari (2017, p. 1300) is that because of the size and 
capabilities of corporations, they are in a unique position of responsibility and thus 
shaming is fair game. This is roughly in line with the broader assumptions of 
legitimacy theory and the CSR/sustainability literature. However, let us consider the 
other side of it: what it is like from the perspective of a corporation.  
 
Shaming and pushing for higher and higher expectations of corporations may have 
the consequence of some (especially small primary producers) feeling frustrated and 
quitting all together. While some may see this is a ‘victory’ as in their eyes of the norm 
entrepreneur bringing about the shaming, as in that their the corporation was 
engaged in a fundamentally illegitimate activity, others may perceive it that unfair 
and excessive demands were placed on a law-abiding corporation that genuinely 
tried to keep up with changing SLO and now there is one less actor to produce a good 
that society values and one less actor to progress the norms of the industry in the 
future. The owner of a Swedish seafood business interviewed in this study felt that it 
had reached a point where their company and others were getting “fed up” 
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(interview recording, 2017) with NGO pressure (and carry-through pressure from 
retailers) and reflected upon why it was even worth bothering going through 
rigorous certification schemes like ASC when there is less and less commercial benefit 
in doing so.  
 
If norm entrepreneurs like NGOs over-reach, push too hard or over-use shaming 
tactics in their efforts to uproot old norms and replace them with new ones, they run 
the risk of some actors quitting all together. While from the perspective of an NGO 
with hard-line environmental stances it may be hailed as a victory for a fishing 
company to quit and a sign of progress towards a new norm, there are of course 
consequences of this – sometimes unforeseen ones. In general terms, existing 
literature on legitimacy assumes that challenges to social license are made on 
grounds whereby the actions of a corporation have drifted too far from societal 
norms, and thus need to be brought back into line (usually achieved through a 
mechanism – shaming for example). However, it would seem that in practice there is 
more complexity to this than existing literature has accounted for.  
 
SLO literature does not offer clear explanations for what happens when the demands 
of a secondary actor are unreasonable, overly-demanding, or ask for something that 
is well beyond what social norms dictate. Under SLO and its self-correcting 
marketplace assumptions, secondary actor overreach would be autocorrected by the 
existing norm remaining in place. Within the SLO literature there seems to be an 
unspoken assumption that ‘all pressure on corporations is inherently good and leads 
to better accountability and outcomes’. But what if it goes too far? What of a 
corporation that is operating completely within the bounds of the law, by all intents 
and purposes is abiding by social norms, and is also making genuine attempts to keep 
up with the wishes of NGOs? Should this corporation be shamed to a point where it 
throws in the towel and quits all together? While the Swedish shrimp sustainability 
case did not result in any seafood companies collapsing (at least to the knowledge of 
the author), it did lead to several small business owners publicly questioning the 
worth of continuing in an industry where they were constantly belittled, in spite of 
their best efforts. The owner of a Swedish seafood business importing shrimp from 
farms in Asia spoke during interviews in 2017 and again in 2019 of being frustrated 
with NGO pressure. This individual reflected upon why it was even worth bothering 
going through rigorous certification schemes like ASC when it seemed that nothing 
would please the NGOs, and they would continue to shout anyway. In the eyes of 
this individual, nothing they ever did would ever please the NGOs, and they would 
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keep finding smaller and smaller things to push back on. Perhaps this demonstrates 
that if NGOs truly were interested in achieving a goal, they would stop when they 
reached it. One must ask the question as to the motives of actors who claim to be 
acting in the best interests of the public and to keeping corporations accountable. If 
you really cared about sustainability, you would accept when a business achieves 
this, rather than always wanting more and more, pushing no matter what, even when 
a target has been met. Perhaps NGOs should back off a little bit, and acknowledge 
when genuine attempts to improve are being made and seek to work with a 
corporation in bringing about change rather than view them as the enemy. 
 
The theoretical assumptions of SLO – which lean more towards the interests of NGOs 
and society – must be updated so as to be able to offer better explanations for cases 
of overreach and associated over-shaming. This is increasingly needed in the new age 
of smart phones and social media, which allows for scrutiny of corporations at ever-
increasing levels of accessibility and unforeseen speeds. A Twitter-based hashtag 
shaming campaign can emerge within a few hours, and a corporation may be called 
on to respond the very next day. Cullen-Knox et al., (2019, p. 70) discuss how social 
media has led to a situation where “interest groups can now contest… with limited 
disciplinary or political barriers and at an unprecedented pace”. The ‘unprecedented 
pace’ point here is important. The frantic, polarized nature of many such campaigns 
often does not allow for the time, nuance or detail needed to discuss a complex topic 
like shrimp sustainability. Or even whether the demands of the campaign are actually 
in line with societal expectations, or are instead perhaps in the guise of self-interest 
cleverly disguised as a noble action against a big evil business. It is very possible that 
the speed of such campaigns means that corporations – especially small business with 
less resources to fight back – sometimes do not get a fair chance to voice their side of 
the story. Moreover, the sudden cost to reputation of such campaigns may lead to 
knee-jerk type reactions rather than considered, good quality decision making which 
usually takes time.  
 
It is not the purpose of SLO (or its father theory in legitimacy) to offer an ‘all-
encompassing’ explanation of the interplay between society, corporations and 
secondary actors. Legitimacy theory emerged from the resource-dependency 
assumption that legitimacy is a resource “conferred… by society” (Deegan, 2019, p. 
2315), and as such it is a privilege for a corporation to have this conferred, and thus 
they must work hard to maintain it. All of that said, it is necessary that we consider 
ways that the SLO model might be improved so as to better account for the gap which 
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appeared in cases such as the Swedish shrimp case (and several others like it). This 
gap can perhaps best be explained as the space between what secondary actors claim 
to be the societal norms that they are fighting for, what the societal norms are in 
reality, and the goodwill of a corporation and the authenticity of its willingness to 
change – all of which compounded by time urgency. One way of updating and 
improving the SLO model might be to draw inspiration from a model such as 
Mitchell, Agle and Wood’s (1997) Stakeholder Salience Model, and develop a 
mechanism which allows managers to rank the claims of actors, and also determine 
what congruency exists between the claims of the actor and societal norms. This 
would help to respond to recent calls within the legitimacy theory literature for 
usable, practical tools to allow managers to work with questions of legitimacy 
(Deegan, 2019). Another improvement to SLO (and to the broader legitimacy theory, 
and even CSR/sustainability field) which could assist in achieving greater 
‘impartiality’ (for lack of better term) would be for the literature to more clearly 
acknowledge the pivotal changes brought about to the assumptions of SLO by social 
media, and the speed and severity of reputational damage which can occur through 
social media based shaming. While several papers have dealt with this (such as 
Cullen-Knox’s et al.’s 2019 look at the 2012 Super Trawler case in Australia), there is 
perhaps a need for the literature to better articulate the stance that not all shaming 
leads to good outcomes, that corporations have the right to push back against 
unreasonable demands which are well beyond the SLO, and that not all changes 
necessarily constitute ‘progress’. There seems to be a desire to have a conceptual tool 
which strikes a fairer balance between achieving accountability of corporations 
through secondary actor pressure, while also being fair and reasonable to businesses 
that abide by the law, and are willing to change and update their practices. 
 
Or perhaps it is the case that the urgency of the many social and environmental 
challenges facing planet Earth requires an equally urgent and frantic response – a 
response which may occasionally overstep its boundaries, but is doing so for the right 
reasons. Such a sentiment was expressed by several respondents from NGOs during 
interviews, and it is a very valid and reasonable point. 
 
The second facet of shaming we must consider are the broader societal implications 
of shaming. Shaming, along with its closely associated counterparts such as ‘call-out 
culture’ may have started with legitimate underpinnings and oriented towards noble 
causes such as exposing genuine instances of poor behaviour, or striving to achieve 
a seemingly noble social or environmental goal, but in the opinion of many (including 
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this author) it is increasingly being overused. As Skeel (2001) notes, bringing about 
shame typically required low cost and low risk for the ‘shamer’, but in turn creates 
high costs and high risks for the shamee. The frequency and ferocity of such shaming 
attacks, and the increasingly minor things chosen to shame on have led to a level of 
black and white, with-us-or-against-us, all or nothing mentality which fails to realize 
the complexity, nuance and grey in many complex social, environmental and 
economic issues. The ‘mob-justice’, ‘pile-on’ and frenzy features of shaming in 
today’s culture are suggesting worrying signs regarding how societies value truth. 
Danish existentialist philosopher Soren Kierkegaard argued that truth was not 
necessarily where a crowd of people was, but in fact in many cases the truth was in 
the location where there was no crowd. Moreover, it seems to be the case that when 
one ‘victory’ is achieved, rather than stopping, shaming will be used on increasingly 
smaller and smaller issues. It is also the case that many of the demands made by so 
called ‘hashtag activists’, and ‘armchair critics’ (a group that sometimes includes 
those from both within businesses and NGOs) are simply unreasonable and demand 
changes which are unrealistic and not grounded in common-sense or real-world 
experience.  
Shaming sometimes enables the simplification of oft-highly complex topics into good 
versus evil, right-versus-wrong framing. It calls for quick, rash judgements while 
never giving the benefit of doubt to the other side. A well-designed shaming message 
will target the reputation of an individual/organization on such a framing, and 
indirectly invite the audience witnessing the shaming to make a polarised, non-
nuanced judgement (Friman, 2015). In the opinion of this author, this is not helpful, 
and reduces the quality of debate and subsequent outcomes. It also perhaps shows a 
level of intellectual laziness, and an unwillingness of the shamer to venture into the 
debate with courage and a mindset that maybe it is they who might be partly wrong, 
and the truth might in fact lie halfway between their opinion and the opinion of the 
one who they have interpreted as an adversary. British philosopher John Stuart Mill 
(1859) puts such a sentiment in the following terms: 
 
He who knows only his own side of the case knows little of that. His reasons may be 
good, and no one may have been able to refute them. But if he is equally unable to 
refute the reasons on the opposite side, if he does not so much as know what they are, 
he has no ground for preferring either opinion... Nor is it enough that he should hear 
the opinions of adversaries from his own teachers, presented as they state them, and 
accompanied by what they offer as refutations. He must be able to hear them from 
persons who actually believe them... he must know them in their most plausible and 
persuasive form. 
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The second part of this message dealing with “he should hear the opinions of 
adversaries from” is especially important in the Swedish shrimp case. Most members 
of the public could not muster the time, energy or effort to do their own research on 
the topic of shrimp sustainability, spending hours reading up on ICES stock data, or 
trawling through pages of UN FAO best practices for shrimp farming. Under John 
Stuart Mill’s framing, perhaps such an individual does not therefore have the right to 
agree with or disagree with a shaming message, and as such should perhaps source 
primary data through which to make up their own mind and take a side, and until 
that point refrain from jumping on the shaming bandwagon. This is especially the 
case when it comes to shaming, given that there is another person or organization 
whose very reputation and standing is being called into question (Skeel, 2001). 
Therefore, perhaps it is a luxury and a privilege to involve a judgement in a shaming-
based debate, and one which carries significant responsibility. When questioned on 
the topic by peers regarding the status or legitimacy of an organization or individual 
perhaps a reasonable response might be something like: ‘I’m only very loosely 
familiar with it, and have to read and listen a bit more before I can form an opinion 
of my own.” While an aspiration to have a society full of people with the time to 
carefully read up on topics and speak in precise and nuanced terms is of course 
idealistic and perhaps not realistic, it is the opinion of the author that the quality of 
public debate has reached a point where something drastic needs to change, as the 
harm done by polarizing, us versus them mindsets, is severe and widespread across 
multiple contexts. If the pursuit of truth and evidence-based decision making still 
remains a distinctive hallmark of Western countries such as Sweden, then it is the 
case that shaming messages should be viewed with a higher degree of critical thought 
than happens at present (and happened in the Swedish shrimp sustainability case).  
 
Shaming-based legitimacy challenges can be a highly effective way for norm 
entrepreneurs to bring about changes. But with great power also comes great 
responsibility, and the party bringing about the shame must be careful to manoeuvre 
in a manner that maintains a level of honesty, integrity and commitment to high 
quality public debate.  
 
5.3.5 Moments of controversy and critical incident 
In a longitudinal sense, contesting of legitimacy seems to take place in three manners: 
on a gradual and ongoing basis, around moments of controversy and critical incident, 
and a combination of the two, which assumes the former built over time to bring 
about the latter. The Swedish shrimp case seemed to be an example of a moment of 
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controversy and critical incident: a fast-paced norm cascade, which is characterized 
according to Sunstein by “rapid shifts in norms” (Sunstein, 1996, p. 909). Both the 
start of the Anti-Scampi campaign in 2011 and the unexpected ‘Red Listing’ of 
Pandalus borealis in 2014 saw what can (relatively speaking) be described as 
profoundly quick changes to social norms, and in turn the required SLO needed by 
corporations to maintain the needed level of legitimacy.  
 
Legitimacy theory literature has given coverage to the three manners of timescale of 
contesting, as described above. However, it would be fair to suggest that perhaps 
legitimacy theory and SLO orient themselves mostly towards the ‘gradual’ 
interpretation: that the interplay between corporations, societal values, and the actors 
who play the role of keeping these in check (such as NGOs) is somewhat of a gradual 
process of give-and-take (Parsons, Lacey & Moffat, 2014, p. 84). Existing literature 
has paid less attention to the role of controversies and pivotal moments as re-
establishing ideas of what is ‘legitimate’. One could argue that this is especially 
important in 2020, as the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 causes COVID-19 disease 
in hundreds of thousands of people around the world. Many norms and value 
structures have been (and continue to be for some time) uprooted and become, 
metaphorically speaking, wet cement once again, and open for contestation. In time, 
things will stabilize and order and normality will return, but the legacy of the critical 
incident of COVID-19 will perhaps become a semi-permanent fixture ingrained in 
norms, just as happened on a more micro level for the Swedish shrimp controversy.  
 
The granting, maintenance of legitimacy seems to have more of a haphazard flow of 
occurrence than simply the routine granting of “on-going acceptance or approval” 
(Parsons, Lacey & Moffat, 2014, p. 84) of the actions of an industry or an actor within 
it as is described in many interpretations of the concept of social license to operate. 
This study highlights how the contesting and determination of legitimacy seems to 
take place when a particular controversy arises – causing a potentially sudden and 
significant change in what constitutes legitimate, as opposed to a more gradual 
change as outlined in existing literature. The most obvious example of this was the 
Anti-Scampi campaign run by the SSNC, whereby the organization was able to yield 
significant public support for their cause and in doing so heighten requirements of 
SLO needed to operate in the shrimp industry.  
 
The heightened requirements for the license were essentially that consumers had to 
stop eating all species of tropical shrimp, retailers had to stop selling them, and 
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fishing companies had to stop farming or catching them. The majority of actors went 
along with this, “fitting in and adapting to the prevailing social norms” (Parsons, 
Lacey & Moffat, 2014, p. 84) which the campaign brought about: namely, that it was 
now unacceptable to have anything to do with tropical shrimp. Under O’Donovan 
(2002) management essentially has four main options in an event which threatens the 
organization’s legitimacy, ranging from complete avoidance through to total 
conformity. Management of firms Sweden could be said to have to have taken the 
most drastic of these options – option D – “Conform to the new societal norms by 
quickly changing practices so that the organization may regain its legitimacy.” 
O’Donovan (2002, p. 348). 
 
These moments of controversy where an action is suddenly called into question seem 
to represent the ‘boil-over’, or tip of the iceberg, of a deeper issue which has been 
brewing for some time. They create an opportunity for society to check it’s alignment 
with the behaviour of organizations – and also a chance for organizations to check 
their alignment with society. This seems to both be the cause of, and cause, a feedback 
loop —one which has the ability to quite quickly change what constitutes legitimacy, 
followed by a period of stability before the next controversy causes legitimacy to be 
questioned and potentially rearranged again. The relationship between firms and 
society in terms of the granting of legitimate therefore seems to be better described 
through a metaphor such as a severe weather event – like a sudden flood which spills 
over and rearranges the organization of an environment, rather than how regular 
rainfall occurs and over time slowly reshapes the direction of the flow of a river. The 
theoretical implications of such a finding are moderately significant, as they illustrate 
a case study of how the requirements needed to negotiate access to and maintain 
access to a market can be changed suddenly and considerably by one actor 
multiplying its influence through the leveraging of public support. It could be argued 
that that existing models of social license do not properly capture the speed and 
magnitude at which change can occur. Otero and Baumann (2016) showed in their 
study of the controversy around Pandalus borealis that controversy mapping can be 
an effective way of seeking to understand the interplay between societal norms and 
moments of controversy. Perhaps more studies like this are needed.  
 
5.3.6 Organizational memory of past shaming and latent threat of future shaming 
can keep corporations ‘paralysed’  
It seems to be the case that the ‘memory’ of successful shaming campaigns lingers on 
far beyond the time when the actual shaming took place. From the data collected in 
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this study, there is clear empirical evidence that shaming-based campaigns can 
invoke both changes to organizational behaviour in the present, as well as changes 
for some time to come. While there is some contestation as to whether organizations 
can actually remember things (at least in the way we apply this term to humans) or 
whether this is indeed just a nice metaphor (Argyris & Schon, 1978), more recent 
contributions have clearly established that whether or not memory exists in the way 
we would like to view it, memory of sorts does indeed exist, and associated 
knowledge transfer certainly exists (Muskat & Deery, 2017; Walsh & Ungson, 1991). 
There seems to be little coverage regarding the interplay between legitimacy and 
organizational memory and/or knowledge transfer, the exception being the 
proposition offered in Stringfellow and Maclean (2014) that foresight and scenario 
planning can help organizations plan ahead to engage proactively with possible 
legitimacy challenges.  
 
Effective shaming-based campaigns seems to loiter for some time within corporation 
organizational memory, and can keep a corporation obedient and compliant to the 
ongoing wishes of the party which brought about the shaming – even if the secondary 
actor in reality no longer has the influence (or perception of) that they once had. This 
seems to be almost some form of ‘paralysis’, where the ‘memory’ of the shaming is 
so strong that it creates almost a sense of ‘learned helplessness’ (Seligman, 1972 ). 
Most of the Swedish supermarket chains targeted by NGO shaming decided to 
minimize the risk of future shaming by simply handing over all future judgements 
on seafood sustainability to NGOs. This took the form of permanently outsourcing 
judgements on the acceptability, legitimacy and sustainability of shrimp by hedging 
their own seafood guides on those produced by the NGOs. This phenomenon is 
explored in the third section of this chapter, when we consider the role of artefacts in 
legitimacy. However here it is necessary to point out that shaming can change 
behaviour both in the present but also on an ongoing basis.  
 
The latent threat of future shaming seems to be a strong driver in ensuring ongoing 
obedience to the status quo. Framed around legitimacy theory (and drawing on 
legitimacy theory’s origins in resource-dependency), this finding can be explained in 
terms of the manner through which “organizations are controlled by an external 
source to the extent they depend on that source for a large proportion of input or 
output” (Pfeffer & Salanick, 1978, p. 271). It would appear from the data that in the 
case of Swedish seafood business and supermarkets, the organizational memory of 
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the initial campaign serves as a significant-enough deterrent to risk any further 
reputational or financial harm.  
 
Such a finding carries implications in terms of how going forward, firms might be 
more proactive about seeking out relations with NGOs and marinating ongoing 
dialogue – so as to avoid unexpected campaigns. Recent voices in the firm-secondary 
stakeholder literature such as Sulkowski, Edwards & Freeman (2018, p. 31) describe 
this, noting that a recent trend seen was that of firms being proactive and actively 
seeking out and initiating relations with secondary stakeholders, “possibly even 
starting, propagating, or leveraging movements – to affect positive change” leading 
to “sustainable value.” It also shows a case where being an actor in an industry – 
whether a producer, seller or even consumer – requires a new and previously unseen 
level of agility and speed in terms of quickly adjusting to the SLO and legitimacy 
requirements determined by other, influential actors. For example, a guide may list 
a particular shrimp species as being unsustainable, meaning that the retailer must 
stop selling it so as to avoid NGO protests and upstream the producer must stop 
catching or farming it and downstream the consumer no longer has the choice to 
purchase it. The speed at which such a change could occur goes inline Stringfellow 
and Maclean’s (2014) argument for organizational foresight needed to predict future 
legitimacy challenges, and suggests that management of legitimacy is as much about 
proactiveness as it is about reactiveness.  
 
5.3.7 Summary 
Legitimacy is contested by norm entrepreneurs who utilize a range of reward and 
punishment tactics to coerce corporations into changing. Punishment and threat 
based tactics drawing on reputational harm through shaming (especially utilizing 
social media) seem to be especially effective at achieving partial or full revoke of a 
corporations SLO and requiring them to conform to the new set of norms. There are 
consequences of these tactics – especially shaming. In some cases, efforts by NGOs 
and other secondary actors may in either perception or actuality represent an 
overreach of their authority, and do serious and unreasonable harm to the legitimacy 
of a law-abiding corporation which is doing its upmost to respond in good faith to 
meet societal norms. Moreover, successful shaming campaigns and the latent threat 
of future shaming may stay in the corporation’s memory and keep them obedient to 
the wishes of secondary actors on an ongoing basis.  
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5.4 Lists, guides and rankings as markers of legitimacy and stabilizers 
of norms  
A central tenant of legitimacy theory is that maintenance of legitimacy requires 
corporations to voluntarily and recurrently disclose to external actors (including 
society-at-large) enough social and environmental information to justify their 
continued existence (Patten, 2019; Guthrie & Parker, 1989). However, there remain 
questions around exactly how this should and does happen, questions such as “what 
specific types of, and media for, disclosures are most effective in supporting the 
legitimacy of an organization?” (Deegan, 2019, p. 2311). It was once the case that the 
annual report was the vehicle through which a company could communicate 
legitimacy (O’Donovan, 2002). The appearance of sustainability-specific sections in 
annual reports, followed by separate sustainability reports on their own saw a new 
era of artefacts communicating legitimacy (Mousa & Hassan, 2015). At present there 
is little coverage in the legitimacy theory literature regarding the fairly-recent 
phenomena of external actors (especially NGOs) developing their own lists through 
which they provide a judgment rating or ranking of the actions of a corporation. One 
might think of this as being a situation where the burden of proof has shifted that is, 
rather than the corporation providing information to external actors, the roles in 
some industries and some countries have nearly reversed and the onus is now on the 
corporation to show that they meet the requirements of these lists, guides and 
rankings. This trend has been identified particularly in the fisheries and seafood 
industry (see Roheim et al., 2018) – and in many ways makes sense, due to the unique 
properties of the trade in terms of it being based largely on business use of natural 
resources, and as such being frequently implicated in SLO challenges (Cullen-Knox, 
2017).  
 
The empirical material collected during the Swedish shrimp case showed how 
secondary actor pressure on corporations lead to a situation where the social license 
to operate (and in turn, an organization’s overall legitimacy) became that all shrimp 
information was required to be funnelled through various lists, guides and ranking 
schemes (henceforth described as artefacts). It brought to surface level questions 
around what information should be used to assess questions such as social and 
environmental; sustainability (and in turn, whether SLO exist), and who should get 
to decide such questions. There are four implications of this which are notable and 
add to our understanding of the interplay between legitimacy and corporations, 
society, and secondary actors. Firstly, that in some situations, achievement of SLO 
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can lead to corporations essentially outsourcing internal strategy formulation to 
secondary actors – both on a one-off and ongoing basis. Secondly, that intense 
shaming campaigns can result in secondary actor-developed artefacts becoming 
norm-mandated as a required for SLO, and as this case showed, corporations may 
not deviating from these artefacts even nearly a decade afterwards (or mount a 
challenge against their authority) – even if the boundaries of the artefacts or the 
content is changed significantly from what it originally was. Thirdly, that abiding by 
artefacts will have different implications for corporations, depending on their degree 
of exposure to the legitimacy topic in question. Finally, questions around the 
information and/or and ideology that can be used to inform artefacts – that is, what 
methodology is employed in their creation.  
 
5.4.1 The integration and normalizing of artefacts 
Under the assumptions of the concept norm entrepreneurship, we assume that 
“existing social conditions are often more fragile than might be supposed”, meaning 
that existing social norms can and often are uprooted and replaced – with this cycle 
of update continuing on an ongoing and a perpetual basis (Sunstein, 1996, p. 909). 
Given the shared theoretical assumptions of norm entrepreneurship with legitimacy 
theory, the subjective notion of constitutes legitimacy also lends itself to a similar 
premise: that norms are not fixed and can be contested through successful challenges 
(Deegan, 2019). While we know much about these challenges look like through the 
previous section of this chapter, we know far less about the possible interrelationship 
between such contests to legitimacy and norm shifts, and artefacts such as 
documents, guides, lists, rankings: that is, questions like how do they artefacts come 
to be, what relationship do they have in communicating, effecting and being effected 
by social norms, and what role they might plan in a successful contest to a 
corporations legitimacy. The Swedish shrimp case saw not just major shifts to norms, 
but simultaneously (and perhaps inseparably) saw artefacts instilled within these 
norms. As empirical material established, it became a SLO for corporations to closely 
abide by the requirements of the artefacts generated by the three NGOs. In the eyes 
of the NGOs they were merely “recommendations – they are recommendations, they 
are not mandatory” (interview recording, 2019). But from the perspective of 
corporations, they were anything but recommendations, and represented a 
mandatory component of achieving SLO. As one respondent, a manager for a large 
Swedish retailer, put it, the NGOs “… more or less they just forced us to take away 
the shrimp.” (interview recording, 2017) 
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Suchman (2003, p. 91) describes how the contract is a social artefact, and exists within 
a complex interplay between the microdynamics of the individual transacting parties 
and the macrodynamics of “larger social systems”. While a seafood guide produced 
by an NGO is not a contract per say, it shares many of the characteristics of Suchman’s 
framing of a social artefact. Moreover, in the Swedish shrimp case, NGO-produced 
artefacts became so deeply normalized as a requirement to obtain SLO that they 
essentially became akin to a contract – that is, the bounds of corporation behaviour 
were constrained by them. The requirement for corporation information on shrimp 
sustainability to flow through a narrow channel or bottleneck (that is, the guides 
themselves) and from this flow a judgement to be granted on the legitimacy of 
activities follows Fine’s (2019, p. 248) idea that reputation often takes the “form of a 
ranking, list, or hierarchy that permits the human desire for evaluative comparisons.” 
Having lists seems to be a way for NGOs to ‘keep track’ of corporation performance 
on questions of shrimp sustainability, and also for NGOs to publicize cases of non-
compliance. Here it is again vitally important to reiterate that the three NGOs – WWF, 
SSNC and Greenpeace – were not always on the same page. Empirical material 
revealed that managers from Swedish supermarkets and seafood companies alike 
seemed to feel as though the SSNC had the most hard-line stance on shrimp 
sustainability, followed by Greenpeace somewhere in the middle and then the WWF. 
This is in line with Ayling’s (2017, p. 352) suggestion that “The factors or qualities 
that will satisfy an audience of a given entity’s legitimacy may differ.” Moreover, it 
also follows recent suggestions in the fisheries and seafood literature regarding the 
subjective nature of many judgements regarding seafood sustainability made by 
NGOs: “The criteria used by certification standards and recommendation lists are 
open to broad interpretation, therefore contested between NGOs driving further 
proliferation of definitions and sustainable seafood programmes.” Roheim (2018, p. 
392).  
 
It seems to be the case that artefacts are of significant importance in facilitating 
judgements around legitimacy, as they provide a rough framework through which 
to make such judgment. This follows a basic human desire for the need for 
reputational judgements to be made through semi-structured or structured 
frameworks of ranking and hierarchy, which allow for evaluative comparisons (Fine, 
2019). Thus, we can suggest that contests to legitimacy are intertwined with artefacts 
which allow for judgement calls around reputation to be made.  
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5.4.2 The outsourcing of strategy, surrender of control and absolving of responsibility 
to artefacts  
While it is common for corporations to receive outside advice temporarily on how to 
run an aspect of their business or to outsource routine, regular processes, it is rare 
that strategy formulation relating to core competencies is semi/permanently 
outsourced (Quinn & Hilmer, 1995). The Swedish shrimp case saw several cases of 
‘outsourcing’ of strategy – the partial surrender of control and absolving of 
responsibility – by corporations choosing to hedge (or in many cases matching word 
for word) their own seafood strategies on the guides, lists and rankings produced by 
NGOs.  
 
In doing so, these corporations (especially supermarkets) partially absolved 
responsibility, but also lost a level of control. This control was further lost due to the 
fact that many of the NGO-generated lists themselves relied on third-party data (such 
as MSC and ASC), resulting in these lists being even further outside of the control of 
corporations. There are of course risks entailed in this. However, in the eyes of these 
actors, obviously risks which are less than those of not complying. The consistent 
finding from interviews with senior management of supermarket chains was that this 
was done primarily on the basis that abiding by these lists was essential in order to 
meet the new benchmark for SLO, and avoid serious challenges to legitimacy and 
acceptance. So far this go that several interview subjects refereed to these NGO-
produced lists in terms of being akin to religious texts, such as the bible comparison 
made by the seafood manager of one of the large food retailers. This is in line with 
the assumption in legitimacy theory regarding how legitimacy-seeking efforts “… 
actions are assumed to be motivated by survival or probability goals”, which in turn 
are “ultimately linked to the self-interest of the manager” (Deegan, 2019, p. 2315). 
Recent studies such as Niu et al., (2019) have highlighted such a phenomena as a 
logical response to external actor pressure on the firm by considering the integration 
of sustainability congruence throughout the entire supply chain. But as of yet, such 
studies have not given in-depth coverage to the nature of such a decision, its nuances 
and its consequences (in both the immediate and long term).  
 
This is a fascinating notion: that a retailer like ICA or Coop can effectively ‘outsource’ 
the risk of making decisions about complex social and environmental issues to a third 
party, without their direct involvement and with no direct financial costs. This, of 
course, carries many advantages such as saving time and money and leaving it to an 
organization with particular expertise in the field, but also carries many unique risks: 
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namely, the idea of blindly endorsing someone else’s judgment and giving too much 
credit to the ability of these NGOs to accurately determine what is sustainable and 
what is not, and the potential of harm to a retailer if controversy strikes and not 
having a leg to stand on in saying ‘Errr, we let the WWF decide our list; it’s not our 
fault’. This is especially true when such a list relies on the input of other third party 
data, and as such becomes even more far removed from the locus of control of a firm. 
The norm became stabilized that ‘lists are good’. This is not an overly unusual 
occurrence, and has been previously. What was unusual, however, was the way in 
which use of the artefacts themselves became the SLO rather than the values that they 
actually communicated. This meant that the contents of the lists remained fairly open, 
and the margin for change was large. And changes to the lists have indeed happened. 
There is a risk here for corporations – that by agreeing to accept lists but not 
specifying their parameters, they are exposed to the possibility of norm 
entrepreneurs using this to their advantage in the future by putting things in the lists 
which were outside of the ‘spirit’ and boundaries of the agreement of accepting the 
lists in the first place. While the norm has been stabilized that ‘lists are good’, the lists 
and other artefacts still have agency in the sense that the information that feeds into 
them can change rapidly and significantly. Legitimacy theory assumes that the firm 
will voluntarily provide external actors with social and environmental information 
to show conformance to societal norms (O’Donovan, 2002). There is little literature 
on the phenomenon seem here where this is ‘outsourced’. Perhaps this finding —and 
its implications – warrant further investigations in future studies.  
 
5.4.3 What information and/or ideology should be used to inform artefacts, and 
where should the cut-off points of artefact taxonomy be?  
Legitimacy theory assumes that disclosure of social and environmental information 
will assist in corporations achieving and maintaining legitimacy (O’Donovan, 2002; 
Deegan, 2019). However, as legitimacy represents a judgement, it is subjective. As is 
the way that external actors view information released by corporations. As Ayling 
(2017, p. 351) puts it, “Legitimacy is largely a matter of perceptions and social 
constructs.” As such, it would seem that the artefacts used to judge legitimacy follow 
this logic. The Swedish shrimp sustainability case illustrated that there often exist 
significant ambiguities in terms of questions around what information and/or 
ideology should be used to generate artefacts, and who should get to make these calls. 
In this case, the contesting centred around the meaning of ‘sustainability’, which 
seemed to become in itself a proxy for legitimacy. Broadly speaking, there were three 
main stances on the artefacts: NGOs claimed the artefacts to be based on science and 
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an honest and accurate tool through which to assess the legitimacy of corporations. 
Fishing and seafood corporations viewed the artefacts as being illegitimate, and 
subjective non-scientific lists developed to further progress NGO interests. 
Supermarkets viewed them with a degree of scepticism, but were quick to accept 
their authority.  
 
The theoretical implications of such findings are that many of the well-intended 
models and initiatives in the realm of sustainability, corporate social responsibility 
and stakeholder engagement could arguably be said to work on naïve, overly 
optimistic and unrealistic assumptions about human and organizational behaviour. 
In a perfect world, and a world described in a considerable amount of the 
sustainability literature, what species of shrimp to capture, at what volumes and 
using what methods would be made based on some sort of highly cooperative and 
collaborative actor or stakeholder dialogue where each was able to openly express 
their interests and these could be balanced against the interests of others so a ‘win-
win’ solution for everyone could be derived, including the long term survival of 
shrimp. However, one could critique many of the models presented in existing 
literature as falling short, due to their failure to acknowledge evidence which points 
to uncomfortable realities – that is, that self-preservation, survival and progressing 
one’s own interests matter more to actors than enacting a science-based interpretation 
of sustainability. Interviewees noted that discussions with other actors in the industry 
were respectful, but that the levels of compromise and cooperation that are often 
flaunted in the sustainability literature were not representative of what actually 
happens: ”It doesn’t always work, sometimes opinions are just too opposite.” 
(interview recording, 2017). 
 
Recent contributions to the SLO literature, such as Leith et al., (2014) and Prno and 
Slocombe (2012), have proposed that NGOs are taking a leading role in determining 
the SLO of a corporation, and that a hallmark of a successful determination is “rapid 
dissemination of information” (Murphy-Gregory, 2018, p. 326). As well as this 
dissemination of information being in the form of campaigns, it seems that it is also 
increasingly in the form of lists, guides and rankings – especially ones which can be 
updated in real time (such as seafood rating guides for smartphones). We must ask 
however, whether NGOs have in producing these artefacts perhaps overshot their 
own legitimacy, and have done a mediocre job at turning complex topics which 
require nuance and detail to discuss into black and white, all or nothing judgements 
(or in this case, red, yellow or green ratings). Perhaps ascertaining the social and 
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environmental sustainability of P. mondon simply cannot be done with three colours, 
and attempting to do so does injustice to the complexity of the issues. Or perhaps it 
is a well-intended effort to make complex information palatable in the eyes of the 
consumer, who only has limited time to spend on making decisions in the 
supermarket freezer aisle.  
 
In other academic disciplines, there are similar debates around the ambiguity of 
categorization, classification, taxonomy and cut-off points. Mood Disorders such as 
Bipolar Disorder have just three categories: either the patient does not have it, they 
have Type I, or Type II. Recent voices in that literature, such as Phelps (2016), believe 
that this rigid categorization does injustice to a disorder which should be dealt with 
in more case-specific and nuanced terms, and that a better way of framing it would 
be a spectrum (as happened with autism).  
 
There are of course consequences of categorization— consequences which some 
respondents interviewed in this study felt that NGOs did not appreciate or 
understand enough when making judgement calls. While from the perspective of the 
NGO making the call that a species of shrimp should move from ‘green’ to ‘red’ (as 
happened in Sweden in 2014, when the WWF deemed that P. borealis stocks were 
‘unsustainable’) was one which to them had no serious repercussions, to other actors 
in the industry it had immediate and potentially catastrophic implications for the 
entire legitimacy of their organizations. Under recent understandings of NGO-firm 
interactions (Taebi & Safari, 2017; Karpus, 2018), this red listing would be considered 
an example of shaming. We could say that this shaming in this case fulfilled the 
criteria described by Skeel (2001): that bringing about shame typically required low 
cost and low risk for the ‘shamer’, but in turn creates high costs and high risks for the 
shamee. In this case, the WWF, with the stroke of a pen or click of a button, put the 
new list online, and suddenly the legitimacy of more than a dozen small fishing 
companies operating in Sweden was under threat.  
 
One way of framing this is through the old adage that with great power comes great 
responsibility. Perhaps as NGOs continue to grow in prominence and ability to 
influence, they too must stop and consider that their sometimes harsh and categorical 
judgements will have real-world consequences. As the once-skewed dynamics 
between NGOs and corporations become slightly more equal (Karpus, 2018; Roheim 
et al. 2018), perhaps there needs to be better efforts made by both parties to be open 
to genuine dialogue and engagement, and seek comprise, win-win outcomes rather 
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than rash judgements. It is easy to simplify complex debates into simplistic 
categories. It is much harder to actually have the necessary debate – and for all parties 
to admit that perhaps the lines are much less clear than they might seem. Or perhaps 
such an expectation is overly idealistic and itself hypocritical by the very fact it sets 
stringent requirements of others while being overly righteous in its expectations.  
 
An actor may make what looks like on the surface an ‘emotional’ or ‘unscientific’ 
decision – but may in fact be fully aware of what the best-available science is and 
how to use it (and prepared to use it in the future), but at this moment in time has 
determined that the best course of action represents making a different interpretation 
of sustainability. In some cases, this could represent deep commitment to a longer-
term cause, and illustrate enduring short-term pain (that is, negative perceptions by 
other actors for being overly emotional or ideological) for longer-term gain 
(eventually achieving a commanding level of narrative in social and environmental 
debates).  
What is key here is acknowledgement that the goals of many actors work on very 
different time spans. An organization such as Greenpeace works on strategic plans 
which look 10 years ahead, and therefore may be willing to behave in a certain way 
in the short term if it will lead them towards their longer-term vision. Gupta (2009, 
p. 417) describes this as being about “wins and losses are smaller battles in a larger 
war, and that the interactions between movements, policy makers, and the public are 
protracted and iterative.” The empirical material showed that while there might 
indeed be a well-known and authoritative body of ‘best available science’ on a 
particular environmental topic, such information is often underutilized, cherry 
picked, or in some cases ignored completely, and the reasons for this are complex 
and varied, and usually not adequately described by saying that an actor ignored 
scientific information.  
 
Another facet of the need for nuance in ascertaining the motivations for an actor’s 
interpretation of a contested term (in this case, sustainability) and subsequent use of 
information is the fact that actors understand that in a negotiation they will likely 
have to concede some of their ground, and as such will put forward an interpretation 
of sustainability which is beyond their actual target – with the anticipation that it will 
be watered down. This point was obviously covered earlier in the chapter in regards 
to intentional overshoot of desired social norms, but this facet of it relates to use of 
information in engaging in debate around a term which has consequences for 
legitimacy. In layman’s terms, such an approach can be best described with an 
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adaptation of Norman Vincent Peale well-known adage “Shoot for the moon – even 
if you miss, you'll land among the stars”. Such an approach goes in line with existing 
literature such Rametsteiner et al.’s (2011) argument that terms such as 
‘sustainability’ often represents a halfway point between science and political 
contestation – contestation which can be won by the most dominant actor in an 
industry. Empirical material documents examples of actors openly wishing for their 
organization to have the definitive narrative on sustainability, but being realistic 
about the fact that it was often a process of negotiation concession. As one respondent 
pondered during an interview: ”So who gets to decide [what is sustainable]? Well, 
we would like to get to decide, but usually, it’s always a compromise” (interview 
recording, 2019). Aiming for the stars and hitting the moon seems to also be about 
the interplay between operational, tactical and strategic decisions and the respective 
time frames that each of these considers. Gupta (2009, p. 417) describes the 
relationship between actor behaviour in the present and their longer-term objectives, 
noting how “Choices, in turn, can make it harder or easier for the group to cultivate 
public support, access resources, and engage in future mobilization and contention.” 
 
This is due to the fact that interpretation of sustainability often ends up becoming a 
hybrid of scientific information shaped and skewered by political will. As one 
respondent put it, “… it’s definitely not science... it’s like science and politics” 
(interview recording, 2019). In the case of the Swedish shrimp industry, political will 
took the form of factors such as: gaining access to a market or protecting existing 
access; self-preservation and survival; reputation and creditability protection or 
advancement; protection or advancement of finances; appeasing an ideology or 
worldview; expanding membership base; self-promotion; and altering behaviour to 
meet changing societal norms so as to maintain legitimacy and relevance. These 
reasons tended to be in line with the legitimacy theory literature’s understanding of 
what motivates legitimacy-seeking behaviour (Deegan, 2019).  
 
Interviews with marine scientists and other experts holding PhDs in fisheries and 
seafood management confirmed that the ICES data is considered by experts in the 
field to be the best available science regarding fish/shrimp stocks, while UN 
guidelines represented best practice in terms of aquaculture. This further added to 
controversy, as many of the NGO guides and lists only used such data very loosely 
or in some cases not at all. A C-suite executive of a large seafood certification scheme 
who was interview in this study suggested that while the science may be settled in 
many cases, emotion around cute and likable marine creatures such dolphins could 
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often overpower science. This follows the trend established in the SLO literature of 
the fisheries and seafood industry having a ‘uniqueness’ about it, and such a 
proposition by the respondent is in line with the findings of Cullen-Knox et al., (2017) 
and Haward, Jabour and McDonald (2013)  
 
 
5.4.4 Summary 
Artefacts such as lists, guides and rankings play an important yet (at present) 
underappreciated role in the construction and deconstruction of legitimacy, and 
associated challenges to SLO. Legitimacy can be successfully contested by challenges 
to information, how it is conveyed, and who conveys it. Moreover, while artefacts 
can be stabilized as a norm, the artefact itself has agency when it is enacted in the 
case of guides and lists due to the fact that information is constantly changing. 
Furthermore, there seems to be an emerging trend in contexts with higher levels of 
legitimacy risk where corporations may ‘hedge’ their own internal strategy decisions 
(especially subject matter related to social and environmental issues) on the artefacts 
produced by secondary actors – or in some cases outsource the strategy decision 
completely.  
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6. Conclusion and contributions  
 
6.1 Conclusion 
Legitimacy is constructed by organizations showing deliberate and ongoing 
compliance to the norms of the contexts(s) in which they are operating, and 
integrating these norms into the value structures which underpin both their strategic 
orientation and operational decision-making capacities. This same legitimacy can be 
contested in a number of ways, such as by secondary actors (for example, NGOs) 
playing the role of norm entrepreneur and using a multiplicity of incentive and 
disincentive-oriented tactics against organizations in order to attempt to uproot 
existing social norms and solidify new ones in their place. Disincentive-oriented 
tactics which seek to question reputation such as shaming seem to be especially 
effective – particularly when run over social media. To corporations operating in a 
domain implicated with natural resources, these efforts to change social norms 
manifest as a challenge to their Social Licence to Operate (SLO), challenges which 
may be serious enough to pose a threat to their overall legitimacy – depending on 
their perception of the degree of influence of the norm entrepreneur launching the 
challenge, and the perception or quantifiable actuality of their claims being 
representative or broader societal norms. These contests often manifest around 
debates as to the meaning of ideologically, politically and scientifically-loaded terms 
– such as ‘sustainability’ or ‘responsibility’, which can and often do become 
synonymous for legitimacy. From the perspective of corporations (especially smaller 
ones), the efforts of norm entrepreneurs can represent unreasonable overreach of 
authority by a secondary actor who has over-shamed a law-abiding corporation that 
was making genuine attempts to keep up with new societal norms. Once a new norm 
has been successfully stabilized, secondary actors then seem to act as gatekeepers of 
assessing ongoing corporation compliance to these new norms, in some cases 
monitoring and enforcing by making it a norm in itself that corporation data on a 
particular topic (in this case, shrimp sustainability) be funnelled through the 
secondary-actor produced rankings, lists and guides. Secondary actors seem to 
leverage the corporation’s memory of past shaming and the latent threat of future 
shaming as a mechanism to keep ongoing compliance to these norms, and 
corporations may ‘hedge’ their own internal strategy closely on these artefacts in 
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order to appease the wishes of the secondary actor so as to ensure maintenance of 
SLO, and in turn overall legitimacy.  
  
6.2 Contributions  
This study has offered empirical evidence solidifying many of the existing claims 
within the legitimacy theory, sustainability and CSR, and fisheries and seafood 
literature. One of many such cases of solidification includes reinforcing how 
questions of legitimacy and social licence are increasingly becoming synonymous to 
questions around sustainability and responsibility. This appears especially the case 
for corporations operating in contexts where they are using on a natural resource 
(such as fish and shrimp), and builds on previous work such as Murphy-Gregory 
(2018) which recognise the explicit link between SLO and natural resources.  
 
Beyond solidifying existing claims however, there are four modest yet novel 
contributions which this study makes that may add to and extend our understanding 
of legitimacy.  
 
Lasting NGO success against corporations 
The first contribution of this study is a well-documented case of NGOs launching a 
successful legitimacy challenge and achieving new operating norms within 
corporations, a specific industry and the broader society of a country – norms which 
have remained in place for almost a decade. This is a rather rare and infrequent 
occurrence in a literature full of examples of NGOs lobbying corporations but often 
with moderate to minimal, slowly-progressing success, and success which is often 
reversed once the campaign ends (Deighan & Jenkins, 2015; van Huijstee & 
Glasbergen, 2010; Corell & Betsill, 2001; Waldron, Navis &  Fisher, 2013). The Swedish 
shrimp case presents a set of empirical material quite abnormal in a literature with 
numerous cases of “mixed or partial success” in NGOs achieving their goals (Sasser, 
Prakash, Cashore, & Auld, p. 28, 2006), or achieving “incremental outcomes” (Gupta, 
2009, p. 417). It contributes by showing a situation where a contest to legitimacy in 
the form of NGO pressure has led to permanent and lasting change across multiple 
levels of analysis. Such lasting change is unusual – especially when it is considered 
that it occurred not just at an individual corporation level but also across broader 
industry and societal norms. The contribution perhaps shows an empirical 
manifestation of ideas raised in papers such as Waldron, Navis and Fisher, (2013), 
Lenox & Eesley (2009) and Spar & La Mure (2003). 
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Voices in the social science literature such as Bernstein and Cashore (2007) have 
argued that “in the absence of effective national and intergovernmental regulation to 
ameliorate global environmental and social problems”, it will increasingly be left to 
private actors to change things. As such, it is vital that there is a clearer understanding 
of how corporations and NGOs alike both establish and contest legitimacy of one 
another.  
This study extends contributions by Lenox & Eesley (2009) by highlighting the extent 
to which contextual domain and proximity of the focal topic in relation to the 
corporations core activities matters in terms of the likelihood of a legitimacy contest 
succeeding. It furthers voices such as Bell & Hindmore (2014) and  Tracey et al.,(2013) 
in showing how significant the role of the public can be to amplify the influence of 
NGO campaigns against corporations.  
 
The Swedish shrimp case is perhaps one of the early documented examples of a 
recent claims of a new trend in the seafood industry of developed countries 
(especially in Northern Europe) of an increasing ability of NGOs to shape the 
operating norms of the industry and mount successful legitimacy challenges, 
challenges which have a lasting impact on corporation, industry and societal 
behaviour. Roheim et al. (2018, p. 395) describe this trend as being about a “shift in 
the roles that extra transactional actors, including both NGOs and governments, play 
in markets demanding credence attributes.” This study contributes by providing an 
impartial, detailed and longitudinal investigation into the circumstances which 
enabled this infrequent occurrence to take place. Both voices in the academic 
literature and practitioners may be able to extrapolate lessons from this case, such as: 
the degree of impact of well-run shame-based campaigns drawing on social media; 
the increasing synonymity between legitimacy and notions of being sustainable and 
responsible; and, the significance of stabilizing artefacts as markers of legitimacy and 
being in control of what information goes into these artefacts. This contribution 
builds on and furthers Black’s (2008, p. 157) argument that understanding 
“institutional embeddedness… [is] critical for understanding how legitimacy is 
constructed, both by those making legitimacy claims and by the regulator who is 
responding to them, often by making legitimacy claims of their own.”  
 
Corporations maintaining legitimacy by hedging against and ‘outsourcing’ to NGOs  
The second contribution of the Swedish shrimp case study is the capture and 
exploration of the unusual and relatively under-documented phenomenon of a 
peculiar response to a SLO and legitimacy challenge: corporations ‘hedging’ their 
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own internal strategy decisions (especially decisions related to social and 
environmental issues) on the artefacts produced by secondary actors – or in some 
cases outsource the strategy decision completely. While this phenomena has been 
described in several studies previously (see for instance Niu et al., 2019, and Mendoza 
& Clemen, 2013), it has been underexplored in the sense that it has been semi-ignored 
and taken for granted as being a logical and reasonable response to stakeholder 
pressure on the firm. This study contributes by suggesting that while such a response 
may indeed be rational, there is in fact considerable complexity, nuance and 
consequence in such a decision to ‘outsource’, and existing literature may have not 
fully grasped the significance of allowing a third-party actor to ‘infiltrate’ internal 
decision-making processes. It extends Lenox & Eesley’s (2009) ideas around the 
various criteria that corporations use when responding to NGO pressure, and shows 
that corporations will weigh up various factors in considering how to respond and 
choose an appropriate course of action. It provides an unusual example of a response 
to NGO pressure under Spar & La Mure’s suggestion of “when the costs of 
compliance are low or the benefits high, firms are more likely to concede [to the 
wishes of NGOs] (Spar & La Mure, 2003, p.95). Furthermore, it showcases that 
artefacts are playing an increasingly central role in both establishing and contesting 
legitimacy, and more attention should be paid to the specific phenomena of 
outsourcing said-artefacts to external actors. This study finds that while hedging can 
be a good way to negate external actor pressure and retain social licence, it also comes 
at a cost: a loss of agency and control over the firm’s own sustainability decision-
making. Future studies are needed to investigate the longer term effects of 
sustainability hedging and outsourcing.  
 
Shame-based campaigning against corporations 
Thirdly, this study shows that shaming against corporations can have varying 
degrees of impact, depending on factors such as the contextual dynamics of the 
situation (such as country and industry specific norms), the style of the relationship 
(for example, business-to-business or business-to-consumer) and perhaps most 
importantly that shaming can have effects in multiple time dimensions (both 
immediate impacts, and longer-term impacts). This study showcases a 
comprehensive example of a shame-based campaign in practice; one that was able to 
in an efficient and effective manner uproot an existing social norm and replace it with 
a new one, and translate this through to lasting changes to the SLO required for firms 
to be considered legitimate.  
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Shame-based social media campaigns have been studied considerably in recent years 
(including the use of shame by NGOs against corporations, such as Karpus, 2018; 
Bloomfield, 2014). This study however broadened the frame of reference in order to 
capture three things which were previously missing. Firstly, the implications of 
shame-based campaigns on all actors within a value stream. Secondly, the interplay 
between shame and broader societal values. Thirdly, the impacts of shame across 
space-time dimensions. 
 
Recent voices in the space have noted how “Future empirical research needs to 
explore the effectiveness of shaming strategies in different business relationships” 
(Taebi & Safari, p. 1303). This is significant because we know that actors do not 
operate in a vacuum away from broader societal trends and other actors. Existing 
literature has dealt considerably with the micro-level of analysis of shame used 
against specific people and specific organizations, but has failed to account for the 
way that shame-based campaigns can both affect and be affected by other actors, and 
society-at-large. This matters in terms of understanding how contests to legitimacy 
happen. Because, as Ayling (2017, p. 366) puts it, legitimacy contests are “complex 
contests over an intangible resource and are conducted at multiple levels before 
multiple audiences.”  
 
Moreover, this study contributes by clearly showing the impacts of shame in both the 
immediate term and the longer term. It showed a shame-based campaign in practice 
and its longer-term consequences for all actors within a value chain and their 
hierarchal arrangement within an industry, and illustrating how shaming can lead to 
changes not just to a corporation, but to the norms of an industry and even infiltrate 
into a broader societal norm (in this case, that eating tropical shrimp is bad). 
This study documents the interplay between the general public and the actors in the 
industry, and shows the “multiple dimensions” perspective of legitimacy challenges 
suggested by Ayling (2017, p. 366).  
 
This study suggests that where possible, longitudinal analysis rather than face-value, 
surface impact should be used as the prominent frame of reference for future studies 
considering the impact of shaming in order to fully capture and understand its effects 
for legitimacy contests. These studies are needed in order to improve our 
understanding of the longer-term consequences of shame-based campaigns against 
organizations— especially in terms of how the latent threat of it happening again 
might come part of organizational memory and identity. And especially as social 
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media activism continues to be one of the primary means through which activism 
against corporation’s manifests.  
 
To NGOs and other actors keen to change social norms, this contribution shows that 
this can be done through a variety of tactics – especially challenges to legitimacy 
which utilize shaming and make out as though a corporation has drifted far from 
acceptable social norms. Caution must be applied however. Not all ‘progress’ is 
necessarily good or legitimate, and norm entrepreneurs must carefully think through 
the broader consequences of their actions if they wish to uproot an existing norm and 
replace it with a new one. Likewise, shaming must be used cautiously and 
responsibility, as it has real consequences which extend far beyond pressing a ‘like’ 
button with a mouse. 
 
For producers and suppliers and distributors in the seafood industry, this 
contribution showcases the need to strive to find realistic and workable midway 
points between optimal environmental outcomes and the (sometimes harsh) realities 
of business which are reasonable and palatable to key actors, and be willing to 
concede ground and make compromises in order to avoid large-scale shame-based 
campaigns. To smaller fishing and seafood businesses, this contribution indicates 
that while it is good to keep up with changing societal norms, it is also reasonable to 
push back if the demands made against them are unreasonable. 
 
The role of artefacts in the establishment and contestation of legitimacy 
The fourth and final contribution of this study is the important and presently perhaps 
underappreciated role played by artefacts such as lists, guides, and rankings in the 
establishment of legitimacy and subsequent challenges to this legitimacy. This study 
clearly showed that legitimacy can be successfully contested by challenges to 
information, how it is conveyed, who conveys said information and the mediums 
through which it manifests. As described in contribution two, there seems to be an 
emerging trend in contexts with higher levels of legitimacy risk where corporations 
may ‘hedge’ their own internal strategy decisions (especially subject matter related 
to social and environmental issues) on the artefacts produced by secondary actors – 
or in some cases outsource the strategy decision completely. Previous literature in 
the legitimacy theory space has clearly documented how organizations will 
voluntary disclose social and environmental information as a mechanism to enhance 
reputation, gain or maintain SLO (Pattern, 2019; Guthrie & Parker, 1989). This 
literature has also acknowledged that artefacts such as rankings and lists (both those 
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produced by the organization itself and those produced by third-parties which 
provide a judgement call on the performance of the organization) are correlated with 
the attainment of legitimacy (Deegan, 2019). It has also been ascertained that artefacts 
can play an important role in establishing legitimacy (Bartlett, Pallas and Frostenson, 
2013, p. 530) However, it is unclear in existing literature the extent to which artefacts 
can be involved in the contesting of legitimacy. As it is also unclear as to the  interplay 
between the longevity of the impacts of NGO efforts to change corporation behaviour 
and the role of artefacts.   
This study contributes by suggesting that artefacts have a pivotal role in both 
contesting legitimacy and stabilizing new SLOs and broader social norms. Artefacts 
may serve as an important mechanism for NGOs to achieve changes to corporation 
behaviour, changes which persist over time. It fills the call by Bartlett, Pallas and 
Frostenson (2013, p. 530) for further research into how legitimacy manifests around 
artefacts which provide reputational signalling, especially “across multiple levels of 
analysis”, as this study does with its actor value-chain approach. Moreover, it 
furthers Black’s (2008 p. 157) claim around “embeddedness“ by showing how, just 
like behaviours and norms, tangible artefacts play a vital role in both contesting and 
stabilizing legitimacy. Furthermore, it perhaps provides empirical evidence of 
Sauder and Espeland’s (2009, p. 63) idea of organizations providing “symbolic 
responses to environmental pressures without disrupting core technical activities”. 
Finally, it adds substance to the ideas hinted at by recent voices (such as Niu et al., 
2019, and Mendoza & Clemen, 2013) that corporations are increasingly recognising 
the importance of lists and guides produced by external actors.  
 
This contribution also responds to recent calls in the literature for more practical 
examples regarding “how managers” should work with SLO and subsequent 
challenges to legitimacy in a strategic and practical sense rather than the mostly-
theoretical and abstract descriptions offered in existing literature (Deegan, 2019, p. 
2311). Future studies are needed in order to further investigate and more clearly 
articulate the role of artefacts in contesting legitimacy – especially in countries 
outside of Northern Europe which perhaps have less of an appetite for sustainability.  
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6.3 Concluding remarks: cautious optimism for the waters ahead 
The latter stages of the twentieth century and first two decades of the twenty first 
saw a major global trend towards significantly greater expectations of organizations 
to incorporate sustainability and responsible business practices into their actions and 
identity – expectations which are now demanded by shareholders and consumers as 
well as traditional activist stakeholders such as environmental NGOs. What started 
as a seemingly small side piece has now become a mandated SLO. It is therefore very 
likely that going forward greater interest (both from researchers and practitioners) 
will be placed on understanding how and why challenges to organizational 
legitimacy, reputation and status come to be, the reasonableness of such challenges, 
and the various options that organizations have to respond.  
Wicked problems such as overfishing and unsustainable fishing are extremely 
complex and intricate, involve multiple actors with multiple (and often conflicting 
interests) and overlap with other social, economic and environmental issues. 
However, the very complexity of unstainable fishing also lends itself to multiple 
points of intervention, including regulation, market-based incentives and voluntary 
schemes. Working with law-abiding corporations which are genuinely willing to 
improve and change their ways seems to be a more positive and beneficial goal to 
strive towards than eliminating them entirely. Globally, 33% of wild-caught marine 
fish and invertebrate (including shrimp) stocks are being harvested at biologically 
unsustainable levels. Sixty per cent are considered to be ‘fully exploited’, meaning 
that there is no room to increase catch-rates. Just 7% of fisheries are considered to be 
‘underexploited’ (United Nations FAO, 2018). Aquaculture is no silver bullet and is 
fraught with its own set of challenges. It is clear that change must happen – and 
quickly. But change is not akin to eliminating actors from the industry altogether. 
Fishing and seafood farming practices – done legally and based on industry best 
practice and voluntary adoption of high-quality certification schemes such as ASC 
and MSC – have a very legitimate and necessary place in the opinion of this author. 
Daily, fish provides more than 3 billion people with 20% of their intake of protein. 
More than 65 million people are directly employed in the primary capture and 
farming of fish. (UN FAO, 2018). Furthermore, as debates around problems such as 
unstainable fishing continue to become increasingly prominent (and increasingly 
measurable, through largescale mechanisms such as the UN SDGs), discussions will 
increasingly be raised around the extent to which information and or/ideology is 
used in attempts to meet these challenges – including the role of artefacts such as 
rankings, guides and lists and what role they play in making a judgement and 
disseminating information. It is the view of this author that we must always strive to 
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follow the best available scientific evidence when making decisions about 
environmental matters, whilst also showing a level of understanding and 
appreciation for actors who are not yet perfect but are making real efforts to reinvent 
themselves towards an orientation which is realistic about the finite resources of the 
world’s ecosystems and the carrying capacity and boundaries of our planet.  
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7. Appendix 
7.1 The shrimp 
 
7.1.1 Pandalus borealis 
Figure 5: Pandalus borealis 
 
Source: United Nations Food and Agriculture Species Factsheet, 2017, used with permission. 
Pandalus borealis is a species of cold-water marine shrimp in the Carideans family. It 
was first described by Danish zoologist Henrik Nikolai Krøyer in 1838, and in 1861 it 
was categorized by Krøyer under the taxonomy Dymas typus. In 1946, it was 
reclassified as Pandalus borealis. It is sold under a variety of different names, including 
Pink Shrimp, Deepwater Prawn and Northern Shrimp (UN FAO Species Fact Sheets, 
2017). In Swedish, it is known as Nordhavs Räka. Pandalus borealis has a wide 
geographical range, with a presence in most parts of the North Pacific and North 
Atlantic Oceans. As part of the ‘coldwater shrimp’ grouping (with the other being 
‘tropical’) Pandalus borealis is found in water temperatures from 0°C to 8°C. Swedish 
fishing boats capture Pandalus borealis in the seas off the West Coast of Sweden, as 
close to the shore as just outside of the Gothenburg Archipelago, the Northern 
Kattegat, and in the Skagerrak, a straight of water between Sweden and Norway 
which accounts for amongst the most significant Pandalus borealis stocks. According 
to the UN FAO Fact Sheet on shrimp, “Commercially, [Pandalus borealis] it is one of 
the most important carideans”. In 2015, an all-time high of 110,000 tonnes of Pandalus 
borealis was consumed in Sweden (Brosius, 2014). Born as male, it takes two to three 
years before its sex changes to female, meaning that in order to reproduce it must live 
for what is considered to be a long time in shrimp terms, and as a result stock levels 
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can be easily and quickly diminished if too many young shrimp are caught before 
they have been able to reproduce (Bergström, 2000). Male Pandalus borealis grow to a 
minimum length of 120 mm, while females reach 165 mm. This places it amongst the 
smaller shrimp species, with tropical shrimp such as Pandalus monodon capable of 
reaching 330 mm. (UN FAO Species Fact Sheets, 2017). 
Pandalus borealis is the most consumed species of shrimp in Sweden, and the most 
readily available at retail outlets and restaurants. A wide range of different Pandalus 
borealis products are available, produced by different companies, at different price 
points and sizes, featuring different labels and in various states of processing (such 
as peeled, unpeeled or semi-peeled leaving only the tail on). In coastal cities in 
Sweden, especially on the West Coast near the fisheries, it is common to find fresh 
Pandalus borealis which have been caught the same day, in the supermarket seafood 
aisle.  
7.1.2 Melicertus latisulcatus 
 
Figure 6: Melicertus latisulcatus 
 
Source: United Nations Food and Agriculture Species Factsheet, 2017, used with permission. 
Melicertus latisulcatus is a species of marine tropical prawn in the Malacostraca class, 
native to large parts of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. It was first identified by 
Japanese marine biologist Kamakichi Kishinouye in 1896. Living along warmer 
coastal waters at temperatures between 20°C and 25°C, it has a wide geographical 
distribution, with the extremities of its range being as far north as Japan and as far 
south as the Great Australian Bite, from west to east ranging from Tanzania to Fiji. It 
is sold under market names including the Western King Prawn, Spencer Gulf King 
Prawn and King Prawn. In Swedish, it is known as the Kungsräka; often preceding 
the name being specific reference to the fact that it is from Australia. It is a medium-
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to-large sized species, living at depths ranging from near to the water’s surface to 80 
metres beneath the sea.  
In Sweden, the only Melicertus latisulcatus available are sourced from a fishery in the 
Spencer Gulf, in Southern Australia. The prawn trawling companies of the region 
have formed a cooperative of 39 shrimp trawling license holders, known as the 
Spencer Gulf and West Coast Prawn Fishermen’s Association (SGWCP), which 
successfully gained MSC certification for the Melicertus latisulcatus stocks in the 
waters of South and Western Australia. Based on interviews with management from 
the Association and consultation of publicly available documents including MSC 
certification, Melicertus latisulcatus are captured in the fishery using what is known as 
the demersal otter trawl technique, using the Double Rig method. Interestingly, the 
trawl duration of is just 3−5 hours, with the Association noting “the short duration 
increases the chance of survival for all by-catch (non-target species)” (Harvesting 
Methods, Spencer Gulf and West Coast Prawn Fishermen’s Association, 2017). 
7.1.3 Litopenaeus vannamei 
 
Figure 7: Litopenaeus vannamei 
 
Source: United Nations Food and Agriculture Species Factsheet, 2017, used with permission. 
Litopenaeus vannamei is a species of tropical marine shrimp in the Penaeidae family, 
native to the East Pacific Ocean, living in coastal areas between Mexico in North 
America and Peru in South America. It was first identified by Boone in 1931 as 
Penaeus vannamei, but was later reclassified. It lives in waters with temperatures 
above 20°C, and reaches sexual maturity after just 6 months, which is a relatively 
short duration compared to other shrimp varieties. Litopenaeus vannamei has a range 
of market names, including White Shrimp, White Prawn, White Pacific Shrimp or 
King Prawn. In Swedish it is known as the Vannameiräka. Originally a shrimp species 
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that was almost exclusively wild caught, Litopenaeus vannamei was first farmed in 
1973 in the United States. By the late 1990s a larger quantity of farm-raised Litopenaeus 
vannamei were being produced than those caught in the wild. As of 2017, 55% of all 
shrimp consumed globally are farmed, with 80% of farmed shrimp being either 
Litopenaeus vannamei or Penaeus monodon. Together, they are the two most 
commercially important varieties of farmed shrimp. (UN FAO, 2016).  
As of September 2018, Litopenaeus vannamei is only available in one of the big four 
Swedish supermarket chains: Axfood subsidiary Hemköp. It can also be found in 
several other foreign-owned supermarkets such as German chain Lidl. It is quite 
possible that by the end of 2018 Hemköp will cease selling Litopenaeus vannamei, so 
as to better align with Axfood’s Fish Policy. The only Litopenaeus vannamei product 
available is produced by a Gothenburg-based seafood company which farms shrimp 
in Vietnam. This product features both ASC and Keyhole certification. 
7.1.4 Penaeus monodon 
Figure 8: Penaeus monodon 
 
Source: United Nations Food and Agriculture Species Factsheet, 2017, used with permission. 
Penaeus monodon is a large species of marine tropical shrimp in the Penaeidae family. 
First identified by Fabricius in 1789, it was classified as Penaeus monodon in 1959. It is 
native to coastal areas in the Indian Ocean, and Western Pacific Ocean. It is sold under 
a variety of names, including Tiger Prawn, Giant Tiger Prawn, Giant Tiger Shrimp, 
Jumbo Shrimp, and Asian Tiger Shrimp. In Swedish it is known as the Tigerräka. The 
tiger reference in its name is due to both its coloration, and the distinct banded lines 
on its body. It is found at depths ranging from the ocean’s surface down to 110 m, 
and can survive in a wide range of water temperatures ranging from 18°C to 34.5°C. 
It is the largest of the tropical shrimp species, reaching up to 330 mm in length. While 
Penaeus monodon is caught in the wild (using bottom trawling), the vast majority of 
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production comes from farms, most of which are in China, Thailand and Vietnam. In 
terms of farming methods, Penaeus monodon shares many similarities with Litopenaeus 
vannamei, with essentially the same process in place. The only major difference is that 
Penaeus monodon grows slightly slower than Litopenaeus vannamei, adding an 
additional two months to the process, totalling in even months from larval form to 
market size.  
Penaeus monodon is no longer available at any of the big four Swedish supermarket 
chains, and is increasingly rare at smaller retail outlets. In fact, no Penaeus monodon 
products could be found upon visits to multiple smaller retailers in both Gothenburg 
and Stockholm throughout 2017−2018. Once a commonly available species, it was one 
of the two target species in the Naturskyddsforeningen Anti-Scampi campaign, which 
commenced in 2011. It is still produced by several Swedish seafood companies 
including a Gothenburg-based seafood importer, which was interviewed in this 
study. Their Penaeus monodon product can be ordered online by wholesalers, hotels 
and restaurants, and consumers directly. It features both ASC and Keyhole 
certification.  
7.2 Eco-labels, certification schemes, lists and guides 
7.2.1 Marine Stewardship Council Certification 
The Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) is an international not-for-profit NGO, 
which founded and manages the world’s largest ‘eco-label’ certification scheme for 
wild caught fish. Founded in 1997, the MSC’s stated mission is “… to use our eco-
label and fishery certification program to contribute to the health of the world’s 
oceans by recognizing and rewarding sustainable fishing practices, influencing the 
choices people make when buying seafood and working with our partners to 
transform the seafood market to a sustainable basis.” (MSC Annual Report, 2016). 
This mission is operationalized primarily through the MSC ‘blue tick’ logo, which 
appears on seafood products that have been caught from fisheries which have been 
assessed by the MSC as being ‘sustainable’. It is considered to be the “dominant” 
certification scheme around the world for wild-caught fish (Ponte, 2012, p. 304). 
Fishing companies, cooperatives, NGOs and even individuals may apply to have a 
fishery certified. The MSC itself does not carry out the actual certification − rather, 
this is done by an independent third party, such as an auditing organization, with 
the idea behind this being to ensure best practice in governance and minimize 
perceived or actual conflicts of interest. The main responsibility of the MSC is the 
development of certification criteria, consultation with stakeholders and broader 
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activities oriented towards the sustainability of the planets oceans. The MSC is 
funded primarily by donations and license fees from certifications. Contrary to 
popular belief, the MSC does not certify specific species, products, or a particular 
fishing company in isolation. Rather, it certifies an entire fishery – that is, a species of 
fish or shrimp living in a particular region of ocean caught using a specific method 
of capture. What this means is that any seafood product derived from fish or shrimp 
taken from an MSC certified fishery can be sold using the MSC logo.  
This certification of a fishery rather than a particular species creates a situation 
whereby shrimp can be MSC certified if taken from one region of an ocean, but not 
certified if taken from another region. Or further still, shrimp may be caught from a 
region which the MSC deems to have sustainable stock levels, but if specific fishing 
methods are not followed then the fishery will not be certified. Such examples are 
evident when looking at the WWF Sweden’s 2017 Consumer Fish Guide, where 
Pandalus borealis is simultaneously listed as green light (MSC certified), orange light, 
and red light, depending on what region it is caught in and the method used.  
MSC certification is based around two main ‘Standards’. The first of these is the Chain 
of Custody Standard, which, according to the MSC is “… designed to ensure that 
every distributor, processor and retailer trading in MSC certified sustainable seafood 
has effective traceability systems in place. It is there to reassure consumers that MSC 
products are what they say they are – sourced legally from a certified sustainable 
source, and not mixed or replaced at any point with uncertified seafood.” (MSC, 
2017). The second is known as the Fisheries Standard, which focuses on ensuring that 
certification criteria “… reflects the most up-to-date understanding of internationally 
accepted fisheries science and best practice management.” (MSC, 2017). The 
certification process is complex and features 28 specific criteria, which centre around 
three main themes: that a stock is sustainable and will continue to survive 
indefinitely; that fishing operations are carried out in such a way that they minimize 
harm to surrounding ecosystems; that relevant laws are abided to and the fishery 
have a management strategy which is able to respond to changing environmental 
needs. In order to gain certification, the applicant party must have an overall average 
score of 80 out of 100, and if even one of the 28 criteria is scored below 60 then the 
fishery automatically fails and will not gain certification.  
The MSC has a strong connection to Sweden. Swedish consumers are, when 
compared to consumers in other countries, amongst the most aware of and receptive 
to the label, and in general very supportive of the idea of paying a price premium for 
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sustainable seafood (Blomquist, Bartolino & Wald, 2015). The MSC has in the past 
been supported by the Swedish Government, including financial support given to 
the MSC by Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) during the MSC’s 
infancy in the late 1990s. The MSC is now the most common ‘eco-label’ appearing on 
seafood products in Sweden, with the vast majority of wild caught frozen shrimp 
products appearing in the big four supermarket chains of ICA, Willys, Hemköp and 
Coop being MSC-certified. The label is strongly supported by all four supermarket 
chains, which view the MSC as being an accurate indicator of social and 
environmental sustainability. 
7.2.2 Aquaculture Stewardship Council Certification 
The Aquaculture Stewardship Council is a not-for-profit NGO which manages the 
world’s largest certification scheme for farmed seafood, or aquaculture as it is known. 
The ASC was founded in 2010 in a collaboration between the WWF and the 
Netherlands-based Sustainable Trade Initiative. The ASC shares many similarities 
with the MSC, and although run separately to one another, have numerous 
crossovers in the work that they carry out. The ASC certifies specific species of fish 
and shrimp as coming from a farming operation, and once certified, seafood 
produced from these farms can carry the ASC logo. Like the MSC, the ASC utilizes 
third-party audit services during the actual certification. The current standards that 
the ASC uses came about as a result of the Aquaculture Dialogues, a negotiation 
process that took place over several years and involved more than 2,000 stakeholders 
with interests in the aquaculture industry. The ASC’s standards cover eight types of 
seafood, including shrimp. The shrimp guidelines focus on five criteria: biodiversity, 
feed, pollution, disease and social.  
As of November 2018, ASC-certified shrimp can only be found in one of the big four 
Swedish supermarket chains: Afxood subsidiary Hemköp. This product consists of 
frozen peeled Litopenaeus vannamei from ASC-certified farms in Vietnam. However, 
these are increasingly hard to find in any of the big four supermarket chains, due to 
the extensive pressure placed on the supermarkets by Naturskyddsforeningen during 
the Anti-Scampi campaign. They still exist sporadically in a few smaller 
independently owned ICA franchised stores.  
7.2.3 KRAV  
KRAV is a Swedish incorporated association that develops standards for food 
products and campaigns for responsible and healthy consumption through 
 
 
205 
promotion of the KRAV eco-label. Established in 1985, KRAV’s stated vision is that 
“… all production of food is economically, organically and socially sustainable and 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs.” (KRAV, 2017). This vision is operationalized 
primarily through the use of the KRAV label, which appears on more than 8,300 food 
products in Sweden (KRAV operates exclusively in Sweden). The KRAV label has an 
awareness rate of 98% amongst the Swedish adult population. Presence of the KRAV 
label certifies that food is organic, and has been produced in an ethically responsible 
manner. KRAV’s standards have been adapted to meet the guidelines stipulated by 
the International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM), as well as 
the EU regulations on organic food, which are laid out in EC No 834/2007. The Fish 
Policy Group determines what species of fish or shrimp may be caught and at what 
quantities; the locations where the fishing may take place; the size of the fish or 
shrimp that can be taken and those that must be returned to the ocean; the equipment 
allowed to catch them with; and acceptable ratios of bycatch (that is, non-target 
species caught during prawn trawling). KRAV features two unique criteria that are 
not covered by the MSC and ASC. The first of these is measurement of CO2  emissions, 
and reductions where possible. In relation to seafood, this criterion implements 
mandates on fishing vessel fuel usage. Animal welfare is the second unique feature 
of the KRAV label which is not present in other similar schemes. The Fish Policy 
Group makes the final decision regarding whether a fishing company’s proposed 
operations can be KRAV-certified, and passes this judgement on to KRAV. A fisheries 
stock assessment costs 30,000 SEK, regardless as to whether certification is granted 
or declined (KRAV License Price List, 2017, p. 1). Organizations whose applications 
are declined may reapply again in the future.  
7.2.4 Naturskyddsforeningen Bra Miljöval 
Bra Miljöval (English: Good Environmental Choice) is a labelling scheme run by 
Swedish NGO Naturskyddsforeningen. It certifies products, services, as well as specific 
supermarket and grocery stores, with the label being featured on cosmetic products, 
portable grills and even insurance. Bra Miljöval is not a certification scheme or 
standard; rather, the appearance of the label reflects the judgement of 
Naturskyddsforeningen that the product or service in question is “… least harmful to 
the environment”, (Det här är Naturskyddsforeningen Bra Miljöval, 2017). According to 
Naturskyddsforeningen, “… the yearly requirements (for awarding the label) have 
different themes and are different from year to year.” The annual Livsmedelsbutik 
Report (English: Grocery Store Report) conducted by Naturskyddsforeningen gives a 
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comprehensive analysis of the products sold at retail outlets in Sweden. At present 
the Bra Miljöval logo is not used on food products. However, it is awarded overall to 
food retail stores. One of the current criteria for awarding the label to a supermarket 
or grocery store is “The shop has chosen not to sell products such as king prawns that 
are harmful from an environmental standpoint.” (Det här är Naturskyddsforeningen Bra 
Miljöval, 2017).  
7.2.5 WWF Sweden Consumer Fish Guide 
The WWF publishes annual guides designed to inform seafood consumers about the 
environmental and social issues associated with different types of seafood, and 
encourages them to make environmentally responsible purchasing decisions. The 
guides cover the most commonly eaten wild-caught and farmed fish and shrimp 
species, and use a traffic light rating system of Red (“Don’t Buy”), Orange (“Think 
Twice”) and Green (“Best Choice”) to pass on recommendations to consumers. Some 
species feature multiple ratings, depending on the location that the species is caught 
or farmed, and the methods used. The guide provides comprehensive descriptions of 
the environmental issues associated each species, focusing around three questions: 1. 
What is it? 2. How was it caught or farmed? 3. Where is it from? As of 2017, there are 
27 country-specific lists, with most of the countries being in Western Europe. While 
these lists are developed for different countries, broadly speaking the lists are similar, 
with differences between countries due to the availability of some fish and shrimp 
species, languages spoken, as well as changing consumer preferences between 
different countries. In explaining this, the WWF (WWF Sustainable Seafood Guide - 
Methodology, 2017, p. 1) notes:  
WWF offices in each country develop fish guides suitable for their office location. The 
selection of species and origins is based on the market relevance of these for each 
individual country… However, all guides use recommendations from a shared pool of 
WWF assessments and therefore provide consumers with the same recommendations 
for the same seafood species. The Swedish chapter of the WWF (The WWF Sweden), 
works closely with the WWF International to develop and regularly update the list, but 
also has a degree of autonomy given their expertise of Sweden-specific issues.  
The methodology used by the WWF for arriving at the assessment for each species 
centres around two documents: The Common Wild Capture Fishery Methodology, which 
is used to assess wild caught species, and The Common Aquaculture Methodology 
Questionnaire, which is used to assess farmed species. According to the WWF (2017), 
“These methodologies are risk based and are regularly updated so that they remain 
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relevant and scientifically robust” (WWF Sustainable Seafood Guides Methodology, 2017, 
p. 1). In terms of the actual source of the data which is inputted into the methodology 
document to derive at an answer, the WWF’s website states that it as well as utilizing 
the expertise of its own marine scientists and those from the above-mentioned 
foundations and institutes, it “… makes use of publicly available scientific data and 
documents to assess the environmental sustainability of seafood.”  
7.2.6 Greenpeace Red List Fish 
Greenpeace International publishes a seafood guide called Red List Fish, which 
proposes a list of fish and shrimp that seafood consumers should avoid due to the 
social and environmental harms associated with their capture or farming. It is not 
country-specific, and the recommendations are for consumers globally, not just for 
Sweden. As of 2017, the list features 21 types of fish, and the entire category of tropical 
shrimp. A unique feature of the Greenpeace list is that it features a social dimension. 
For example, under ‘tropical shrimp’, it is noted that “The placement of shrimp farms 
often blocks access to coastal areas that were once common land in use by many local 
people.” (Greenpeace International Seafood Red List, 2017, p. 1). In terms of the 
methodology used to compile the list, the guide states that the Red List is 
“scientifically compiled” and that those species appearing on it are there because of 
“major concerns for fisheries, including low stock numbers, destabilization of the 
ecosystem-wide food chain, and irresponsible fishing or farming practices that 
contribute to the destruction of our oceans. (Greenpeace International Seafood Red List, 
2017, p. 1). In a similar manner to the WWF, Greenpeace uses two methodological 
documents to make assessments: one for wild caught seafood, and one for farmed 
seafood. The assessments are made by Greenpeace themselves. The procedure is 
based on “…  answering a relatively simple set of ‘worst practice’ questions in various 
aspects of fishing for which an answer of ‘yes’ immediately grades a fishery as red.” 
(Greenpeace ‘Red-Grade’ Criteria for Unsustainable Fisheries, 2016, p. 1) 
7.2.7 ICES Data Centre  
The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) Data Centre is widely 
used by stakeholders in the fishing industry to make decisions. Data is freely 
available online, and any interested persons can search through a database of over 
300 million different measurements regarding marine ecosystems, fishing methods, 
species, and more. Search tools developed by ICES allow for users to produce data 
sets comparing and contrasting different metrics – for example – the impact of a 
particular shrimp trawling method on a species of dolphin. The Data Centre also 
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features stock assessment graphing tools, oceanographic calculator and modelling 
tools, terminology dictionaries, and tools for coding and organizing data. NGOs such 
as Greenpeace are known to draw heavily on ICES data when compiling their Red 
List Fish guides, in particular, the Stock Assessment Graphs, which are widely 
considered to represent the most accurate data on stock levels of particular fish or 
shrimp stocks, and are often used to form the basis of regional fisheries policies, such 
as the European Union’s Common Fisheries Policy (Daw & Gray, 2005, p. 190). 
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